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This report documents research conducted on small-scale informal self-employment at the margins of the 
South African economy. Despite high levels of poverty and unemployment South Africa has, by 
developing country standards, comparatively low levels of informal economic activity. Economic 
informality is therefore not only an issue of theoretical interest, but also one of significant public policy 
salience. The research combined qualitative and quantitative inquiry to understanding the contribution of 
informal self-employment to the livelihoods of impoverished households, along with factors that enable 
and constrain informal it. These empirical questions were examined in relation to current state policies 
and programmes targeted at the informal sector. The report concludes with policy recommendations 
intended to enhance the ability of policy makers to support the livelihoods of impoverished South 
Africans. 
Research methods 
Informal self-employment was examined at three research sites (in Limpopo, Eastern Cape and Western 
Cape Provinces) drawing on a research approach which combined qualitative and quantitative inquiry. 
The research commenced with analysing the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS) dataset to identify 
correlations, and questions for qualitative investigation. Detailed in-depth qualitative inquiry focused both 
on enterprises and the households to which they were linked, in order to understand how informal self-
employment contributes to these households’ livelihoods. The focus of the qualitative inquiry was on how 
households engage with, and benefit from these activities, along with the relationship between the 
household economy and that of the larger enterprise. Factors that influence informal self-employment 
such as the larger structural context and economy, local social networks and practices of livelihood 
making and patterns of skills acquisition and human capital development, were all examined in detail. 
The influences of the broader policy and regulatory environment, including state-led efforts to support the 
informal sector and SMMEs (small, medium and micro-enterprises) was also considered. 
The quantitative inquiry built on preliminary statistical analysis of the NIDS dataset, which was followed 
with administration of selected NIDS survey modules to the qualitative case study households, thereby 
enabling the qualitative case studies to be ‘located’ in relation to the distributions that could be found in 
the larger quantitative dataset. The combined qualitative and quantitative analysis enabled the 
characteristics of the informally self-employed to be explicated, along with the variety of factors that 
served to influence the prospects and returns of the informally self-employed. In doing so the research 
seeks to understand the reasons for South Africa’s comparatively small informal sector, and considers 
how policy responses to it can be improved. The research seeks firstly to understand the nature of 
informal self-employment, and the policy context, before considering how policy responses can be 
improved. 






The research findings are considered in what follows under three headings: The characteristics of the 
informally self-employed; the factors that influence informal self-employment, and Policy responses to 
economic informality. 
The Characteristics of the informally self-employed 
  The research shows how involvement in informal self-employment is strongly differentiated by a 
number of key factors including locality, age and gender. Informal self-employment is most 
prevalent in urban informal areas.  Whereas employment in the formal sector tapers off sharply 
among the middle aged (mid 40’s), the numbers of those involved in informal self employment 
remains much steadier with age. Finally, women predominate in the informal sector, in 
contradistinction to the male dominated nature of formal sector employment. 
  Analysis reveals that the time devoted to the informal self-employment activities has a strongly 
bimodal quality; it is split between those who work full time, and those that work under 16 hours 
per week. With regards to occupations, ‘elementary’ and relatively poorly paid activities, such as 
retail, predominate. Capital and skills are salient barriers both to entry and potentially more 
lucrative activities.  
  Informally self-employed people are motivated by a diversity of objectives, which extend well 
beyond the objective of simply maximising profit traditionally imputed to them by conventional 
economic models. The research shows that these motivations can include maximizing income 
streams, ensuring food security, mitigating risk, and repositioning themselves within their social 
networks (‘accumulating social capital). 
  Informally self-employed people characteristically engage in multiple livelihood activities which 
are bound up in complex and often synergistic ways within the household economy. The 
boundaries between the domestic and enterprise economies are frequently permeable (e.g. the use 
of unpaid kin labour, residential spaces for work, and high levels of ‘off-take’). In this way 
informal economic activities are an extension of a household’s abilities to leverage and maximise 
return to their existing assets and labour capacity. Accordingly, higher household incomes from 
informal economic activity are positively correlated both with formal employment on the part of a 
household member and by the existence of a marital relationship within the household. 
Furthermore, informal economic activity interacts in complex ways with household size and may 
support, or possibly even attract, additional household members. 
  Finally the research highlights the central place of social networks or ‘social capital’.   Economic 
activity is invariably shaped by local mores and imperatives. An example is the existence of 
strong normative codes of community solidarity that serve to discourse price competition among 
traders. In addition informal economic activity typically relies on the extensive deployment of 
social networks and ‘social capital’, even if these can also impose costs in the form of claims and 





entitlements by others. A key dynamic for many of the informally self-employed is their desire to 
contain or evade redistributive claims, (from kin, customers, crime, etc.), even while they seek to 
maximise their own gains from these networks. 
Factors that influence informal self-employment 
  The research documents the extent to which informal self-employment is fundamentally shaped 
by the structure of the larger economy. The informal sector is bound to the formal sector through 
extensive backward linkages involving, for instance, production, capital and skills. Many of the 
informally self-employed relied on resources conferred by formal sector employment, and many 
of the smallest survivalist microenterprises used the resources of state social grants as (seed or 
operating) capital. The research also documents how local markets are often ‘thin’ and marked by 
various resource, credit and informational deficits. 
  The research reveals the importance of skills, education and individual histories of human capital 
formation. An educational profile of the informally self-employed suggests they occupy an 
intermediate place between the unemployed and formally employed. Moreover while earnings 
rise steeply with higher levels of educational attainment, they are also strongly differentiated by 
gender (women trail behind an equivalently educated group of men). 
  With regards to social networks and ‘social capital’, informal self-employment was found to have 
no discernible relationship to measures of ‘trust’, yet it was correlated with forms of associational 
life and membership for women (but not men). This correlation was intensified if the woman had 
a history of migration. This suggests the adeptness of self-employed women at using ‘social 
capital’ and organising themselves to attempt to overcome the considerable disadvantages they 
face. 
  The research report describes several important dynamics influencing the governance of 
economic behaviour in the informal sector. Not only is informal (viz. non-state) economic 
governance a key dynamic in the informal sector, it often has a hybrid and ‘nested’ quality in 
relation to formal, state-led governance.  Informal and formal practices of economic governance 
are therefore frequently intertwined.  Finally, the use of violence or threats of violence is a key 
factor underpinning informal forms of governance. 
  The research report identifies the key places for providing infrastructure. Although infrastructure 
is often strongly desired, inappropriate infrastructure provision can disrupt the narrow niches and 
social networks in which small-scale economic activity occurs. 
  Finally the research report identifies the central role of credit, savings and the work of managing 
redistributive claims. The research suggests the issue of supplier credit is a complex one, and 
ostensible credit constraints often reflect more fundamental problems of low profitability. With 
regards to granting credit to impoverished customers, informally self-employed people alternated 
between on the one hand strengthening their capacity to collect debt, and alternatively resisting 





extending it to customers. Savings and (to a lesser extent) risk management, are conducted 
through informal instruments. 
Policy responses to informal economic activity 
  Surveying the policy terrain, the research identifies a variety of policies targeting the informally 
self-employed and SMMEs at national, provincial and local government level. Despite often 
ambitious policies and an elaborate institutional architecture, implementation on the ground is 
highly variable. Not only is coordinating between the three spheres of national, provincial and 
local government vexed, local economic development (LED) and enterprise support services for 
SMMEs are patchy on the ground. These weaknesses are greatly exacerbated within under-
capacitated rural municipalities. Finally, while existing interventions target the small and medium 
SMMES, the issue of whether small scale survivalist microenterprises ought to be recipients of 
enterprise support services is ambiguous and largely unresolved. 
  Although conditions are highly variable, the research suggests that even a relatively resourced and 
functional metropolitan municipality has scope to improve its response to those engaged in the 
informal sector. Discrete groups of specialist officials often appear relatively constrained by their 
line function, and struggle to coordinate actions with their peers. Deep seated ambivalences, 
between the imperative to support those in the informal sector and impulses to constrain and 
exclude them, were common amongst many officials, but especially pronounced in the under-
resourced rural municipalities. In both urban and rural settings informal traders complained of 
being relatively unheard and subject to little more than perfunctory consultation. 
  Specific areas of difficulty for those who accessed enterprise support services were noted.  For 
instance training was frequently in generic business management, rather than technical and 
practical skills frequently desired by beneficiaries. Training was often of short duration, and both 
beneficiaries and enterprise support practitioners readily identified the need for longer term 
mentorships.  Finally, the research discerned the rising policy appeal of co-operatives but notes 
their modest success to date.  Co-operatives frequently face considerable challenges in relation to 
the organisation sophistication required for effective collective management, the sapping 
demands for resources and employment in a resource poor context, and the enduring problems of 
market access.  
Key policy recommendations 
The analysis of informal self-employment, and the policy context, described earlier suggests a number of 
key policy recommendations: 
  At the outset it is necessary to acknowledge that the ‘informal sector/economy’ concept is 
imprecise and contested. A narrow focus on economic informality can obscure key dynamics, 
such as the interpenetration of the formal with the informal sector, and the impact of the larger 
structural economic context. 





  The informal sector ought to not be conflated with the illegality or criminality.  The informal 
sector covers a wide range of economic activities, many such as subsistence agriculture or small 
scale enterprises are not readily ‘visible’ to the state, yet are not illegal. At their lowest levels 
many small scale economic activities are so marginal they carry no legal tax obligation. 
  There is a need to understand that those in the informal sector are motivated by a diversity of 
objectives, and many small scale survivalists have little scope for growth, upscaling or 
employment creation. A sharper policy distinction ought to be formulated between small scale 
survivalists and entrepreneurs with capacity for growth, in order that each group can be targeted 
by appropriate interventions. 
  Policies affecting the informally self-employed ought to be conceptualised at multiple scales of 
possible intervention. These include the larger overarching macro structural context, the 
intermediate realm of enterprises and institutions and finally, the micro level of individuals and 
households. Support for the informally self-employed ought to be thought of in relation to three 
key domains, namely: productivity enhancing interventions; institutionally-orientated responses; 
human development; and welfare enhancing interventions (particularly for small scale 
survivalists). These are elaborated on in what follows. 
i. Productivity enhancing interventions 
  Policy responses need to recognise the challenges faced by SMMES require attention to the larger 
structural context, and not simply ameliorative changes in the SMME sector. Attention ought to 
be directed to the role of trade, industrial and monetary policy in patterning (sometimes on highly 
unfavourable terms) the broader economic terrain on which informal self-employment takes 
place. 
  Policy efforts ought to include efforts to enhance the capacity of informally self-employed people 
to maximise returns to their activities.  While only a small group of these individuals are 
potentially able to upscale their activities or create employment, informal self employment 
supports the livelihoods of many. Support to the informally self employed ought to include the 
staples of enterprise support such as: credit and microfinance; risk pooling and management 
mechanisms; training; and systems of contract enforcement. While none of these are a panacea 
for the informal sector, each is required to support it. 
  Efforts to support informally self-employed people need to be embedded in a firmly sectoral 
approach, and pay attention to the larger value chains in which informal enterprises are located. 
The informal sector’s existing extensive backward linkages to the formal sector are important 
potential points of policy leverage. Hence existing formal sector suppliers ought to be encouraged 
(through incentives and regulation) to extend the support they already provide to informal 
enterprises (currently this includes marketing, merchandising and limited credit). 
  In order to build forward linkages to the formal sector, there is a need to recognise and support 
brokers and market intermediation. Policy ought to be concerned with facilitating and remedying 





market failures in the provision of intermediation services. Efficiencies and profitability could be 
improved by supporting the agglomeration of brokerage services, in addition to which 
policymakers ought to also check exploitation within these intermediary relationships. 
  Policy support for market access by informally self-employed people ought to be differentiated, 
realistic and astutely focused. Such support should probably either focus on lucrative, higher 
value (typically distant) markets for specialist products (craft, specialist agro processing, etc.), or 
alternatively it should target the low value, potentially higher volume local markets for basic 
products and services (such as basic food and household essentials). 
  There is scope to consider the extent to which state procurement can be appropriately incentivised 
and managed to become a vehicle to support small scale producers and service providers. 
  Finally there is scope to grow and improve the capacity of the state to support informal self-
employment and SMMEs by proactively identifying strategic opportunities and threats, 
particularly in relation to market changes, emerging technologies and novel products. This high 
level market surveillance (most likely to fit with the mandate of the Department of Trade and 
Industry) will engage in proactive assessment of the market and regulatory terrain, in order to 
discern threats and opportunities to the SMME sector. 
ii. Institutional arrangements 
  Informally self-employed people, and policymakers who engage with them, are likely to benefit 
from greater coherence and comprehensiveness in the organisations that represent them. Where 
these are absent, there is scope to facilitate the formation of associations representing their needs, 
interests and perspectives. 
  There is a need for policy makers to understand the place of prevailing local systems of informal 
(viz. non-state) economic governance which crucially shape the terrain on which informal self-
employment occurs. Where appropriate, these forms of governance ought to be harnessed in 
support of those in the informal sector. However, caution needs to be exercised to ensure that 
systems of local governance are not ‘captured’ by narrow elite interests, or used to perpetuate 
regressive social forces (such as patriarchy). 
  There is a need to examine re-emergent models of institutional support for the small scale self-
employed, particularly co-operatives. An awareness of the strengths of the co-operative model 
needs to be tempered by recognition of its potential limitations. These limitations include: the 
often considerable burden imposed by collective management; the substantial pressures co-
operatives face for immediate (and often unsustainable) gain exerted in resource poor contexts; 
and their enduring difficulties in accessing markets. 
  While enterprise support services have much potential to support informal self-employment, 
policy making efforts ought to recognise where they require improvement. This includes 
remedying the co-ordination and considerable capacity problems these services face in many 





places; bridging the conventional divide between enterprise support and financing; and 
prioritising local level participation in the provision of services. 
  Policy efforts to support the informally self-employed need to sustain a focus on other, ancillary 
aspects of state service provision, such as infrastructure and safety and security. Appropriate 
infrastructure, planned and delivered with the input and needs of the informally self-employed 
firmly in mind, will temper disruption of its production, and maximise potential benefits. 
Secondly, as the informally self-employed are vulnerable to crime, safety and security ought to be 
supported through efforts to build social cohesion, effective policing and appropriate physical 
urban environments (secure storage facilities, lighting, passive surveillance, etc.). 
iii.  Social security and human capacity development 
  Policy needs to recognise the limits of conventional enterprise support services, particularly for 
small-scale survivalists who have limited prospects or capacity for growth. This group is likely to 
benefit from typical human development and welfare-enhancing interventions, which support 
consumption and investments in human capital (such as health and education), and which 
mitigate risk and vulnerability. Although social security and employment are often seen as 
mutually exclusive, state cash transfers (social grants) often enable informal self-employment. 
There is need to recognise the crucial role of social grants in informal self employment and the 
value of the unconditional nature of South Africa’s current system of cash transfers. Proposals for 
conditional cash transfers, vouchers, etc. need to be tempered by awareness of how they could 
erode the scope for the informally self-employed to leverage grant income in flexible and 
livelihood-supporting ways. 
  Those who work in the informal sector are often linked to the formal sector through production 
linkages and patterns of churning employment. For this reason workplace protections, and 
socialised work entitlements (such as unemployment benefits and death, disability and maternity 
cover) ought to be extended to those in SMMEs, in order to better cover those whose employment 
shifts between the formal and informal sectors. Table of contents 
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2. Literature review: Framing the context of Informal Self-
Employment 
2.1 Defining economic informality: Conceptual and definitional issues 
The nomenclature of the ‘informal sector’ was coined by Keith Hart (1973) to define low productivity and 
marginal enterprises. Defying early predictions that it would be absorbed into the formal sector, informal 
economic activity has continued to grow globally. In 1993, the ILO sponsored 15th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) defined ‘informal employment’ as employment in informal 
sector enterprises, which themselves were defined as, “non-separate legal entities independent of their 
owners; they must produce at least some goods/services for sale/barter; they must be of a size below a 
certain threshold and engaged in non-agricultural activities” (Jütting et al., 2007: 5). With Statistics South 
Africa’s (Stats SA) introduction to regular household surveys in the post-apartheid period, this enterprise-
based approach was how informal employment was initially operationalised in South Africa’s official 
statistics; determining whether an enterprise was in the informal sector largely depended on the 
respondent’s perception to this effect. 
Over time, two concerns emerged regarding this manner of defining informal employment. The main 
concern was that it omitted workers who were employed in an ‘informal job’ in the formal sector, where 
“Informal jobs refer to those jobs outside the regulatory framework because they are not subject to labour 
legislation, social protection, taxes or employment benefits” (Jütting et al., 2007: 5). The decline of state-
based economic governance associated with neo-liberalism and globalisation has increasingly seen 
economic informality, in the form of casualisation, outsourcing and industrial outworking, within formal 
enterprises and markets. A lesser concern was that some individuals were employed in what appeared to 
be the informal sector, but on terms which resembled those of ‘formal jobs’. The 17th ICLS of 2003 
therefore adopted this more inclusive and nuanced approach. However, the actual operationalisation of 
this employment-based (part of the) definition of informal employment depends on consideration of 
various characteristics of the individual’s employment and relationship to the employer, with views 
differing as to precisely which characteristics should be included and in what manner. Some argue that 
while the terminology of ‘informality’ remains useful to describe the growing global workforce outside of 
full time, stable, work with employment protection, the global reality of an increased interpenetration of 
formality and informality undercuts the analytic usefulness of the ‘informality’ concept somewhat (Chen, 
2007). 
South Africa’s, Stats SA’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) statistical releases draw a clear 
distinction between ‘informal employment’ and employment in the ‘informal sector’, where the former is 
inclusive of the latter but in addition includes “persons who are in precarious employment situations 
irrespective of whether or not the entity for which they work is in the formal or informal sector” (Stats 





SA, 2010: xviii). However, the releases report figures only in respect of employment in the informal 
sector, which is specifically defined as having “…the following two components: i) Employees working 
in establishments that employ less than five employees, who do not deduct income tax from their 
salaries/wages; and ii) Employers, own-account workers and persons helping unpaid in their household 
business who are not registered for either income tax or value-added tax” (Stats SA, 2010: xviii). 
Yu traces and compares a variety of different approaches to defining/measuring informal employment in 
South Africa, in particular based on the QLFS. The approaches differ from one another in a variety of 
ways, such as how one operationalises the determination of ‘informal jobs’, whether or not one includes 
agriculture, and whether or not one includes individuals working for no pay within private household 
businesses. 
The figures reproduced below show Yu’s estimates as to the extent of informal employment based on 
these different approaches and using the same database, namely the QLFS from the fourth quarter of 
2009. These different approaches are not detailed here (the purpose is simply to illustrate that the 
definitions and approaches selected matter a great deal). 
Figure 1: ‘Informal employment as percentage of all employed, QLFS 2009Q4’
 
Note: ‘Stats SA method B’ is the unofficial one that Stats SA usually does not report in its releases ( i.e. using the 
fuller definition of ‘informal employment’). 
Source: Yu, 2010: 15 
To what extent does this definitional uncertainty pertain to informal self-employment? Arguably, not 
much, in that the employment-based defining characteristics of informal employment generally do not 
apply to the informally self-employment, because in cases of self-employment, the survey instruments 
generally do not even ask the relevant questions, such as whether the employer contributes to a retirement 
fund, whether there is a written contract, etc. In other words, ‘informal self-employment’ is simply taken 
to mean self-employment in the informal sector. However, Stats SA’s operational definition of the 






informal sector is somewhat arbitrary (though inevitably so and in a manner consistent with many other 
countries), and incidentally was not fully translatable for use with the NIDS data, which was the dataset 
that was relied upon for the present study (see below). The specific issue is that the Stats SA definition 
requires that the enterprise has fewer than five employees, while the NIDS questionnaire does not include 
a question about the number of employees at all. The part of Stats SA’s operational definition that was 
translatable (and that we depended upon centrally to distinguish informal self-employment from self-
employment in the formal sector) was whether the person’s enterprise is registered for income tax and/or 
VAT. One small wording problem with the NIDS questionnaire bears mentioning, namely “Is the 
business registered for income tax and/or VAT?” The problem with this is that it excludes the possibility 
that the individual is registered for income tax, which is a fully possible way in which the self-employed 
can operate while being legally compliant. Thus, in principle, our use of the NIDS data to track the 
informally self-employed is more inclusive than the Stats SA definition as applied via the QLFS, however 
the difference is probably extremely slight, in that there would appear to be very few informal enterprises 
that employ five or more employees.1 
2.2 The informal sector in South Africa: Extent and constraints 
In South Africa discussions concerning the informal sector have long antecedents (cf. Beavon & 
Rogerson, 1990; Rogerson & Whyte, 1991; Rogerson, 1997, 2007; Lund, 1998; Muller & Posel, 2004; 
Devey, Skinner & Valodia, 2005; Cichello, 2005; Essop & Yu, 2008; Potts, 2008).Furthermore the rubric 
of the ‘informal sector’ is often bound up with larger debates concerning poverty, economic 
marginalisation and entitlement. The force of these issues, perhaps most recently, was evident in the 
debate concerning the ‘second economy’ (African National Congress 2004), which pivoted on the notion 
that impoverished  people are trapped in an underdeveloped ‘Third World’ economy disconnected from 
the core, first world economy. The adequacy of the economic dualism inherent in the ‘Second economy’ 
formulation was questioned by several commentators (Frye, 2007; Neves & Du Toit, 2007b), an 
indication of the fierce contestation that can characterise discussions of economic informality. It also 
shows how debate and public policy about the informal sector is confronted with the cardinal problem of 
enduring economic marginality, poverty and inequality in the face of economic growth, market modernity 
and democracy. 
According to Stats SA’s QLFS for the fourth quarter of 2010, there were 2.2 million individuals 
employed or self-employed in the informal sector (excluding agriculture); compared to 9.2 million in the 
formal sector (excluding agriculture), 627 000 in agriculture, and 1.1 employed in ‘private households’ 
(e.g. as domestic helpers). Thus informal sector employment accounted for 17% of those who are 
                                                      
1Fortunately, there is a fairly good match between the number of informally self-employed individuals according to NIDS (1.298 million), and 
Stats SA’s QLFS for the third quarter of 2008 (1.364 million).1 





‘employed’. Approximately 90% of those in the informal sector are African, and they are 
disproportionally female, and generally poor with low average incomes (Rogerson 2007) 
The statement is often made therefore, that for a middle income country, the size of the informal sector in 
South Africa is unusually small (DBSA, 2005). This is especially so when one considers that there are 4.1 
million adult individuals who are unemployed, plus another 2.2 million adults who are regarded as 
‘discouraged job seekers’(i.e. as many as there are employed or self-employed) in the informal sector. As 
informal sector employment is supposedly the default option for those unable to secure formal 
employment in much of the developing world, the question is often posed, why do more South Africans 
not opt for informal (self-)employment rather than unemployment? 
The most common explanation is that in South Africa the colonial and apartheid legacy has served to 
inhibit and dampen an entrepreneurial culture among Africans (although this is a formulation which 
frequently leaves ‘entrepreneurial culture’ undefined).  In addition, South Africa combines developing-
country conditions with a strong and highly developed formal economy, this creates a context with 
relatively few opportunities for those in the informal sector to gain a foothold or grow their enterprises 
(Philip and Hassen, 2008).  In addition, a range of specific contextual factors which serve to inhibit the 
informal sector have been identified including: low and erratic income streams, credit constraints, 
prohibitively expensive infrastructural costs and inadequate access to training (Chandra, & Rajaratnam, 
2001; Chandra et al., 2001; Skinner 2006). To these Cichello (2005) adds the fear of crime, ‘jealousy’ 
(envy) and pervasive redistributive claims within communities. 
An alternative perspective holds that the informal sector is in fact larger than statistics lead us to believe: 
that the small size of the informal sector is a function of inadequate measurement. A fierce debate on this 
point erupted in early 2011 with the release of public comments by Adcorp, a South Africa-based 
employment services company, to the effect that their methodology for estimating informal employment 
was superior to Stats SA’s. The gist of Adcorp’s claim was that a high proportion of informal sector 
operators preferred not to reveal their employment status to Stats SA’s enumerators because of (among 
other things) uncertainty as to the legality of their activities and/or the danger they might expose 
themselves to if answering candidly (radio interview with Loane Sharp, SAFM, 7 February 
2011).Adcorp’s own employment index thus sought to correct for this deficiency by examining the 
frequency of money changing hands among poorer communities (the scale of which it claims is 
inconsistent with the high unemployment figures) and somehow attributing the ‘gap’ to informal 
employment. Adcorp claims that its methodology is explained in a report entitled “Employment Index 
Methodology and Key Results.” At the time of writing, however, this report had not yet been made 
publicly available. 
Stats SA’s rejection of Adcorp’s claims and methodology (Lehohla, 2011) was strongly-worded and 
wide-ranging but, significantly, failed substantively to address the core issue raised by Adcorp, namely 
whether or to what extent survey respondents tend to under-report their self-employment activities. In this 
respect it is worth recalling that qualitative fieldwork conducted after-the-fact to complement the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) noted the extent of informal economic activity was 






noticeably higher than the KIDS data tended to suggest (Adato et al., 2007). However, although there 
does appear to be a strong likelihood that survey data do under-represent informal sector employment, 
Adcorp’s estimates are rather difficult to assess or accept in the absence of information about its 
methodology. Adcorp suggests that informal sector employment is in the range of 6 million, almost three 
times as many as Stats SA data would have it.2 Rather than the official unemployment rate of 24%, this 
implies a rate closer to 8%, which is difficult to accept based on casual observation. While the truth 
remains elusive, the debate underlines the extent of ignorance concerning the sector and the fact that 
answering the question as to why South Africa’s informal sector is so small requires a clear understanding 
of how large it actually is. Perhaps what this debate does unequivocally illustrate is that despite its 
obvious public policy salience, understandings of the informal sector remain elusive and potentially 
contested. 
2.3 Conceptualising informal self-employment 
The preceding sections have described some of the debate surrounding the informal sector, including how 
it ought to be defined and measured, and how the constraints upon it should be understood. This 
underscores both the need for research focused on these issues and clear explication of the research 
approach taken in examining informal self-employment. The latter is examined in what follows. The 
focus of the present inquiry is on the small-scale, informally self-employed, but it is useful to note that 
there is no homogenous nomenclature for those who engage in this category of activity. Instead 
terminology is fundamentally shaped by disciplinary and theoretical precepts and varies from necessity-
entrepreneurs, to survivalists, to those who ‘make a living’ (in contradistinction to ‘earn a living’) 
(Webster, 2005) or in a Marxist register ‘petty commodity producers’ (Moser, 1978). 
In the current inquiry the focus is on the informally self-employed who work for their own account (with 
or without employees), in enterprises that are small in size. The focus of the inquiry is on the lower rungs 
of the statutory definition of small, medium and microenterprises (SMME), as it examines those who live 
and work under conditions of economic vulnerability, in enterprises which have relatively limited 
prospects for growth and up scaling. Furthermore, in defining the focus of the current inquiry it is helpful 
to specify what, and who, it does not include. The focus is neither on those who work under conditions of 
informality within formal sector enterprises, nor is it on those who engage in relatively lucrative activities 
(above the conventional definition of SMMEs); yet voluntaristically choose to remain in the informal 
sector, typically in order to evade taxation or aspects of regulation. Therefore, to invoke the enterprise and 
employment definitions of informality discussed earlier, the focus of the current inquiry is on the 
informally self-employed who work in the informal sector. 
                                                      
2 Moreover, logically one would suppose that most of the difference, to the extent it exists, comprises those who are informally self-employed, 
given that such individuals would appear to have a greater incentive to conceal their status than employees of informal enterprises. 





Having defined the key foci and the stratum of economics in which informal self-employment is 
examined; three additional points concerning the approach followed by the current inquiry need to be 
made. 
I. Firstly, much inquiry into the informal economy tends to be sector or sub-sector specific. Despite 
its utility for understanding intra-sectoral dynamics, this form of analysis potentially inhibits the 
analysis of commonalities across sectors. For this reason this report examines a range of 
enterprise and activity types. 
II. Secondly, studies of the informal sector are often marked by a fundamental and foundational 
dichotomy: they are either rooted in the enterprise/business study tradition, or alternately have a 
firm household and/or livelihoods focus. The enterprise and household traditions embody distinct 
disciplinary, methodological and even paradigmatic assumptions. Furthermore each tradition 
invariably neglects important elements. Enterprise studies frequently overlook the larger 
household and social context; while livelihood or household-orientated enquiry is inattentive to 
some of the enterprise-related questions concerning value chains, markets and monetary flows. 
This duality constrains analysis because both aspects are analytically significant. Informal 
enterprises do not exist as independent economic entities: they need to be understood in the 
context of the households that they support and on which they depend. For this reason economic 
activities are often highly reliant on various hidden transfers between the enterprise and domestic 
domains (for example, unpaid labour; residential spaces for trading; and ‘off-take’ from the 
enterprise). At the same time these household-enterprises need to be understood as businesses, 
and their fortunes and prospects analysed with reference to the market and value chains within 
which they exist. For these reasons, the present enquiry is neither exclusively focused on the 
enterprise nor on households. Instead it seeks to understand informal self-employment by 
examining both enterprise and household level dynamics, and accordingly takes as its analytic 
unit the ‘household-enterprise’ unit. 
III. Thirdly, much writing on the informal sector is rooted in conceptual and disciplinary allegiances 
to abstract economic ‘rationality’. Against this backdrop informal economic activity is understood 
in terms of the economic objective of minimising cost and maximising economic gain, those 
within the sector are therefore judged by the yardstick of highly normative and prescriptive 
notions of how the ideal-type entrepreneur acts, or ought to act. In so doing,(and by looking at 
informal sector entrepreneurs in terms of their deviation from an ideal type, rather than in terms 
of the contextual rationality of their actual strategies), analysis incurs ethereal risk of 
misunderstanding those within the informal sector. An example of which is how, in an influential 
cross-country comparative study in the business sciences,, South Africa’s predominantly female 
African sector workers were deemed to be innately lacking an ‘entrepreneurial mind-set’ (Maas 
& Herington 2006). This is a formulation which simultaneously invokes the spectre of highly 
essentialised individual deficits, and obfuscates the larger constraints on those who toil in the 
realm of economic informality. 






This inquiry seeks to avoid all three of the above problems by examining enterprises across a variety of 
sectors, by taking a firm household-enterprise focus, and by eschewing the presuppositions of the 
normative ‘entrepreneurship’ concept. The analytic focus of the current inquiry is not how closely the 
actions of the informally self-employed accord with abstracted notions of economic rationality, but rather 
more inductively how the informally self-employed come to constitute their economic agency. The 
analytic focus is therefore not on judging how the self-employed ought to act, but rather on examining 
how they actually do act. In seeking to explore this question, a range of related issues are examined 
including how, why and to what end they act. In seeking to understand how the informal self-employed 
constitute their economic agency, this inquiry seeks to expansively locate informal self-employment 
relative to larger social and economic relationships below. 
2.4 Value and social networks 
Having identified the focus of the current inquiry, namely the small-scale informally self-employed, the 
present section will examine the value and social networks within which the informally self-employed are 
located. 
Economic actors are located relative to the larger structure of the economy and economic opportunity 
through their position in value chains (cf. Gereffi, 2005; Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2010). In the 
present inquiry the informally self-employed generally occupied the lower rungs of value generation and 
economic opportunity, with a relative few managing to position themselves a tier or two higher. While 
detailed value chain analysis (cf. Gereffi, 2005) was beyond the scope of the current inquiry, it did seek to 
contextualise activities within value chains in general, schematic terms. This inquiry considers markets, 
prices and costs in order to convey a sense of the backward (and forward) linkages to larger commodity 
chains, and the position research informants occupied in the hierarchy of value. In addition, attempts were 
made to quantify the vexing issue of profitability (within the limits of respondent’s willingness and ability 
to do so) if only to gain a sense of the order of magnitude of their economic activities. 
In addition this inquiry is also attentive to other kinds of value-generation. It examines value generation 
and gains in ways that avoid the bias towards conceptualising value in exclusively monetised terms. In 
addition it attempts to avoid what Ferguson (2007) terms ‘productionist thinking’: the default assumption 
that all economic activity is (or normatively ought to be) inherently productive. Ferguson argues that in 
the late globalised world much economic activity, particularly the informal sector, entails forms of 
‘distributive’ labour. This is particularly evident in high labour intensity, low productivity tasks, such as 
the common scenario of multiple traders vending similar articles at similar prices in overtraded markets. 
Ferguson (2007) argues this to be a form of distributive labour, similar to the distributive labour of 
claiming social entitlements (from kin or strangers, via entreaties or begging, or more forcibly via crime). 
This is not to suggest that those in the informal sector are ‘unproductive’, it is to simply make the point 
that in a global context where labour is increasingly disconnected from production much labour 
essentially entails the (re)distribution rather than production of value. The utility of this insight is that it 





tempers the impulse to apply a narrow template of ‘productivity’ to those eking out a living engaging at 
the margins of the South African economy, and the nature of much informal economic activity. 
Consequently this inquiry seeks to consider economic activity quite expansively, from the lucrative to the 
infinitesimally small scale. This enlarged conception of value generation also draws attention to the social 
dynamics of economic activity, considered in what follows. 
2.5 Social networks 
Understanding informal self-employment by examining the nexus of household and enterprise, demands a 
focus on the social dynamics of economic activity. The last three decades has seen the ascendancy of a 
network approach in understanding economic activity, in contrast with much orthodox economic thought 
which conventionally ascribes irrationality or miscalculation to behaviour that is inconsistent with the 
choices of the cost-minimising, profit-maximising, homo economicus. The challenge is then to understand 
the social realm, which in much neoclassical economics is the domain of “irrationalities, frictions, 
hindrances or externalities’ (Gudeman, 2001). A network perspective acknowledges the manner in which 
economic actors and markets are fundamentally socially embedded. The analytic focus extends to actors 
and the larger institutional and social context in which they act, in order to make informal self-
employment intelligible. 
If a focus on social networks has become increasingly prominent in accounts of economy, a focus on 
social networks is particularly useful in understanding economic informality. The informal sector is a 
realm where economic exchange, markets and governance are, by definition, not codified to the same 
extent as is the case in formal contexts. In arguing for analytic attention to the social networks that 
underpin informal self-employment, Grabher and Stark’s (1997 cited in Meagher, 2005) describe a three-
part typology of ‘legacies, linkages and localities’. This focuses attention on issues of historical and 
temporal change (viz. legacies); the actions and strategies of those in the informal sector (linkages) and 
the specificity of context (localities). Finally, despite the utility of social networks to much economic 
informality, assessments of their role are often underpinned by a fundamental ambivalence. On one hand 
social networks are lauded as the stuff of social capital and trust, as a social good that enables economic 
exchange (Fukuyama, 1995). On the other hand social networks, particularly in the context of economic 
informality on the Africa continent, are derided as potentially rapacious and exploitative (cf. Bayant, Ellis 
& Hibou, 1999; Meagher, 2006). The current inquiry makes no assumptions concerning the value of these 
networks. Instead it examines them analytically to understand how they work, and the extent to which 
they can both enable and constrain informal self-employment. 
2.6 The livelihood context of informal self-employment 
Understand the patterning of economic opportunity and marginality in the South African context, is key to 
grasping prospects and patterns of informal self-employment. South Africa continues to be shaped by the 
political economy of racialised underdevelopment, which Philip (2008) argues is perpetuated in terms of 






four key factors. The first is the legacy of historical inequalities in the acquisition of skills and education, 
which stubbornly endure into the present. The second are the vast discrepancies, both inter and intra 
group, of assets such as capital and land. Historically large racialised inter-group discrepancies have 
increasingly seen mounting levels of intra-group inequality, particularly amongst black Africans. The 
third is the spatial legacy of inequality and underdevelopment, and dysfunctional settlement patterns. The 
former homelands and urban townships are often located far from markets and economic opportunities. 
The fourth factor is the nature of the formal economy, with its capital-intensive, concentrated, vertically 
integrated monopoly structure. These four factors not only contribute to a post-apartheid distributional 
regime of enduring poverty and inequality, they constitute an adverse environment for the informally self-
employed. These legacies are also manifest in different forms between the focal rural and the urban 
settings. 
In the rural contexts of Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, smallholder agriculture has been in slow decline 
for much of the twentieth century. This decline is the consequence of a century of state neglect of 
smallholder agriculture, shrinking remittances from migrant labour, and the waning of the collective 
social arrangement that historically facilitated agriculture in locales such as the Eastern Cape (Andrews 
and Fox, 2004). Although there are agro-ecological differences between the two focal rural sites of the 
Eastern Cape and Limpopo provinces, both locales are subject to the declines in the land and agricultural 
based livelihoods of the past. This is the process of de-agrarianisation, evident all over the developing 
world (Bryceson, 1996). 
Outside of the former homelands, market liberalisation has seen increased concentration and 
consolidation within the commercial farming sector and the shedding of thousands of agricultural jobs. 
This has occurred simultaneously with declines in the mainstays of low skilled industrial labour and 
employment in the resource extraction and manufacturing sectors. Consequently South Africa’s 
comparatively unskilled workforce is increasingly locked out of formal employment in capital intensive 
tertiary production (Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn and Wooldard, 2006; Black, 2007). The unskilled also 
bear the brunt of deepening practices of casualising and externalising labour, as increasingly footloose 
South African corporations globalise, restructure and list overseas (Bassett, 2008). 
Moreover the changing urban and rural livelihood dynamics described here are interlinked. Many rural 
households maintain links to urban locales and household members. Scholarship on the homeland-city 
migrant networks has long conceptualised households as spatially ‘stretched’ between the rural 
homelands and their historic labour receiving metropolitan poles (Spiegel, Watson & Wilkinson, 1994; 
Spiegel, 1996). These spatially stretched households and livelihoods are typically underpinned by forms 
of oscillatory and circular migration. The livelihoods of the impoverished and economically marginalised 
are highly complex and varied, and often incorporate disparate activities across different contexts and 
actors. In the case of the Eastern Cape, its corresponding urban migrant receiving areas are concentrated 
in the urban Western Cape (especially Cape Town), but also include other metropolitan areas such as 
Durban and Gauteng. From Limpopo, sites of migration areas have predominantly been in the industrial 
heartland of Gauteng. However declining opportunities for industrial employment in the last few decades 





has curtailed the possibilities for rural back investment by disrupting the flow of urban resources. Bank 
and Minkley therefore argue that “the main dynamic in the post-apartheid era at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century is that rural labour – once so eagerly desired – has become a burden to the state and 
an irrelevance to capital” (2005, 32). 
South Africa is therefore a highly monetised context, but also one in which opportunities to generate 
income through either formal or informal employment are constrained and often precarious. The resultant 
economic marginalisation sees millions of the impoverished and economically marginalised ‘adversely 
incorporated’ into the political economy of South Africa. In this context it is unsurprising that the post-
1994 poverty headcount increased marginally (Hoogeveen and Ozler, 2006). This was followed by small 
reductions in the poverty headcount where increased incomes to the poorest between 2001 and 2005 were 
driven mainly by the increased take-up of state cash transfers. If the benefits from the social wage and 
public services are included, there have been discernible increases in welfare after 2000 (Bhorat and 
Kanbur, 2006). Amidst income based measures of poverty and deprivation, it is also useful to examine 
vulnerability as the product of a series of interlinked deprivations of human capacity (Sen, 1999). The 
poorest and most marginal of the survivalist self-employed are locked in cycles of low asset holdings, 
limited income, and poor opportunities. This inhibits their ability to make investments in themselves, their 
children (pre-eminently through education and health), or their nascent enterprises. 
In describing the structural context within which informal self-employment takes place, an additional, 
household dimension that ought to be stressed is the crucial demand for, and role of, socially reproductive 
labour. Highly gendered, this is the third element of the ‘triple burden’ of productive, socially 
reproductive and community maintenance work which women disproportionately shoulder (Moser, 2002). 
Daily survival is often dependent on substantial unpaid domestic labour expended on tasks such as child 
or elder care, household provisioning (such as collecting fuel or water) and on-going household 
maintenance (of fragile physical structures). The burdens of this work are strongly felt because the 
impoverished typically have limited access to assets, utilities (energy and water), and labour saving 
domestic devices.  They inhabit contexts in which property and infrastructure rights are assured not 
through contract or legal fiat, but rather use, possession and wider communal recognition. Furthermore, 
the economically marginalised are the least able to externalise the burden of social reproduction: in this 
context it is women in such households who frequently tend to the young, the ill, the elderly and 
occupationally injured. In addition they are at the base of spatially-extended ‘care-chains’ (Hochschild, 
2000), and are likely to care for the dependents of the vast army of women who, in turn, look after the 
dependents of the less poor, the middle class and affluent. The demands of this care work can constitute a 
considerable burden (Hunter, 2006) around which household members need to strategise. In labour 
constrained households, high dependency ratios and the demands of care work constitute key labour 
constraints. 
The overarching structural context, delineated above, frames the position and prospects of the 
economically marginalised in contemporary South Africa. Apart from the increasingly precarious 
proceeds of formal sector employment, they rely on permutation of three essential sources of livelihood 






making. The first are state cash transfers, the second, practices of social reciprocity, and the third, 
informal economic activity. All three of these are expanded on in what follows: 
I. The first component of impoverished livelihoods in contemporary South Africa is a 
comparatively generous system of state cash transfers. Funded by a relatively efficient and 
progressive system of taxation, over a quarter of the South Africa population (in the categories 
children, the disabled and the elderly) receive a social grant. Grant income tempers the severity 
and depth of poverty and inequality in South Africa (Wooldard and Leibbrandt, 2010) and serves 
an important redistributive function (Neves et al, 2009). In addition, grant income is absorbed 
into prevailing systems of mutual assistance and social reciprocity. 
II. The second major component of impoverished livelihoods is practices of mutual assistance and 
social reciprocity. It is through these practices that they access resources such as earnings from 
employment, remittances and social transfers. Termed ‘informal social protection’ (Bracking and 
Sachikonye, 2006), these systems of social reciprocity are crucial to the livelihoods of many 
South Africans, and are evident within several of the focal case studies contained in the present 
research. These practices are underpinned by culturally and historically rooted practices of 
reciprocity and social exchange, within spatially extended social networks. Underpinned by 
ideologies and institutions of mutuality, practices of social reciprocity operate both within kin 
networks and through other forms of associational life (such as church, youth, savings, local 
community and trade associations). They are strengthened by social events and traditional 
ceremonies such as weddings, funerals and initiations. The demands of social reciprocity are a 
key factor shaping the terrain on which economically marginalised people make a living and 
through which they both accumulate and sequester livelihood-enabling resources, as well as 
mange risk. Du Toit and Neves argue: ‘Gifts and favours, formal exchanges, family histories, 
financial, emotion[al] and moral debts all have an impact in reciprocation practices, and 
balancing of the resulting obligations take place according to calculations shaped by social norms 
and personal relations’ (2009a, 23). 
III. The third and final resource for livelihood making consists of forms of informal self-employment: 
the central concern of the current inquiry. These activities straddle a range. At the lowest level are 
survivalists scrabbling to sustain livelihoods through what Davis (2006) terms ‘survivalist 
improvisation’ above these are small and medium sized enterprise operators who are generally 
better able to satisfy the basic demands of simple reproduction. This range of activities is the 
focus of the current inquiry. 
  






In the section that follows the methodological aspects of the inquiry are discussed in detail. 
3.1 Qualitative-Quantitative (Q2) integration 
Central to the present research project is the use of a methodology based on integration between 
qualitative and quantitative research. A wide range of potential approaches exist for combining qualitative 
and quantitative inquiry. These range from fairly traditional strategies in which qualitative and 
quantitative research are done relatively independently of each other, and the findings of one approach are 
used to test, validate or ‘triangulate’ the other, to far more integrated approaches in which the two 
modalities are carefully sequenced and linked (Howe and McKay 2004; Du Toit & Neves, 2007a; Ragin, 
Shulman, Weinberg & Gran, 2003). The present research accords equal weight to both components: each 
is equally important. Therefore in this inquiry qualitative knowledge is not used once-off at the outset to 
explore the issue, nor is it tacked-on merely to add descriptive depth. Similarly, quantitative data is not 
used by simply appending a perfunctory statistical analysis to qualitatively-derived insights. The approach 
followed to attain qualitative-quantitative integration is instead, far more comprehensive and built on 
previous work (Du Toit & Neves, 2007a). 
In this research project qualitative and quantitative inquiries intersect at, at least three distinct points. 
Firstly, at the outset, prior to the commencement of qualitative inquiry, quantitative analysis is used to 
help identify issues (e.g. associations between different variables) for qualitative investigation. Secondly, 
following the fieldwork (with households, enterprises and policymakers) but before the focus group 
interviews, quantitative inquiries are used in order to contextualise the sample of the households selected 
for qualitative research. This was done by implementing selected modules of the NIDS Wave I 
questionnaire to the households in the qualitative sample, thereby enabling these units to be ‘located’ 
relative to the larger NIDS data set. Thirdly and finally, following the focus group interviews, quantitative 
inquiry is used to further investigate thematic issues identified in the course of the qualitative work. In 
this way the Q2 integration entails a process of iterative interrelation between the qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry. This not only relies on the sequencing described above; it also demands on-going 
team interaction in order to align methods and clarify emergent findings. 
It is useful to reflect on the kind of knowledge these different approaches produce. The quantitative data 
is used to elucidate underlying correlations and quantify the scope and size of these relationships. 
Quantitative inquiry is rooted in the canons of statistical probability and is well suited to extrapolating 
from the sample to larger populations. In contrast, qualitative inquiry is well suited to exploring complex 
social phenomena, particularly when the phenomena in question is elaborate, rooted in non-linear causal 
dynamics or terms that are un-amenable to quantification (such as actors’ ‘aims’, subjective ‘meanings’, 
and  cultural context). Qualitative inquiry makes few claims of representivity or generalisability. 
Combining quantitative and qualitative research in a strategic and principled way enables the present 
inquiry to harness the strength of each respective approach. 






3.2 Qualitative fieldwork and Q2 integration 
The qualitative fieldwork was undertaken during the course of 2010, and built on earlier studies done in 
2007 (Du Toit & Neves, 2007a) and 2009 (Neves & du Toit, forthcoming). Several of the earlier studied 
household-enterprises were re-sampled and included in the 2010 inquiry. A selection of thirty household-
enterprises roughly evenly divided between the Elim (Limpopo Province), Mount Frere (Eastern Cape 
Province) and Khayelitsha Township (Greater Cape Town, Western Cape Province) were sampled. It is 
helpful to recall that the ‘household-enterprise’ unit of analysis refers not to a specific enterprise form 
(viz. an enterprise run from a home) but instead represents the dual analytic focus on both household and 
enterprise (whether both exist in the same point in space, or not).In-depth interviews and observational 
research was undertaken in the enterprise context, which was followed by household level enquiry, in 
many cases at different locales and even with a different household informant. In most cases this process 
of fieldwork entailed multiple visits. The resultant material was synthesised into case studies and is 
presented in the abridged case studies contained in the appendix A, and the schematic overview in 
appendix B. 
Although most of the focal case studies’ household-enterprises were well established and had run for 
many years, some were considerably newer. Virtually all of the household-enterprise case studies 
included in the study were outside the regulatory net of taxation, health, safety and employment 
legislation. The National Small Business Act (1996, amended 2004) designates a microenterprise (in 
wholesale, trade, catering and accommodation) as having fewer than five employees, an annual turnover 
below R200 000 and gross assets below R100 000 (RSA, 2003). This was a threshold below which the 
vast majority fell, with the possibility of one or two exceptions that may have been narrowly above it. The 
selected case studies therefore include enterprises at lower tiers of a hierarchy of enterprise size, and 
include extremely small, survivalist enterprises at the lowest levels of what is conventionally regarded as 
identifiable as enterprise. These include a range of monetised activities with such vanishingly small 
returns that they are typically unrecognisable, even to those who operate them, as an enterprises or 
businesses. 
The case studies are purposively sampled in order to derive a diversity of household-enterprise units by 
enterprise type, size and gender of the enterprise operator. Inquiry into the enterprise sought to elicit data 
about issues related to the enterprise history, structure, assets, scope, employment relationships, suppliers, 
markets, access to credit, customer relationships, issues related to their right to trade and the regulatory 
context. This was followed by a household orientated inquiry which examined household composition 
and other livelihood activities, as well as the nature of the household’s interaction with the focal 
enterprise. Drawing on individual and household history as well as life and enterprise histories, the 
research sought to understand these dynamically, over time. 
The household and enterprise level inquiry occurred parallel with a process of community level inquiry, 
involving government officials and policy makers. This component of the research process relied heavily 
on interviews, a review of the literature (both academic and ‘grey’) along with focus group interviews. 





These interviews were undertaken with local community level informants, predominantly those working 
in, or with the informal sector, in order to understand aspects of the local context in which informal self-
employment occurred, as well as aspects of the regulatory and SMME support services context. 
Prominent in these were local, district and municipal officials, various economic development officials, 
provincial officials and staff from various local enterprise support organisations. In addition, a small 
group of staff within the national departments (the Department of Trade and Industry, the Small 
Enterprise Development Agency, etc.) was sampled. A snowball sampling methodology was used where 
informants identified other potential informants. 
Key informant and official interviews were followed by a sequence of focus groups with many of the 
interviewees, along with other additional key role players in each of the three core research sites. 
Emergent insights and project findings were presented, and feedback was invited, in order to provide a 
form of ‘respondent validation’. This process had several key objectives. Firstly it provided a valuable 
opportunity for information dissemination to key role-players, secondly it served to test the veracity of the 
findings, from the participant’s perspectives, and finally it fed into a recursive process of data refinement 
and analysis. 
3.3 Quantitative methods and Q2 integration 
It has already been described how the quantitative component of this inquiry was integrated with the 
qualitative. To reiterate, the quantitative component of the inquiry intersected with the qualitative 
component in: the identification of patterns and relationships for qualitative inquiry; the quantitative 
contextualisation of the qualitative findings; and quantitative exploration of provisional factors (emerging 
from the first two phases). The quantitative component of this inquiry was accordingly divided into three 
broad phases. The first phase took place before the commencement of the qualitative in-depth interviews, 
the second took place shortly after the qualitative in-depth interviews but before the focus group 
interviews and the third phase took place after the focus group interviews. By and large the quantitative 
methods used were unsophisticated: descriptive statistics, a few statistical tests for equivalent proportions, 
and one or two correlation statistics. 
The qualitive inquiry exploited the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), for which 
the fieldwork was conducted in 2008. The reason for using the NIDS data was partly because of the close 
association between the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD) and NIDS, but 
also because the NIDS questionnaire included a useful, somewhat self-contained sub-module on self-
employment. In addition, the longitudinal focus of NIDS is a key asset: over time, and with subsequent 
waves, emergent hypotheses and findings from the present study can be used for future longitudinal 
research. As will be discussed later, one small but notable advantage of the NIDS approach relative to the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) is that the QLFS requires the respondent to identify his or her 
main work activity, thus not allowing one to capture information about a person’s secondary activity. By 
contrast, NIDS was designed to allow a person to indicate a wage job, as well as casual employment, self-
employment, and agriculture, in any combination. Moreover, as with wage employment, the NIDS 






questionnaire allowed for the respondent to indicate more than one self-employment activity. The 
quantitative work focused exclusively on African and Coloured respondents (as did the qualitative 
fieldwork interviews). African and Coloured people represent 88% of the informally self-employed; 
moreover the underlying number of observations in NIDS for White and Asian/Indian informally self-
employed was only 58% and 9%, respectively.  





4. Research Context 
This section contextualises the research, by firstly describing the broad policy terrain of state support of 
SMMEs, following which the contextual specificity of the focal research settings is discussed. 
4.1 Policy context: State support and regulation of SMMEs 
In this section state support for and regulation of SMMEs (Small, medium and micro enterprises), 
amongst whom the informally self-employed fall, is discussed. In South Africa policy responses to the 
informally self-employed are largely the domain of SMME policy, which is characterised by a range of 
policies and programmes at national, provincial and local level. While many of these policies and 
programmes are complementary, some run in parallel and are relatively disconnected from each other. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is arguably the major state player in defining the policy 
terrain, along with provincial departments of economic development (the Department of Economic 
Development and Environmental Affairs in the Eastern Cape; the Department of Economic Development, 
Environment and Tourism in Limpopo and the Western Cape’s Department of Economic Development 
and Tourism). At the local government level there are substantial differences between the various types of 
municipalities: district and large metropolitan municipalities are expected to draft and adopt strategic 
plans based on SMME development. Fewer of these prescriptions extend to local municipalities, who are 
dependent on their superordinate district municipality counterparts. In addition to this terrain of national, 
provincial and local government, there are a number of organisations providing enterprise support 
services. Both state and non-state funded these organisations are tasked with implementing policies and 
initiatives of both national and provincial government. In the chapter that follows, literature is drawn on 
and the policy terrain applicable to the informally self-employed is described in terms of the following 
domains: 
  National policies 
  Provincial policies 
  Municipal policies 
  Enterprise/business support organisations 
4.1.1 National policies 
Several sections of legislation and key policies located within the national context are entrusted to the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and form the basis for much SMMEs support and regulation in 
present day South Africa. The 1995 White Paper on SMME Promotion was part of a consultative process 
which aimed to develop and regulate SMMEs. Drawing on the inputs of various stakeholders it examined 
the challenges and opportunities faced by SMMEs and culminating into the National Small Business Act 






of 1996 (as Amended in 2004). The Act made provision for establishment of support organisations and 
provided statutory definitions of SMMEs. SMMEs were comprehensively defined in terms of: the total 
full-time equivalent of paid employees; total turnover and gross asset value (excluding fixed property). 
For example in agriculture, a medium enterprise employs 100 people, has R5 million annual turnover and 
R5 million in total gross asset value. A small enterprise employs 50 people, has a R3 million annual 
turnover and R3 million in total gross asset value. A very small enterprises employs 10 people, has a total 
turnover of R500 000 and R500 000 in total gross asset value. Lastly the microenterprise employs 5 
people, has R200 000 total turnover, and R500 000 total gross asset value (RSA, 2005). Definitions 
extend to cover virtually every sector of the economy, but significantly even a legislatively defined 
‘microenterprise’ is comparatively large. 
It is significant that the White Paper and much subsequent state policy essentially conflate 
microenterprises with smaller scale, survivalist enterprises (Von Broembsen, 2008). This despite the fact 
that survivalist enterprises are driven by poverty, where the operator is ‘pushed’ by conditions of 
necessity and desperation. These enterprises are marked by little capital, virtually no skills training and 
income levels that fall far short of even a minimum income standards. Skinner (2007) shows that even if 
survivalist and microenterprises were combined, only 8% earned above the income threshold for taxation, 
while Napier et al. 2006 (cited in Von Broembsen, 2008) estimate that only 3% of employees of 
microenterprises are paid (most are presumably unpaid kin). Microenterprises, and to a greater extent 
survivalist business, have few prospects of up-scaling or growth and are below the reach of many 
traditional enterprise support interventions. 
State activities aimed at supporting and encouraging SMMEs build on the framework of the National 
Small Business Development Act., and include the 2005 National Strategy for the Promotion of 
Entrepreneurship and Small Enterprises. It provides for four priority focus areas for SMMEs 
development, targeting: specific historically disadvantaged groups (such as Africans, youth, women and 
the disabled); designated geographical areas with high poverty and unemployment rates; potential growth 
sectors; and finally new forms of enterprises such as co-operatives. It is against this policy backdrop that 
particularly business support services directed towards co-operatives have risen sharply. 
Other legislative and policy developments incorporate a focus on SMME development. The National 
Youth Fund targets the youth. The National Strategy for the Development and Promotion of Franchises in 
South Africa (2000) seeks to foreground franchising as an area of SMMEs activity, and reportedly has the 
potential to include many aspirant entrepreneurs. Similarly, the National Industrial Policy Framework 
(NIPF), of 2007, was adopted with a view to (perhaps rather ambitiously) strengthening the place of 
SMMEs in the manufacturing sector. However it is co-operatives that are viewed as a particularly 
important modality of supporting SMMEs within policy making circles; as such the DTI strategy towards 
co-operatives warrants greater explication. 
DTI’s Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS) was formed with a view to intervene in the informal 
economy and incentivise co-operatives as a mechanism for SMME development and support. The 





overriding emphasis of the CIS is to support the formation of co-operatives as viable business entities. It 
is presumed that this process will promote the competitiveness of co-operatives, and create an 
organisation form that will allow designated historically disadvantaged groups to participate more fully in 
the market, thereby diversifying enterprise ownership. 
The CIS aims to support co-operatives (registered in terms of Co-operatives Act of 1991) through a 
maximum grant of R300 000 and has been operating since 2005/2006. It requires recipients to: adhere to 
co-operatives principles; be based on rural or semi-urban areas; be active in the manufacturing, retail, 
service and agriculture sectors. Furthermore as a key domain of SMME policy, support to co-operatives is 
under review in the proposed Co-operatives Amendment Bill. The Act seeks to integrate different 
agencies involved in SMME support and development, and will make provision for a Co-
operatives Development Agency constituted and run with input from co-operatives themselves. 
4.1.2 Provincial policies 
Having described the overarching national context of SMME support, the range of provincial policies and 
interventions which seek to respond to the SMME sector are now examined. There are discernible 
differences between provinces. Policies for co-operative development, predicated on the belief that co-
operatives can make substantial impact on the SMME sector, show up some of the similarities and 
differences between the various focal provinces. 
Limpopo: In common with the other provinces, Limpopo’s Growth and Development Strategy (LGDS), 
includes a focus on co-operatives. The LGDS proposes to development a cluster value-chain approach. 
Clusters are to be developed in a manner that encompasses an array of industries, organisations, 
institutions and service organisations involved in a specific sector. It is intended that a key focus of a 
sustainable cluster developing in Limpopo will be agro-processing, tourism, mining and horticulture. 
Eastern Cape: In addition to a strong emphasis on co-operatives as the predominant form of SMME 
support, the Eastern Cape also has a comprehensive provincial strategy for SMME development and 
support. Termed the Integrated Strategy for Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Small Enterprises in the 
Eastern Cape (Eastern Cape Department of Economic Development and Environmental Affairs, 2009), it 
highlights the place of provincial response to SMME support activities. Furthermore, and in keeping with 
national and provincial emphasis on support for co-operatives, the Eastern Cape has a co-operatives 
strategy in addition to its detailed SMME strategy. Informed by its Provincial Growth and Development 
Plan, the intention is to encourage co-operatives particularly in the manufacturing and tourism sectors. 
The plan both diagnoses the problems areas that impede SMMEs development and sets out a number of 
objectives to remedy them. Although these are rather ambitious and broad, they are summarised in terms 
of four components discussed below. 
I. The first component is developing a SMME Institutional Framework. The first pillar seeks to 
develop capacity within the Department of Economic Development and Environmental Affairs 
(DEDEA), in order to address challenges which affect implementation of policy by DEDEA and 






municipalities. Chief among its interventions are to train the staff in regional offices in aspects of 
policy development and implementation to enable them to better serve municipalities. There is 
also the intention to establish three bodies to bolster SMMEs development, namely a Forum for 
Development Finance Institutions (to track SMME funding trends); a Provincial SMME Working 
Group (to co-ordinate SMME support); and an Enterprise Development Agency (most notable to 
co-ordinate non-financial support to SMMEs). Each of these forums is intended to draw together 
various combinations of state and non-state actors, including the private financial services sector, 
NGOs, donor organisations, research institutes and institutions of higher learning. This will 
ideally enable DEDEA to co-ordinate the contributions of different actors to SMMEs, in order to 
maximise available services and avoid duplication. Also mooted under this pillar is the 
establishment of an ‘Innovation Hub’, which is “meant to support entrepreneurs to innovate and 
develop new products linked to growing economic sectors of the economy of the province in 
order to enhance manufacturing” (DEDEA Eastern Cape, 2009). 
II. The second component is SMME Programme Design and Support. Having defined the 
institutional architecture above, the second component entails increasing financial and non-
financial services to SMMEs. A priority with the former is to assist entrepreneurs who are unable 
to access finance, particularly due to collateral constraints and/or creditworthiness issues. The 
latter will focus on the non-financial, business support, and seek to reduce the high failure rate of 
SMMEs, by examining issues such as business management, skills development and enterprise 
marketing. The largely unrealised potential of state procurement from SMMEs is also noted in 
relation to avenues for SMME support. 
III. Small-scale informal sector enterprise operators and hawkers, often at the lowest rungs of a 
hierarchy of SMME size, are significantly also viewed as warranting support. In order to support 
them, the Provincial Informal Business Support Programme is to be established and will comprise 
of various state agencies (i.e. the DEDEA, the Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs and the district Municipalities) along with associations within the informal 
sector. 
IV. Thirdly, SMME Regulatory Functions and Services. This component essentially seeks to 
examine, and where appropriate, lessen the regulatory constraints on the SMME sector. It aims to 
do so through a two pronged approach of, on one hand, educating those in the sector (particularly 
aspirant entrepreneurs) on regulations; and on the other hand engaging with municipal officials to 
rationalise and simplify regulations, in order to make it easier for the informally self-employed to 
comply with them. 
V. Fourthly Monitoring and Evaluation. The fourth and final component concerns policy co-
ordination and management, and will be allied to the task of monitoring and evaluating SMMEs 
and SMME support services. The strategy proposes conducting monitoring and evaluation, along 
with research, and linking this to a series of information dissemination activities, such as annual 
conferences, seminars and summits on SMME development in the province. 





The Western Cape: The Western Cape Co-operatives Strategy (October 2007), details an 
implementation plan with six objectives, and targets certain sectors notably the tourism, agriculture and 
craft sectors. It also targets geographic areas marked by high levels of deprivation, poverty and social 
problems such as crime. Cape Town’s largest townships of Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha are high on 
the priority list. These six areas are focused on: 
I. Creating an enabling environment for co-operatives to thrive. Some interventions in this regard 
are to ensure that sector departments and local authorities develop co-operative strategies and 
programmes for implementation. In addition to which databases of co-operatives are to be 
compiled, and attention devoted to raising awareness about co-operatives as an organisation 
modality. 
II. Co-ordinating co-operative activities between government and the envisaged, emergent co-
operative movement. This will include the sharing of information and holding of meetings to 
support co-operative development across various government line departments. 
III. Developing the co-operative sector through increasing resources, both financial and technical. 
These resources will enable co-operatives to register and formalise. 
IV. Strengthening the co-operative movement. Resources will reportedly be earmarked for 
exchanges and learning among co-operatives. 
V. Developing tools appropriate to support development of co-operatives. It is envisaged these 
tools will help in the areas of registration, business planning and development, management, 
financing and marketing of co-operatives. 
VI. Monitoring and evaluation. An annual survey of co-operatives will be undertaken in order to 
gauge needs, blockages and constraints to growth. 
VII. In sum then, a wide array of provincial policies targeting co-operatives as a key modality for 
SMME support. 
4.1.3 Municipal policies and Local Economic Development (LED) 
Municipalities are tasked with developing and regulating SMMEs. SMME strategic plans and forms of 
local regulation (often local by-laws) are the primary mechanisms for this. However local municipalities 
vary widely in terms of how they approach the task. Smaller municipalities in particular are highly reliant 
on national and provincial government for many of their policy and operational prescriptions. In addition, 
within smaller, less-capacitated local municipalities, their corresponding district municipalities are 
expected to assume responsibility for policy developments related to SMME support. 
However, in terms of understanding SMMEs, a crucial function of local municipalities is directorates or 
departments of Local Economic Development (LED). LED is a “decentralisation mechanism” which 
allows local and regional governments and their communities (business, labour and society) to shape their 
environments, improve competitiveness in local economies and ensure infrastructure and services work 






well for industry and society” (Fray, no date). LED is intended to be a partnership of municipalities, 
businesses and communities; wherein local government assumes responsibility for ensuring overall 
economic and social conditions of the locality are investor friendly, productive and conducive to the 
creation of employment opportunities. Local Economic Development is therefore conceptualised as an 
outcome of actions and interventions resulting from sound local governance and integration of national 
priorities and programs within local spaces. 
Central to the LED process are local Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). These are required to consider 
the local resources, opportunities and constraints and provide the structure for priority settings within the 
municipality. Prominent in this process are LED forums, which provide a platform for the various 
stakeholders to meet at regular intervals. In this formulation, LED is not intended to be an autonomous 
initiative of local government, but rather provide the space for the co-ordination of intergovernmental 
relations between all three spheres of government. It is hence argued that “the district and metropolitan 
scale is ideal for this de-concentration and for intergovernmental co-ordination. It is large enough for 
national and provincial government to organise their capacity spatially and small enough to respond to 
local/regional conditions and unique requirements” (DPLG, 2006). In this formulation local government 
not only has a co-ordinating role, but also a connecting one. It is supposed to connect its inhabitants to a 
range of services that are provided by different government department and institutions, rather than 
providing these itself. 
4.1.4 SMME Support organisations 
State-funded SMME support organisations are tasked with delivering services consistent with national 
policies. Despite their limitations, they are key domains of support to the SMME sector and the 
informally self-employed. SEDA (Small Enterprises Development Agency) is responsible for providing 
non-financial assistance on behalf of DTI. Established in December 2004 SEDA was formed in terms of 
the National Small Business Amendment Act of 2004, which made provision for the merging of three 
organisations; Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency, National Manufacturing Advisory Centre (NAMAC) 
and the Community Public Private Partnership Programme (CPPP). Accountable to the DTI and a host of 
donor funders, SEDA has a national head office in Pretoria and nine provincial offices. Provinces in turn 
have offices located in district municipalities, each branch staffed by a branch manager, business advisors 
and support staff. SEDA provides business development and support services for small enterprises 
through its national network in partnership with other role players in the area of small enterprise support. 
SEDA also implements programmes targeting business development in deprived geographical areas 
prioritised by the state. 
SEDA has a strong presence in the Eastern Cape, where additional SMME support is facilitated and 
executed by the Eastern Cape Development Association (ECDC), under the auspices of the provincial 
Department of Economic Development and Environmental Affairs. The ECDE was established in terms 
of the Eastern Cape Development Corporation Act (Act 2 of 1997), in five regional offices throughout the 
province. The ECDC renders seven broad services, including providing development finance, promoting 





investment, promoting trade, enterprise development services, project development, spatial and rural 
development, and finally property management and development. For the purpose of the current study, 
enterprise development services are of key interest, as they target SMMEs with skills development 
support, business advice, information technology support, product and market development and business 
linkages development. These services are extended to start-up, emerging, expanding and underperforming 
businesses. Enterprise development services exclude financial support, which are the responsibility of a 
dedicated Development Finance unit. 
In terms of focal research sites, the Western Cape offices of SEDA are somewhat of an exception because 
they are not closely aligned to the Cape Town Metropolitan municipality, and SEDA has comparatively 
few provincial offices in the province. In the Western Cape, SMME support is executed by the Cape 
Agency for Sustainable Integrated Development (CASIDRA) particularly in rural areas, and administers 
the Real Enterprise Development Initiative (Red Door Project) at urban sites, with 13 advice centres 
throughout the province. These are an integral part of the Provincial Department of Economic 
Development and Tourism, and located within the provinces sub-directorate of Enterprise Development. 
It was created to support SMMEs, from those in their formative stages to established ones. Red Door is 
orientated towards black-owned businesses, and its services include assisting in writing and refining 
business plans; improving business skills; helping access finance; assisting with access to affordable 
service providers; conducting marketing and research; providing information on government incentive 
programmes (provided by entities such as like SEDA, DTI, Industrial Development Corporation, Khula 
Enterprise Finance, Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office (CIPRO) for enterprise 
registration, etc.); facilitating applications for government tenders; and providing information on import 
and exports. Red Door also offers essential facilities such as internet access; small conference rooms; 
access to mentors; and runs a community entrepreneurship outreach programme. 
In Limpopo SMMEs development and support is handled by the Limpopo Business Support Agency 
(LIBSA) which is part of the Department of Economic Development, Environment and Tourism. In 
particular it is located within the directorate of Promotion of SMME Development. While LIBSA’s role is 
business skills development and support, its work is complemented by its sister organisations the 
Limpopo Economic Development Enterprise and Trade and Investment Limpopo which assists with 
finance and marketing respectively. With a head office in Polokwane and 20 branches throughout the 
province LIBSA’s role is biased to developing key sectors of the Limpopo economy including mining, 
tourism and agriculture. Manufacturing, construction and information communication technology have 
moreover also been identified as key sectors of growth. In addition to enterprise development activities 
such as drafting business plans, LIBSA has two more programmes, namely SMME and co-operative 
development. The former is focused on business incubation, the latter on co-operative development. 
Business incubation is an intensive 15 month capacity-building course for new SMMEs to maximise 
chances of their success. The training includes access to bookkeeping, marketing management, stock 
control, practical pricing and costing and customer care. 
This array of services provides the context of state support for SMMEs, a realm within many of the 
informally self-employed operate. 






4.2 Research sites 
The section that follows describes the specificity of the focal research settings. 
4.2.1 Elim (Limpopo province) 
The town of Elim is located in Limpopo Province about 110 kilometres northeast of Polokwane and 20 
kilometres east of Makhado town (formerly Louis Trichardt). Elim originated in the 1880s as a Swiss 
mission station built around a hospital and college. Much of the land in and around Elim remained tribal 
land, although some was later appropriated by the government to establish the township of Waterval, 
which currently falls under the authority of the local Makhado municipality. The larger Elim district 
contains seven additional villages: Shirley, Mugangeni, Mabedengwa, Tshuhara, Mabovo, Makangele, 
and Njakanjaka (all under the jurisdiction of a traditional authority). Over time population growth has led 
the eight villages to all but fuse together. The population of Elim is made up of Shangaans, Venda, 
Tswana, Somalians and Mozambicans who have intermingled over the years. The area’s inhabitants are 
overwhelmingly comprised of black Africans (97.4% in 2001) (Makhado Municipality, 2005). In the 
1980s the government upgraded the provincial roads passing through Elim. The existence of an accessible 
hospital increased the attraction of Elim as a destination. Elim is situated within the Makhado Local 
Municipality, which falls under the Vhembe District Municipality. The Makhado Local Municipality had 
a population of about 515 000 people in 2001, which is almost 10% of Limpopo’s population (Makhado 
Municipality, 2005). 
Near Elim’s main intersection are privately owned structures that comprise the community’s commercial 
hub. The ‘old shopping centre’ consists of a building that houses a variety of businesses(e.g. an Eskom 
pay-point, a butchery, a dry cleaners, a dressmaker’s shop, and a petrol service station) surrounded by a 
variety of smaller buildings, semi-permanent structures, and approximately 800 stands of various sizes, 
about half of which are operated by fruit and vegetable vendors. 
In 2006 a new shopping mall, ‘Hubyeni’, was constructed diagonally across the main intersection from 
the ‘old shopping centre’. The establishment of Huybeni was the result of a process started a few years 
earlier by an agency of the provincial government called Trade and Investment Limpopo. Trade and 
Investment Limpopo commissioned a number of ‘nodal scoping studies’ with the explicit purpose of 
determining the feasibility of setting up malls in rural communities around Limpopo (Aliber et al., 2011). 
Elim was one of those where the demographics and associated ‘market demand’ were deemed adequate to 
support a mall development, and in due course private investors committed to doing precisely this. 
Hubyeni is located on land that was obtained via negotiations with the tribal council, whereby the 
previous residents were compensated and the council received regular rent. Hubyeni consists of 36 stores 
of various sizes, of which the anchor tenant is a large Spar. There is also provision for 50 hawker stalls 
and a taxi rank; however these facilities remain largely vacant. The impact of the new mall on existing 
businesses has been difficult to discern. While the owner of the main building that forms the focus of the 
‘old shopping centre’ was vehemently against the mall, the qualitative evidence suggests that the 





introduction of the mall has mainly served to intensify rather than displace Elim’s commercial activity. If 
anything, the displacement has been in terms of local residents who formerly travelled all the way to 
Makhado town for their shopping, and who now shop locally. There is little indication that the number of 
hawker stalls has diminished; moreover, there has been further conspicuous private investment in the 
immediate area around the main intersection, including newly built doctor’s rooms and a hardware store. 
Complementing these commercial activities, the settlement of Elim serves as a transport hub for people 
and goods. Taxis and buses transport people; to convey a sense of the scale, the route between Elim 
pointing east along the road to Giyani is served by more than 60 taxis. The goods that are transported to 
and/or through Elim include agricultural produce, furniture and building materials (Aliber at al., 2011). 
As is the case with the taxi industry in South Africa’s main cities, those who drive taxis are usually 
employees whose employers/owners tend to be local businessmen. The transport industry in turn supports 
a thriving market for those in auto repair and car washing. 
The increased demand for residential accommodation is visible through evidence of higher density 
settlement around the town’s centre. The further away from the centre, the sparser the distribution of the 
residential units. Virtually all the open space in the immediate vicinity of the two shopping malls has been 
taken up by car-repair, carwash and other informal businesses. The original Elim residents have either 
extended their houses, or constructed other buildings or temporary shelters on their stands to provide extra 
accommodation. The extra accommodation is leased out to temporary Elim residents for up to R300 a 
month. One such individual had constructed four rows of seven single rooms. Along the four roads that 
converge at Elim’s main intersection, (in recent years) a number of residents have begun leasing out space 
for service-based enterprises such as hairdressers, carwash stations, brick-making, car-repair and places 
for public entertainment. Meanwhile, those residing beyond the town centre or the main roads can still 
afford to use their spare land for subsistence agriculture (Paradza, 2009). 
With regards to the statistics, the demographic profile of the Makhado area is dominated by the young, 
with the largest population band the age category 5-14 years old (at 28%). Average incomes are 
extremely low (even if 75.9% of households reporting ‘no income’ do stretch credulity). Those who earn 
between R401 to R800 per month make up 10.8% of the population. In terms of education the majority 
(38.0%) report no completed education, followed by those with secondary schooling (26.4%), and then 
higher education (7.2%). Accordingly, many of the respondents (33.0%) have elementary skills and 
occupations. Despite high levels of poverty and deprivation, vigorous state driven efforts at electrification 
mean that many have access to electricity (67.0%), although the majority dispose of refuse themselves 
(76.8%), and use pit latrines ((Makhado Municipality, 2005). Limited water infrastructure means only 
3.3% of respondents have water inside their yard, while 28.4% use a community stand pipe. The district 
has an estimated HIV prevalence rate of 9.0% HIV+ people, and a high (39.0%) projected numbers of 
AIDS-related deaths (Makhado Municipality, 2005; Vhembe District Municipality, 2008). 






4.2.2 Khayelitsha (Western Cape) 
Khayelitsha is a large urban township within Cape Town, and falls under the municipal jurisdiction of the 
metro municipality. Although there is a century-long history of African migration into metropolitan Cape 
Town, much of the larger Cape Province was declared a ‘coloured labour preference area’ in the mid-
1950s. State policies actively sought to discourage black African migration to Cape Town, and the city 
remains exceptional for being the only major South African metropolitan area without a black African 
majority (the largest population group would historically have been classified ‘coloured’). African 
migration into Cape Town was actively prohibited by the apartheid pass laws. For several decades the 
apartheid state declined to build new housing stock for Africans, with much existing housing intended for 
migrant workers unaccompanied by their families. Against these constraints population densities in the 
established African townships of Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu steadily rose, and ’in-fill’ (often 
‘backyard’) sites became increasingly utilised. The poor quality of urban services and housing shortages 
were a festering source of protest from the 1970s onwards. It was against this backdrop that Khayelitsha 
was established in 1983. 
Located approximately 30km away from the central business district of Cape Town, and edged by a 
buffer zone of working class ‘coloured’ neighbourhoods and a military base, Khayelitsha was 
intentionally sited far from the envisaged axis of white residential area growth. During its early 1980s the 
apartheid ideal was to relocate all of Cape Town’s African residents to far-flung Khayelitsha, but 
determined resistance, unrelenting African in-migration to Cape Town and the late 1980s collapse of 
influx control scuppered this segregationist ambition. The initial projections were that 220 000 
Khayelitsha residents would occupy leasehold housing, or be allocated serviced stands to build their own 
structures (Cook, 1985). Low-lying, sandy and prone to seasonal flooding, many of the early residents of 
far-flung Khayelitsha were displaced by the forced removals and internecine violent conflicts in the 
adjacent Crossroads settlement, or those with no (apartheid state endorsed) legal entitlement to be in Cape 
Town. Khayelitsha was therefore at the outset largely populated by those desperate enough to live there. 
Planned and developed as a racial enclave, Khayelitsha continues to be a dormitory town, populated 
(almost exclusively) by over half a million black Africans the vast majority of whom are Xhosa, often 
migrants. The original 1980s township lay-out made little allowance for commercial activity: nothing 
more than 3-4 shops, a minimarket, a post office and a bank agency’, with no other sites for retail, 
industrial or manufacturing activity (Cook, 1985, 62). Although contemporary Khayelitsha has grown to 
over 500 000 inhabitants, it has no discernible economic centre and is far removed from the industrial and 
commercial employment hubs of urban Cape Town. However, during the course of the 2000s, several 
changes in the urban face of Khayelitsha occurred. Firstly, a handful of supermarkets and the open-air 
‘Khayelitsha Mall’ opened for business, as corporate South Africa’s retail giants extended into urban 
townships. The second conspicuous change was an on-going process of urban redevelopment, with dense 
informal settlements slowly replaced by the provision of urban infrastructure and low cost housing. In the 
informal shack areas this entailed a process of ‘de-densification’, with some residents (drawn by random 
ballot) moved to new (and invariably more distant) ‘greenfield’ sites. Those who remained behind 





dismantled their shacks in order to have their plots surveyed, and receive their low cost, two roomed 
concrete block houses, in a delicate process of in-situ upgrading. Although generally welcomed by 
residents, this slow process of replacing ramshackle corrugated iron, wood and plastic shacks often 
fractured social relationships, neighbourly ties and marginal but delicately balanced livelihood activities, 
built up over the preceding quarter century (Du Toit & Neves, 2006). 
The focal research locales of Site B and Site C, (with their low cost (‘RDP’) housing and informal shack 
settlements) fall under the City of Cape Town’s Ward 92. The enduring poverty of Khayelitsha is evident 
in the area’s demographic profile: 40.7% of the population are aged 19 years or younger, the 
unemployment rate is 54.1% (compared to a provincial rate of 29.9%), and a quarter of households report 
no income (City of Cape Town, 2006). Of the minority that are employed, the two sectors that 
predominate are the wholesale and retail trade (18.9%) and domestic employment in private households 
(18.4%), the latter for  female residents (City of Cape Town, 2006). As an Urban Renewal Programme 
node, Khayelitsha ranks third in the poverty index, after Inanda (KwaZulu-Natal) and Mdantsane (Eastern 
Cape). 
4.2.3 Mount Frere (Eastern Cape Province) 
The town of Mount Frere is located in the far northern region of the Eastern Cape, in the former homeland 
(‘Bantustan’) of the Transkei. Mount Frere is located approximately 80 km from the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial border and the (formerly white South African) town of Kokstad, and 100 kilometres north of 
the former Transkei capital city of Mthata (Umtata). The focal research site included the town of Mount 
Frere, along with the surrounding communal lands and villages of the larger district. Mount Frere and the 
surrounding district fall within the Umzimvubu municipality (197 551 people), which in turn falls under 
the larger Alfred Nzo District Municipality, comprised of 392 180 inhabitants (Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality, 2006). The area is occupied by amaPondo clans in the east and the Baca in the West, with 
the isiXhosa language widely spoken and many local residents readily identifying themselves with the 
larger ethnic appellation of ‘Xhosa’. 
Much like many others of its kind, Mount Frere is a small rural service town. The larger context has been 
shaped by the history of nineteenth century colonial subjugation and twentieth century efforts to turn it 
into a labour reserve for South Africa’s industrial economy. An early way of explaining the division 
between the Transkei inhabitants was in terms of the distinction between traditionalist ‘reds’ (referring to 
the  blankets and ochre clay with which they adorned themselves) and ‘school’ (those Africans who 
embraced modernity, Western schooling and Christianity), (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999), or between 
‘townsman and tribesman’ (Mayer 1971). This has been a staple of discourse concerning the Transkei’s 
inhabitants for much of the twentieth century, this formulation is overly dichotomous and easy to 
overstate (yet the tension between tradition and modernity continues to be heuristically helpful in 
understanding the region) (Bank & Minkley 2005). It manifests in ambiguities of a hereditary chieftaincy, 
practices of subsistence agricultural production and the extent to which traditional idioms and 
cosmologies still inform everyday life. This setting is also shaped by legacies of underdevelopment and 
administrative weakness. 






The Transkei was the first of the ‘independent’ homelands in 1976. Its structures of governance are 
‘patrimonial’ (Peires 1991): homeland leaders maintain power by dispensing patronage within clientele 
networks. The homeland state secured political loyalty by securing an amalgam of local interests 
including those of the business elite, homeland bureaucrats and co-opted traditional authorities, while 
maintaining a delicate balance in the apartheid state which bankrolled the homelands. However, by the 
1980s rapacious corruption and popular opposition had weakened the hold of the Transkei’s ruling 
Matanzima family. Waning elite and (crucially) military support served to weaken the homeland regime. 
The repeal of apartheid, and the end of the political rationale for spatialised ethnic separation in South 
Africa, saw the Transkei violently reincorporation into the larger, unitary South African state. 
Despite its re-incorporation into post-apartheid South Africa almost two decades ago, widespread poverty 
persists in the largely rural, former Transkei. A dearth of progress on rural development has frustrated the 
promise of market led rural growth. Development remains constrained by the impoverishing spatial 
legacy of Apartheid, which means that it is peripheral to, and distant from the opportunities and markets 
of the core economy. In addition it is constrained by a range of planning, integration and institutional 
weaknesses, inherited from the region’s chequered administrative history. In this setting small rural 
service towns such as Mount Frere are important economic nodes, but not for the servicing of an 
agricultural economy. Instead Mount Frere is a retail and service hub, a conduit for the distribution and 
consumption of goods and services. Local incomes are generally derived from public sector employment, 
urban remittances and, increasingly, state cash transfers (‘social grants’). Much consumer expenditure 
effectively ‘leaks’ to nearby Kokstad (Business Trust / DPLG, 2007),the 2001 (Stats SA) census reflects 
that employment in the larger Alfred Nzo municipality is at a low 13%. Drawing on the 2001 survey, and 
a household subsistence level of R19200 per annum, the poverty incidence in the municipality is 90% 
(Alfred Nzo District Municipality, 2006). 
The busy national N2 highway runs down Mount Frere’s main street. Constant traffic includes laden 
trucks travelling from Durban to East London, Port Elizabeth, the garden route towns and Western Cape. 
Mount Frere does not have a CBD (Central Business District) as much as it has a single road, lined by 
supermarkets, hardware stores, banks, insurance-company offices, a municipal-office, a post office, a 
fried-chicken outlet and various smaller retail outlets and petrol stations. Away from the main road is a 
mixture of suburban homes, overgrown vacant lots, small businesses and a single block of flats, occupied 
predominantly by local civil servants and formal sector workers. On the outskirts of town, a large, newly 
built 260 bed state hospital attracts referrals from throughout the district. The urban edge of Mount Frere 
is ringed with shack settlements and more established villages (some with neatly laid out plots and 
substantial houses). This settlement pattern blurs into the fallow and unfenced fields of surrounding 
communal grazing lands. 
As a rural service centre Mount Frere can vary between virtually deserted on public holidays and 
Sundays, to being overcrowded and crammed with visitors from the surrounding district. Many 
businesses depend heavily on the monthly spikes of social grant and public sector salary payments, when 
dense multitudes of shoppers crowd the town, spilling over into the main road. The local municipality 





appears to labour under the constraints faced by many smaller rural municipalities, and its services appear 
patchy and prone to interruption. There was, until relatively recently, no official provision for the large 
number of vendors that sold their wares on the main road, and virtually no evidence of municipal 
regulation. Various items, including live chickens, clothes, agricultural products and medicinal herbs were 
routinely sold from parked cars and pick-up trucks on the main road, or on the crowded pavements. For 
many years a local, independently-managed supermarket took ingenious advantage of the regulatory 
vacuum, by hawking its own wares on the pavement in front of the store. Each day a forklift truck would 
lower a large steel counter (complete with cash register) onto the pavement, and surplus, overripe and 
conveniently repackaged seasonal produce would be sold by a uniformed store employee. After 2009, the 
municipality removed a number of unauthorised steel shipping container enterprises off municipal land, 
and built scores of open fronted, roofed concrete vendors’ stalls on a road perpendicular to the main road. 
Although the stalls are occupied by vendors, many feel their new location was not as optimally located as 
their previous unofficial sites in town, along the main road. 
5. Findings: The characteristics of the informally self-employed 
In this section the qualitative and quantitative empirical material is drawn on to develop a descriptive 
overview of informal self-employment, in terms of the characteristics of the informally self-employed. 
5.1 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: Numbers and 
definitions. 
According to the NIDS data, in 2008 there were approximately 1.14 million African and coloured 
individuals engaged in informal self-employment, where ‘informality’ is indicated by a ‘no’ response to 
the question, “Is the business registered or income tax and/or VAT?”3While concern was expressed above 
regarding the exact wording of this question, there can be no doubt that it does serve to draw a real 
distinction. This is illustrated for example by comparing the incomes of these two groups, as in the table 
below: 
Table 3: Average net 






n (usable) Refusals/don't 
knows 
Registered for tax 173,695 22,916 50 58% 
Not registered for tax 1,138,926 2,413 355 61% 
 
                                                      
3 There were also 26 observations for which the response to this question was missing, extrapolating to about 59 000 people. These were not 
included in the pool of informally self-employed for the purposes of this analysis. 






Those self-employed who are registered to pay income tax or VAT earn almost 10 times as much on 
average as those who are not registered, suggesting a distinction worth noting. The ‘cause and effect’ 
nature of this comparison will be discussed in a later section. For now this difference appears to justify 
use of the tax registration variable to define informality for analytical purposes. Moreover, there are no 
other variables within NIDS’ self-employment sub-module that appear suitable for helping distinguishing 
the formal from informal. 
The table above also reveals a problem with the NIDS dataset, namely the inadequacy of the income data. 
More than half of the sample declined to respond to the questions about income, or they answered zero.4 
The absence, inconsistency and overall poor quality of the income data could be taken as evidence in 
support of Adcorp’s doubts about the candour of respondents to official surveys regarding informal self-
employment. By contrast, the response rate for the income variable for wageworkers was about 86%. 
Having said that, the response rate on income questions for the formal sector self-employed was almost as 
poor as for the informally self-employed.5 
However, it is worth noting that the main filter question regarding self-employment depended on a 30-day 
reference period (“Have you engaged in any self-employment activities during the last 30 days?”). What 
the data cannot show is how many people may have been involved in informal self-employment in the 
course of the previous 12 months but not in the previous month. One way of seeking to account for this is 
to consider the responses to the question as to how many months in the previous year the respondent was 
involved in this self-employment activity. Only 65% were engaged in the activity in each of the previous 
12 months. One interpretation is that there are far fewer ‘year-long equivalents’ involved in informal self-
employment than 1.14 million; in fact it works out to about 836 000. 
On the other hand, it also means that there were presumably more people involved in informal self-
employment in the previous 12 months than the 1.14 million. One way of guessing the significance of the 
‘absent entrepreneurs’ is to assume that the NIDS ‘snapshot’ is more or less time-invariant (i.e. that if the 
fieldwork been conducted a month earlier or a month later, the number of people reporting involvement in 
informal self-employment would have been effectively the same, as would these people’s reports of how 
many months in the previous 12 they had been involved in that activity). From these assumptions, one can 
infer that for every respondent who indicated that they had been involved in informal self-employment in 
the previous 30 days, and for 6 months of the previous 12, there is one other person who was also 
                                                      
4In fact, the NIDS survey asks about net income from self-employment in three ways: i) the raw value of net income in the previous month, ii) the 
show-card range for the previous month’s net income for those who declined to give a raw figure, and iii) the net income over the previous 12 
months. The questionnaire also asks how many months in the previous 12 was the respondent involved in the self-employment activity. Answers 
to each of these three was very partial, moreover there would appear to be many instances in which zero values appeared which should rather 
have been missings or refusals. As is described in the appendix, our attempt to maximise the number of useable observations by means of 
‘combining’ these different variables was unsuccessful, thus for all tabulations/calculations involving net income, we chose in the end to rely 
mainly on the variable for net income over the previous 12 months, in particular the non-zero values thereof. 
5 See Appendix 4 for further reflections on the quality of the self-employment income data in NIDS. 





involved in informal self-employment for 6 months in the previous 12, but who did not happen to be 
involved in the previous 30 days, and thus is not recorded as informally self-employed. In the table below, 
the right-hand column seeks to infer the total number of people who might have been involved in 
informal self-employment in the previous 12 months, including those not actually recorded as self-
employed because their involvement did not include the previous 30 days. The end result is that one can 
estimate that there were 2.5 million people involved in informal self-employment in the previous 12 
months in total. Of course, the 30-day reference period is not unique to the self-employment module, and 
the same numerical gymnastics could be performed in respect of wage employment. However, one could 
argue that it is the nature of informal self-employment to be especially impermanent and fluid. Thus, this 
is a valuable means of getting a more accurate sense of the actual numbers of people involved in it. Taken 
together, the two columns underline an important feature of informal self-employment, namely its 
bimodal nature between enterprises, on the one hand that appear to be enduring and stable, and on the 
other those that are short-lived. 
Table 4: Number of months involved in the self-employment activity in the previous 12 
Months involved Estimated number at 
point in time 
Inferred number over 
course of 12-month period 
<1 2,946 35,348 
1 56,858 682,294 
2 49,554 297,326 
3 66,277 265,106 
4 43,014 129,042 
5 35,355 84,851 
6 59,925 119,851 
7 12,616 21,628 
8 37,256 55,883 
9 14,232 18,976 
10 45,633 54,760 
11 15,677 17,103 
12 651,884 651,884 
Total – excl. missings 1,091,227 2,434,051 
Total – incl. missings 1,138,926 2,540,446 
 
To round off this preliminary, quantitative profile of informal self-employment, attention ought to be 
focused on two aspects of its demographics, namely ‘where’ and ‘who’. In respect of ‘where’, the four 
‘geo-types’ provided for in the NIDS data are utilised (which are in turn based on the ‘settlement type’ 
typology used by Stats SA). The categories are a bit problematic in that the distinctions appear to relate 
more to the legal nature of the tenure than the urban/rural functionality (e.g. it would appear that some 






dense settlements within the ex-Bantustans are regarded as part of the ‘ex-Bantustan’ geo-type by virtue 
of it being ‘tribal land’, whereas for current purposes they might better be treated as ‘urban formal’). 
Nevertheless, it is a useful starting point.6 
As Table 5 shows, a very high proportion of the informally self-employed are located in urban formal 
areas. This merely reflects the fact that working-age adults are in fact concentrated in urban formal areas 
(about 47%). The fact that the same share of ex-Bantustan and urban formal dwelling adults are involved 
in informal self-employment suggests that the sparser population densities associated with rural areas is 
not in itself a major deterrent to informal self-employment. Somewhat in contrast, a noticeably higher 
percentage of those residing in informal urban settlements are involved in informal self-employment. This 
most likely reflects the greater intensity of need of ‘squatters’ to rely on informal self-employment in 
order to eke out a livelihood, and perhaps fewer opportunities to draw on land-based livelihoods and 
subsistence food production, along with weaker social networks. 
Table 5: Informal self-employment by ‘geo-type’ 
 Number Share of informally 
self-employed 
Share of adult 
population 
Rural formal 55,539 4.9% 3.3% 
Ex-Bantustan 366,019 32.1% 4.0% 
Urban formal 506,849 44.5% 4.2% 
Urban informal 210,519 18.5% 6.5% 
All 1,138,926 100.0% 4.3% 
 
As for ‘who’, it emerges that involvement in informal self-employment is strongly differentiated by age 
and somewhat differentiated by gender (Figures 2 and 3 below show this differently: Figure 2 compares 
the shares of women and men in wage employment versus informal self-employment. Apart from the fact 
that for most age cohorts the share of those in wage employment far exceeds those in informal self-
employment, there is a strong bias of wage employment in favour of men, whereas for informal self-
employment this is generally not the case. Another interesting contrast is that while the share of women 
and men in wage employment drops precipitously past the age of 44, for informal self-employment this is 
not the case to the same extent. 
                                                      
6 Another issue is that the geo-types refer to the respondent’s place of residence, which is not necessarily where they ply their trade. This is not a 
shortcoming of the data so much as a reflection of the complexity of reality; while our qualitative interviews do indicate that this distinction is 
real (for example, some informal operators in Elim commute in from adjacent rural areas), our impression is that it is not disastrously common. 





Figures 2: Wage employment and informal self-employment by age cohort and gender 
 
Figure 3 below focuses only on informal self-employment. The two dashed lines in fact plot the same 
values as in the previous graph, but appear different on account of the different scale. What the figure 
conveys however is that in contrast to wage employment, informal self-employment has a bias in favour 
of women, at least between the ages of 34 and 54. One possible interpretation is that women focus on 
informal self-employment in part to compensate for their exclusion from formal sector wage employment. 
Figures 3: Informal self-employment by age cohort and gender, absolute numbers and shares 
5.1 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: Enterprise types 
and incomes 
Returning briefly to the topic of self-employed economic activity over time, it is worth noting that the 
informally self-employed also vary in how much time they devote to their enterprises in a given period. 
The NIDS questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how many hours they spend working in an average 
week on their enterprises. The responses are summarised below using categories imposed after the fact: 






Figure 4: Share of informally self-employed by average hours worked per week 
 
The pattern is clearly bi-modal in that almost 40% of all informally self-employed are effectively full-
time (33 hours per week or more), while another 46% spend two days or less (up to 16 hours). The 
intuitive interpretation is that this represents distinct roles of informal self-employment in people’s 
livelihood strategies. One might further wonder whether there is some kind of relationship between hours 
worked and the longevity of the enterprise, but in fact there is no discernible relationship, as is evidenced 
by the fact that the average months worked in the enterprise (out of the last 12) was roughly 8 or 9 for 
each ‘hours worked per week’ category. Perhaps more surprisingly, there is no clear relationship between 
average hours worked and income, which in the table below is measured in three different ways. The only 
relationship that does emerge is that those who work 8 hours or less per week on average appear to derive 
less income. Apart from the possibility that the lack of correlation merely reflects to the weakness of the 
income data, a plausible interpretation is that some of the least remunerative self-employment 
activities(namely petty trading) tend to require large amounts of time, because one of the main time 
requirements is ‘being there’ in order to attract the custom of passers-by. 




Net income over 
previous 12 months 
Net income over 
previous 30 days 
12-month net 
income per month 
worked 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
<8 1,309 200 938 300 193 77 
9–16 2,762 800 994 500 427 183 
17–24 3,343 400 961 370 504 100 
25–32 2,014 950 650 500 349 200 
33+ 3,077 1,000 1,245 400 555 167 
N 326 406 279 
 





The table that follows reports the occupational breakdown of those in informal self-employment. 
Unfortunately, there was an extremely high rate of non-response to this question. Thus, some categories 
that might otherwise have appeared separately are lumped together as ‘other’. The self-employed tend to 
be located in three main occupations namely: ‘elementary occupations’; ‘craft and related trade workers’; 
and ‘service workers and shop and market sales workers’. The preponderance of ‘elementary occupations’ 
over ‘service workers and shop and market sales workers’ seems strange given the usual impressions 
(borne out by the qualitative fieldwork) that petty traders dominate the ranks of the informally self-
employed. However, according to the South African Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO) (to 
which NIDS adhered), one of the main sub-categories of ‘elementary occupations’ is ‘elementary sales 
and services occupations.’ While the mean and median income estimates are of limited utility given the 
small sample sizes and the various difficulties with the income data noted above, the general pattern is 
consistent, namely that the rewards to ‘elementary occupations’ are modest as compared to those which 
would appear to require more skill, or capital, or both. 




Net income over 
previous 12 
months 
Net income over 
previous 30 days 
12-month net 
income per month 
worked 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Service workers & shop 
workers 
50,750 1,321 700 737 500 202 92 
Craft and related 
activities 
96,504 5,901 1,000 1,337 475 643 210 
Plant and machinery 
operators 
25,904 8,875 5,200 1,513 750 1,736 833 
Elementary occupations 292,846 1,214 200 727 225 259 100 
Other 11,409 
 
Don't know 4,724 
Missing 656,790 
All 1,138,926 
N  139 159 60 
 
The qualitative inquiry, and its sample of cases studied examined the variety of activities in which the 
informally self-employed took part. What are noteworthy of these are the regularities between activities, 
and the extent to which certain kinds of activities re-occur. Although the qualitative data is not orientated 
to broad generalisability the data suggest that a range of approximately a dozen activity types or 
enterprises predominate in South Africa’s informal sector. 






The data also underscore the notion that some activities and enterprise types are potentially more lucrative 
than others, and there is an inherent hierarchy of value. Consistent with the quantitative analysis, the most 
remunerative activities are those that rely on higher levels of skill, capital or equipment, which constitute 
barriers to entry. In the empirical material discussed examples of these included dressmaking, specialised 
farming (i.e. bees, chickens and cattle), artisanal manufacturing (such as welding and tin smithing) or 
services such as mechanical repairs, taxi driving or ploughing. The barriers to entry imposed by the 
demands of skills, capital and equipment are generally lower for the less remunerative activities such as 
menial physical work or petty vending. As those employed in the least lucrative of enterprises and lowest 
levels of return engage in activities that require limited skills and capital they typically sell their primary 
tradable asset: their time or physical labour. Activities here include collecting firewood or water, or 
tending cattle or making sundried mud-blocks (in rural locales), or the long, messy work of preparing 
cooked sheep heads (‘smilies’), or extremely low levels of vending. These activities demand either high 
levels of physical effort, or the investment of large amounts of time for low returns. In this somewhat 
schematic distinction between potentially more lucrative activities which rely on higher skills and capital 
versus the less remunerative activities that make fewer demands on skills and capital, the case of retail 
trade is a useful one. The case studies suggest that retail, which predominates within the informal sector, 
can seemingly straddle a wide range, from relative small-scale and survivalist to relatively larger, more 
profitable enterprises (Ligthelm, 2005). 
5.3 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: Gender 
differentials 
With regards to gender, the gender composition of the main occupational categories for which adequate 
information is available is shown below. Women are dominant among those involved in ‘service workers 
& shop workers’ and in ‘elementary occupations’ (i.e. those occupations that from the previous table tend 
to be the least remunerative). 
Table 8: Share of informally self-employed who are women, by main occupational categories 
 Share of whom are women 
Service workers and shop workers 84.7% 
Craft and related activities 42.2% 
Plant and machinery operators 20.5% 
Elementary occupations 67.2% 
 
The data generally point to the adverse conditions under which women work. Women, particularly 
unmarried women, have fewer tools and occupationally relevant items of equipment than men. In 





addition, they have comparatively lower earnings than men, even when matched for educational 
attainment. 
5.4 Characteristic of the informally self-employed: Enterprise 
objectives 
In addition to enterprise numbers, types and incomes, the qualitatively-derived data suggest another 
criterion by which to understand the characteristics of the informally self-employed, namely the 
objectives or anticipated endpoint to which the self-employment activity is orientated. Even the relatively 
limited number of case studies presented in this research, illustrate the range and diversity of objectives 
associated with the activity of informal self-employment. 
Despite the fact that the research revealed that not all informants were equally able to accurately quantify 
their profitability, qualitative inquiry did reveal the ‘order of magnitude’ of the focal enterprises. Incomes 
and activities ranged from simply augmenting household subsistence, to enabling accumulation and asset 
building. In many of the focal case studies (but particularly the food vendors and producers) the 
contribution to household subsistence was central. There was evidence of relatively high levels of ‘off-
take’ (gain extracted in kind) from these enterprises. In these cases the ‘off-take’ was not only a major 
aspect of the enterprise; it should also be recognised as an objective equal in importance to that of making 
a monetary profit. In these cases the profitability of the enterprise could easily be subordinated to the 
extraction of ‘off-take’. 
Viewed in narrowly money-metric terms, the case study of Vavile’s stall showed that high levels of ‘off-
take’ inhibited the potential growth of his enterprise, and at several points undermined its very 
sustainability. Yet to understand his activity it is necessary to appreciate that his objective was to sustain 
his household, rather than grow or even sustain his enterprise uninterrupted. The fungibility of money (the 
ease with which it can be converted from one realm of value to another), is widely understood yet often 
taken for granted. However, it can potentially obscure the fact that although the objectives of generating 
income and or bolstering food security overlap, they are subtly different. 
Food security and cash income were not the only objectives of informal sector activity. Another key and 
desired effect of self-employment was the way it allowed people to locate themselves in their households 
and social networks. For instance cool drink seller Magalama remained committed to her cool drink 
selling ‘business’, despite her low sales amounting to about R50 per month, and constituting less than 5% 
of her state old age grant income. However, the case study demonstrates how this activity served to keep 
her busy and socially engaged within the context of village life. Having only arrived in the village after 
her retirement from an urban centre Magalama was a relative outsider. This marginality was compounded 
by her physical immobility and the difficulties this imposed on interacting with others and building social 
networks. Her marginality flowed not just from her status as a relative outsider, but from the fact that she 
could offer little up for social exchange. Devereux (2001) explains that the most vulnerable of 
impoverished people typically face constraints in the systems of social reciprocity because ‘they have 






weak social networks and lack tradable assets (including labour)’ (Devereux, 2001). Magalama was 
marginalised in terms of both of these dimensions, despite the fact that she is, in relative terms, materially 
comfortable. It is against this backdrop that Magalama’s cool drink vending assured her of a stream of 
visitors, cementing her place in social networks and serving to integrate her into the relational life of the 
village. It enabled her to enact appropriate forms of dignity, propriety and the sociality that Nyamnjoh 
(cited in Ross, 2005) termed ‘conviviality’. Although Magalama’s cool drink vending was poorly 
remunerated it provided an opportunity for her to potentially mitigate some of the suspicion or even 
hostility she as a socially atomised, elderly women might otherwise elicit within her village context. 
Here it is helpful to bear in mind the nature of the context in which she lives. As a social group, elderly 
rural women (without any male social guarantors), in a patriarchal village context are vulnerable in very 
particular ways. For instance it is they, who are amongst the most likely to attract potentially devastating 
accusations of witchcraft. These are accusations which can potentially lead to significant, and devastating 
interpersonal violence (Delius, 1996). Magalama’s poorly remunerated cool drink vending cannot be 
adequately viewed in narrowly money-metric terms. Instead Magalama’s activities are an instrumental 
part of her efforts to maintain her social respectability within the community. 
The point is not simply that the objectives to which informal economic activities are orientated can vary, 
and can include non-material social and symbolic benefits as well as food security and monetary income, 
but that they also need to be understood in a temporal context. Activities often make sense, not only in 
respect of immediate gains, but in terms of larger, complex livelihood strategies that often extend across 
time. For example, Sibongile’s spaza shop was not intended simply to generate a daily income. Instead it 
served to provide the family with a foothold in the city, and thereby facilitated the education of her 
children, and hopefully also their ascendancy into secure, formal, middle class occupations. In this 
decades long, intergenerational project her primary objective was not, for instance, to grow the enterprise 
substantially, or to turn it into a business that could be inherited by the next generation. Instead the 
enterprise was to provide a resource springboard for the social mobility of the next generation. The 
purpose of the enterprise was to enable the subsequent generation to overcome the need to work in the 
informal sector altogether. 
The temporal, longitudinal nature of enterprise objectives is also evident in relation to Nselo’s rural quqa 
(taxi). This enterprise is dependent on an aging vehicle with high, on-going maintenance costs. Little 
provision is made for its amortisation, depreciation or eventual replacement. Hence, to conceptualise 
Nselo’s quqa enterprise as a ‘transport business’ rooted in notions of enterprise sustainability and asset 
renewal, is to misunderstand the nature of the activity. Instead running a quqa is simply is a way of 
extending the rate at which retirement savings from the formal sector are drawn down and eventually 
exhausted. The enterprise does not arrest this decline instead it simply serves to slow the downward 
trajectory. Nselo’s quqa therefore enables him to effect arbitrage between a vehicle he owns or would 
own for his own use (a ‘private car’ in local parlance), and his need to extend the drawdown of his formal 
sector derived income. 





Informal economic activity thus potentially satisfies a diverse range of objectives. Informal self-
employment needs to be understood with reference to the full range and complexity of the aims and 
motivations of the people engaged in it. This is often missed by orthodox neoclassical economic 
approaches, which reductively gauge the success or failure of informal activity in terms of the aims of 
minimising costs and maximising profit. Such a narrow approach is inadequate, and would lead to 
misunderstanding the needs and interests of the informally self-employed, and an incorrect analysis of the 
kind of opportunities and obstacles they may face. 
An alternative and more expansive conception, which better captures the diversity of the objectives and 
its fundamental social embeddedness, is therefore needed. The contours of what such a perspective might 
look like are evident in the livelihoods approach (Von Broembsen, 2008).  This perspective does not 
simply understand informal self-employment as orientated towards generating income, but rather as 
activities which are socially reproductive and aimed at sustaining individual and household survival. 
Similarly, Petersen and Charman (2008) draw on a similar conception, and argue that informal self-
employment ought to be understood within the triad of sustaining livelihoods, generating income and 
mitigating risk. Despite the utility of the livelihood perspective, it has substantial limits. Not only does it 
tend to oversimplification and reduction, through its failure to theorise the intensely relational character of 
livelihood activities, it is also poorly suited to capturing the longitudinal characteristics of these activities 
(Murray, 2001). 
5.5 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: Diverse enterprise 
activities 
Informal self-employment is frequently marked by diverse activities and complex synergies, both within 
and between the household-enterprise units. These synergies are complex and best illustrated by the 
qualitative findings.  Several unitary household-enterprise units were marked by multiple activities which 
dovetailed neatly together, for instance, Nongazi’s tavern, spaza shop and braai’ed meat business or 
Neliswa’s dressmaking, footwear retail and healing. Both cases demonstrated the deployment of various 
household members across various activities, throughout the course of the day or week. Nongazi’s 
children returning from school to light the fires and cook meat for the late afternoon passing trade; while 
Neliswa’s day was patterned by early morning traditional healing services followed by sewing and 
weekly forays to resell purchased footwear as she straddled the major categories of production, retail and 
services. 
These interlinked activities were clearly evident in the retail trade but not limited to it. Several of the rural 
household-enterprises who engaged in agricultural production sought to maximise profits by producing 
their own inputs, and effecting arbitrage with their agrarian production systems. Hence, David’s bees 
quite literally cross pollinated his other crops, Maxaba grew (and, significantly, ground) maize to feed her 
chickens, while Raphulu’s vertically integrated enterprise extended from his beef production, through 
cattle trading, to an abattoir, to the retail of raw meat (from his butchery) and cooked meat (from his basic 
‘restaurant’). 






The complexity of informal economic activity sometimes resulted in activities and enterprises that eluded 
easy categorisation. For instance during the research period Tenathi’s ‘second hand goods and hardware 
store’ at various points sold: toiletry items adulterated with medicinal herbs; novelty tune-playing 
Valentine day mugs; and groceries. Each of these disparate items was opportunistically stocked in 
response to an emergent opportunity. These ranged from the initial presence of the sangomas, to a 
favourable deal on a ‘job lot’ of novelty mugs and finally the opportunity for grocery sales, provided by 
the serendipitous closure of an adjacent spaza shop. This diversity and dynamic array of retail defies easy 
categorisation according to conventional typology of enterprise type, and illustrates the nimbleness of 
Tenathi’s ability to source, stock and respond to changing opportunities. 
Diverse activities and synergies were not only evident within enterprises; they were also evident in the 
relationship between groups of the informally self-employed. These were particularly evident in the fixed 
retailers who worked from a static location in close proximity to each other, such as the fruit and 
vegetable vendors Alina, Maria and Salminah; the dressmakers Mavis and Nancy (who not only pooled 
their labour at various times but also took turns tending their collective wares); Neliswa and the 
dressmakers adjacent to her; as well as the polony vendor Zenzile and her confederates (selling polony, 
frozen meat and newspapers respectively). Tenathi’s retail activities demonstrated similar patterns of 
mutual support and synergies with other enterprises (which shifted over time). For example in 2006 
Tenathi’s hardware was bound up in a mutually beneficial relationship with sangomas who occupied a 
part of her premises rent free. Although she derived no rental income from them, Tenathi’s store 
synergistically harnessed their presence, as the sangomas drew in the passing trade and also deterred the 
criminal element. In addition, a web of synergistic interrelations extended beyond the sangomas who 
shared her building. Tenathi ran her store in parallel with her father’s hardware store across the road, and 
they referred customers between each other if they lacked a desired item. 
In much the same way as Zenzile and her polony-selling confederate, Tenathi and her father ran similar 
enterprises in close proximity to each other. Although this arrangement potentially risked them 
undermining each other’s sales, it made it more difficult for a potential competitor to enter and also 
provided the opportunity to pool labour. Hence the regimes of labour required to run Tenathi’s store were 
fluid. During slow periods Tenathi would go and sew at her mother’s house, but when Tenathi travelled 
further afield a young female relative would be dispatched from her father’s house to tend to her business 
(whom Tenathi would reward with small amounts of cash). 
Finally, it is useful to reflect on the wide range of affiliations and relationships that underpinned these 
synergistic arrangements, each almost as particular as the specificity of an individual’s life and social 
network. For instance, prior to her husband’s claiming of their nuptial property during their divorce, 
Sibongile had for many years sold his alcohol on consignment from her spaza shop. After her loss of the 
spaza shop, and amidst fierce competition from formidable Somali traders, Sibongile withdrew from 
selling groceries, and subsequently entered into a casual arrangement with the Somali trader (buying flour 
from him and selling vetkoek to him). Similarly, spaza shop owners Sibongile and Nongazi, entered into 
mutual beneficial business arrangements, with a provider of electronic arcade games. Both had free 





standing arcade game machines in their shops which were owned by the third party, but the profits were 
(by verbal contract) evenly split between the women and the supplier of the machines. Both women had 
been party to this arrangement for many years. 
5.6 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: The interrelation 
between household and enterprise economies 
The evidence suggests that in many cases household and enterprise economies are tightly intertwined, and 
transfers between household and enterprise are commonplace. Qualitative case study material suggests 
the widespread practice of internal transfers in kind (‘off-take’) particularly from food retailer’s focal 
enterprises. Examples include case studies of chicken farmer Freddy, fruit and vegetable vendors Vavile 
and Alina, Maria and Salminah and spaza shop and braai’ed meat seller Nongazi. The levels of ‘off-take’ 
were considerable in several of the case studies, and for several household-enterprises a substantial 
objective to which their informal self-employment was orientated. Vavile, amongst others, suggested that 
vending comestibles was favoured because it lent itself to this arbitrage to meet directly the household’s 
subsistence needs, unlike other items like cellphone accessories or toiletries. Apart from ‘off-take’ 
another form of transfer between household and enterprise was the use of an unpaid or underpaid (relative 
to market wages,) kin labour. Although commonplace in several case studies such as those of Aubrey, 
David, Raphulu, Tenathi, Sibongile, Vavile, Maxaba and Mamjoli it was not ubiquitous, and several 
respondents quite pointedly sought to avoid kin labour. The difficulties of using kin labour included the 
potential unreliability of kin (evident in the case studies of Neliswa and Marley) or potential entitlements 
kin might exact, evident in the case studies of Freddy and Tenathi (in relation to her biological children). 
Where kin labour was evident, an aspect of particular interest is the terms in which it was frequently 
described by research respondents. Many, such as Raphulu, Tenathi, Sibongile, Thembela and Sipho, 
firmly resisted describing those who toiled in their enterprise variously as employees or ‘workers’. Even 
regular monetised exchanges following labour, were variously termed  ‘pocket money’, ‘gifts’ or 
‘stipends’ rather than salaries or wages. The candid manner with which most respondents described these 
employment relationships and the incredulity which routinely met researchers’ description of them as 
employees, is significant. The force of their disinclination to view such workers as employees is not 
readily reducible to a desire to simply evade employment legislation. Rather, it was rooted fundamentally 
in prevailing conceptions of what constitutes a ‘proper’ (formal) enterprise, job and employment 
relationship. 
From a quantitative perspective, there are certain kinds of ‘hidden transfers’ which the NIDS data are 
unable to provide much insight into, such as the extent to which, the informally self-employed consume 
out of their business stock, or draw on unpaid family labour. However, there is one line of inquiry 
possibly using NIDS data that does speak to the relationship between informal sector self-employment 
and the household, namely by looking at the extent to which households combine informal self-
employment with other economic activities or strategies. In particular, the analysis explores whether the 
presence of informal self-employment in a household is more or less likely, and more or less rewarding, 
in the context of the household having or not having other income sources. 






Table 9 begins by comparing the incidences of informal self-employment according to whether the 
household does or does not receive wage income, then whether it receives any employment-related 
income or not and finally whether it receives or does not receive grant income (The first two dyads are 
closely related, in that wage income accounts for the main type of employment related income). The main 
finding is that the incidence of informal self-employment is roughly twice as high among households 
which do not have other employment-related income sources, implying that informal self-employment is 
largely compensatory in nature. The situation with state social grants is somewhat different, in that the 
difference is small and not statistically significant. It might be surmised that there are countervailing 
pressures of approximately the same magnitude such that there appears to be no relationship; on the one 
hand, informal self-employment might also be compensatory for the absence of social grant income, 
while on the other hand, those who have social grant income are better able to enter informal self-
employment. The latter proposition is one supported by research on state social grants, which documents 
the widespread phenomena of social grants channelled into productive assets and activities, including 
informal self-employment (Neves et al. 2009; Lund, 2002). 
Table 9: Share of households having informal self-employment in relation to whether or not they 
have income from other sources 
Household has… 
Share of HHs with 
ISE 
income from regular wage employment, versus 5.3% 
no income from regular wage employment 12.1% 
income from regular wage employment, formal self-employment and/or casual 
employment, vs. 
6.3% 
no income from regular wage employment, formal self-employment and/or casual 
employment 
12.1% 
income from social grants, versus 10.1% 
no income from social grants 8.1% 
 
Table 10 examines these relationships somewhat differently — in term of the implications of the 
‘household portfolio’ for informal self-employment income, access to equipment for informal self-
employment, total household income, total social grant income, and average household size. The main 
insight distilled from the table is that, regardless of ‘geo-type’, among households engaged in informal 
self-employment, those with wage income tend to earn more from informal self-employment than those 
households which do not have wage income. This is the case whether one measures informal self-
employment income using variables capturing what individuals earned in the previous 12 months, or 
variables referring to income over the previous month. At least for ex-Bantustan and urban-informal 
areas, this earnings differential might in part be explained by the fact that households involved in informal 
self-employment are more likely to own equipment for their activities if someone in the household also 
has wage employment. In this way the acquisition of resources conferred by formal sector employment 





provides opportunities for informal self-employment and maximising the returns to existing portfolios of 
assets. 






















ISE only 31,216 450 328 31% 3,438 964 5.0 
Wage only 610,993 - - - 2,614 671 3.0 
Both 23,107 1,671 790 31% 4,209 919 4.7 
Neither 260,754 - - - 2,259 1,036 3.7 
Ex-Bantustans 
ISE only 282,022 1,262 414 43% 2,037 891 4.8 
Wage only 839,743 - - - 3,828 850 4.6 
Both 58,557 2,319 988 56% 5,116 1,052 6.1 
Neither 2,442,601 - - - 1,736 1,050 4.5 
Urban formal 
ISE only 339,717 1,747 1,016 38% 2,906 712 3.9 
Wage only 3,027,602 - - - 6,292 710 3.6 
Both 146,589 2,116 1,252 37% 6,928 779 5.0 
Neither 2,408,117 - - - 3,525 945 3.5 
Urban informal 
ISE only 153,240 1,076 512 24% 2,490 628 3.8 
Wage only 499,622 - - - 4,380 689 3.9 
Both 51,916 1,592 916 38% 5,158 852 4.9 
Neither 760,909 - - - 1,591 850 3.5 
Other findings from the table include: 
  With the exception of rural formal households (of whom a high proportion of those earning a 
wage are presumably working on commercial farms), those with wage employment only tend to 
have higher household incomes than those with informal self-employment income only. 
  Wage-earning households that are also involved in informal self-employment tend to have higher 
total household income than those that do not have informal self-employment. 
  Again with the exception of those in urban formal areas, households involved in both wage 
employment and informal self-employment tend to be larger than other households, implying a 
number of different possible interpretations. Larger households may have more need to diversify 






into informal self-employment, and/or more opportunity to do so by virtue of having greater 
household labour capacity. The qualitative data suggests that some of the most successful 
enterprises are rooted in large households with ample labour capacity. Finally, research on the 
State Old Age Grant has demonstrated, its acquisition by a household member is associated with 
increased numbers of household members (Klasen & Woolard, 2009). 
In a similar vein, the relationship between gender, marital status and involvement in informal self-
employment is explored. The table below for example shows the breakdown by marital status of women 
and men who are and are not engaged in informal self-employment. The most conspicuous finding is that 
both women and men involved in informal self-employment are much more likely to be married than 
women and men in general and much less likely to fall in the ‘never married’ category. This fact lends 
itself to various interpretations, the most obvious of which is that the marital home assists (or at the very 
least is correlated with) the establishment of informal enterprise.  
It can be hypothesised that households constituted around the formal conjugal contract of marriage are 
more successfully able to engage in informal self-employment because they are in aggregate terms more 
likely to have: accrued start-up capital and assets; the requisite surplus household labour capacity; and 
perhaps, are less likely to be marked by contested decision making processes as household members more 
readily defer to patriarchal household heads. These factors furthermore needs to be viewed in the light of 
evidence from the qualitative research, which suggests that many involved in informal self-employment 
are not necessarily seeking only to maximise income/profits, but rather pursue these activities, inter alia, 
as a means of diversifying the household’s ‘livelihood portfolio’. 
 
Table 11: Comparison of marital status of those who are not and are informally self-employed, by 
gender 
 Women Men 
Not ISE ISE Not ISE ISE 
Never married 51.5% 37.6% 60.0% 44.7% 
Living with partner 9.9% 11.5% 9.2% 16.4% 
Married 25.1% 36.3% 27.3% 35.8% 
Divorced/separated 2.8% 4.5% 1.4% 1.5% 
Widow/widower 10.7% 10.1% 2.0% 1.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The quantitative data allow for consideration of the extent to which the marital home assists in the 
establishment of informal self-employment activities on behalf of one or more of its members by means 
of providing the start-up capital. While the NIDS dataset does not ask a question about the extent or 
source of start-up capital as such, it does ask, “Do you have any tools or machinery that you use in these 





[self-employment] activities?” and “Approximately how much it would cost you to replace these tools 
and machines if you had to buy them today?” (Unfortunately, as with the variables relating to income 
from self-employment, these variables relating to tools and equipment have a high incidence of missing 
responses, plus a number of zeros which would appear to be miscoded missing responses). Table 2 
reveals that married women are significantly more likely to have equipment or tools than those who are 
not married (i.e. subsuming never married, living with partner, divorced and widowed). At the same time, 
the differences among men by marital status are much less pronounced, perhaps suggesting a gender 
asymmetry in the nature of informal self-employment. The final observation, of course, is that informally 
self-employed men in general are more likely to have equipment or tools than women. 
Table 12: Shares of informally self-employed women having tools/equipment, married versus other 
 Women Men 
Married 34.3% 61.9% 
Never married, divorced, widowed, etc.* 20.6% 59.6% 
P > |z| 0.0031* 0.695 
*Note: the underlying sub-sample sizes are small for divorced women and for divorced and widowed men, which 
is the main reason for collapsing some of the marital status categories. 
5.7 Characteristics of the informally self-employed: Social networks 
Social relationships, networks and forms of social rootedness (or ‘embeddedness’) are key characteristics 
in how the informally self-employed engage with informal economic activity. Although social 
relationships and networks are an important component of all economic activity (Granovetter, 1985 & 
2005) it has already been suggested that these social dimensions are particularly prominent in the context 
of economic informality. Markets and economic exchange in the context of economic informality are 
highly reliant on direct social relations, trust and interpersonal guarantee, as these contexts are 
characterised by far lower levels of access to codified rules (such as law, contacts and written procedures) 
along with weaker systems of intermediation (including legal, fiscal and business services) than are 
typical of formal contexts (Philip, 2008). Furthermore, informal economic activity frequently involves 
resources, assets and forms of value that are firmly embedded in social relationships. For instance, forms 
of wealth such as household labour capacity, communally owned land, or in many rural contexts cattle 
(ownership of which embodies a range of social and cultural values) are neither easily commensurate 
with, nor easily convertible to money. For these reasons informal self-employment frequently demands 
the ability to trade across realms, to effect arbitrage between the social domain on one hand and the 
market on the other. The extent to which this occurs has been suggested in relation to the often hidden 
transfers of unpaid kin labour and ‘off-take’ from enterprises. 
The manner in which social imperatives can fundamentally shape the objectives or desired endpoint of 
informal self-employed economic activity has already referred to (for example the case study of cool 
drink vendor Magalama). Furthermore, these social imperatives pattern how informal economic activity is 






conducted. They shape local idioms and everyday practices of trade. An important terrain of such social 
regulation is the issue of pricing. In many of the focal retail contexts the prices of standard items are 
frequently remarkably uniform. Similar prices prevailed for the daily comestibles (bread, milk and 
seasonal fruit) sold by spaza shops; beer sold by taverner’s; and even dressmakers had roughly 
commensurate prices for standard items of apparel. This was driven by a seemingly widespread 
reluctance to engage in price competition. Many research informants denied that they competed on price, 
and attributed their (relative) success to luck, happenstances or other non-market factors. In their 
strenuous avoiding of price competition, informal vendors instead engage in what Petersen and Charman 
(2008) term ‘covert competitiveness’, whereby they attempt to secure supplier discounts, prime vending 
locations, seek to build good customer relationships or grant credit. The case studies of Neliwas, Zenzi 
and Marley saw them routinely engaged in exaggerated displays of hearty rapport with customers, which 
they readily understood to be part of their sales strategy, rather than a lower price. When questioned on 
their competitive strategies, vendors often responded in vague and obtuse ways, arguably to a degree 
which could not simply be attributed to proprietal secrecy. The reluctance to engage in price competition 
is comprehensible when considering how South Africa’s poorer communities often exhibit strong 
normative codes of reciprocity and communal solidarity. This emphasis on communal solidarity 
underpins a reluctance to compete on price. Price competition would, according to standard economic 
theory, result in lower prices and price equilibrium at the lower end of a given market. Therefore there is 
strong social pressure against trader’s ‘breaking rank’ and increasing market share by price competition in 
what would, for the collective, amount to a zero sum game. The force of the social prohibition against 
competing on price is arguably best exemplified by an example of its infraction, in response to successful 
Somali spaza shop owners in 2008. 
Following xenophobic violence in 2008, including towards Somali traders, an officially commissioned 
report (Knowledge Link Services / City of Cape Town 2009) documented how tensions rose with local 
(South African) spaza shop owners “…not being able to compete effectively with foreign spaza shop 
owners in terms of price and changing customer preferences” (46). Although a phenomenon such as 
xenophobic violence is undoubtedly complex and irreducible to single factors, it is clear that by engaging 
in overt price competition the experienced and organised Somali traders violated local mores and 
prohibitions against price based competition. This practice fed into the hostility and violence of existing 
spaza shop owners. 
The influence of social embeddedness on social relations has been described in terms of social capital. So 
too has the contestation and inequity which can characterise these networks. Social capital is not an 
unmitigated good. Individuals can be estranged from networks of social reciprocity or incorporated into 
them on highly adverse and unfavourable terms. This is the dark underbelly of social capital: contestation 
is reflected and enforced through suspicion, pervasive claims of ‘jealousy’ and is often a key factor 
driving accusations of witchcraft. Claims are typically articulated in terms of violence or the threat of 
violence. Aspects of these are evident in many of the case studies, ranging from Tenathi’s delicate and 
compliant efforts to demonstrate her lack of complicity in her sangoma confederates death, Zikhode’s 
lingering suspicion of the hand of his neighbours (jealous at his relative success) in his arrest, and Marley 





and Neliswa’s reluctance to use kin labour. The socially redistributive claims directed towards the 
informally self-employed take on many forms: tropes of jealousy and accusations of witchcraft; the 
entreaties and entitlements of kin or neighbours; criminal victimisation; and forms of unsanctioned 
claims. The management of these socially redistributive claims is a key task of the informally self-
employed. As Cichello (2005) documents, fear of these, and fear of exhausting kin entitlements, were an 
enterprise to succeed, are major hindrances to informal self-employment. 
  






6. Factors that influence informal self-employment 
The section that follows describes the most salient factors which influence informal self-employment. 
These factors ‘mediate’ informal self-employment and are described in terms of the extent to which they 
either enable, or conversely constrain, informal self-employment. 
6.1 Factors that influence informal self-employment: The structural 
context 
The structural context of the broader economy and the value chains within which the informally self-
employed are located are key determinants of success. Understanding the nature of the formal economy is 
critical to conceptualising informal self-employment. South Africa has been long industrialised, and 
subject to the forces of monetisation and commodification for over a century. The prospects for autarkic, 
subsistence production have long since been eroded. With the possible exception of traditional medicinal 
herbs, virtually every product manufactured or retailed in the informal sector has tight backward linkages 
to formal sector suppliers (Skinner, 2006). 
The complexity of challenges faced by the informally self-employed in positioning themselves relative to 
these backward linkages is starkly evident in relation to tinsmith Radebe. Although adept at producing 
and marketing his wares, Radebe had in the past drawn on the services of key intermediaries (including a 
local skills development project) to secure a supply of scrap tinplate. When he lost his connection with 
these intermediaries he was confronted with the challenge of sourcing this material.To do so necessitated 
he engage with a large, listed, multinational canning company, a task compounded by his limited 
proficiency in Afrikaans and English, his low levels of literacy and lack of access to communications 
technology (fax, email). His general lack of business sophistication made it difficult for him to write 
‘offers to purchase’ or tenders for scrap material collection. Moreover his erstwhile supply was 
interrupted by various processes of formalisation within the corporation that produced the coated sheet 
metal. Firstly a process of upgraded industrial automation meant that production had become more 
efficient, so far smaller amounts of the waste tinplate, so coveted by Radebe, was now generated. 
Secondly, the damaged and scrapped tinplate material was no longer vended at the factory gate in small 
quantities to the passing trade. Instead it was now collected as part of a contractual arrangement between 
the canning company and a corporate scrap metal merchant. Amidst these processes of automation and 
formalisation, a third set of constraints emerged, centred around intellectual property concerns. As the 
canning company producing packaging for some of South Africa’s largest food conglomerates, it had 
steadily had to assume responsibility for its clients’ ‘brand equity’. Accordingly, the canning company 
was increasingly reluctant to release material with clients’ logos and branding, particularly if this 
branding was to be emblazoned on ‘township stuff’, as a canning company official put it. 





The extent to which the informally self-employed can be enmeshed in larger markets is evident in the 
case of Raphulu. Raphulu’s vertically integrated value chain was not a quixotic attempt to avoid 
incorporation in the core economy. Instead it was carefully interlaced with both the ‘formal’ (i.e. 
dominated by white farmers) and the ‘informal’ (black) cattle market in the region. Raphulu not only 
bought superior beasts to improve his herd: in addition, (constrained by resource-poor consumers 
unwilling to pay a premium for superior quality meat) he sold his superior cattle at the commercial 
livestock auction. At the same time he purchased inferior quality cattle at these auctions for resale in the 
price-sensitive local market (he summarised his impoverished customer’s implicit belief that ‘meat is 
meat’). In this way Raphulu carefully calibrated his sales strategy to the different registers of value which 
prevailed in the ‘formal’ market and ‘informal’ markets. The thinness of this local market was a 
constraint to Raphulu growing his enterprise. 
In the face of the spatial and market access constraints faced by the largely black African informally self-
employed research informants, it is unsurprising that many of them sought to access niches in markets 
(presently) not served by formal sector corporations. An example of this is the market for live chickens 
that Freddy taps into. The customer preference for live birds is linked to widespread practices of animal 
sacrifice in the context of a strong tradition of ancestor veneration and propitiation, along with the lack of 
access to refrigeration. Another example of a market niche not yet dominated by ‘big retail’ is the demand 
for traditional garments and dresses, often for the ceremonial, matrimonial or liturgical market. 
Dressmakers such as Neliswa had tried to make, manufacture and sell garments such as tracksuits and 
school uniforms, but soon found they were unable to compete with inexpensive Asian imports. However 
the niche traditional and church uniform market was at this point impervious to external competition. 
However markets are dynamic and it ought to be emphasised that if these niches prove sufficiently 
lucrative, larger corporate players may seek to enter them. 
It is worth noting that the manner in which the self-employed negotiate their place in the value chain is 
seldom passive or marked by acquiescence. This is illustrated by two examples: that of the minibus taxi 
operators; and that of Tenathi’s second-hand goods vending business. At the time of the research the taxi 
owners (who had purchased trailers from Pelepele) were fiercely contesting local government plans to 
implement a bus-based integrated rapid transit system within the Cape Town metropolitan area. Despite 
the assurances of various state based actors that there would be a place for taxi operators to provide a 
‘feed in’ service to the transit system, the taxi operators viewed it as a real threat to their livelihoods. This 
was a set of concerns in relation to which they collectively threatened protest and disruption. 
Tenathi’s efforts to assert her place in the value chain were marked by a different strategy of response and 
agency. Her second hand goods were deliberately un-priced, as her African customers would offer her 
substantially below the price, and she inflated the asking prices to incorporate a substantial margin for bad 
debt. However the itinerant dealers who offered her goods for resale would raise their prices if they saw 
her prices and (seemingly generous) profit margins. Keeping prices secret, contingent and available only 
on enquiry, was a key technique Tenathi used to carve out a niche for herself in the space between the 
second hand dealers who offered her stock and the customers who bought from her. She readily 
understood that to give up proprietorial information and publically display her prices would amount to 






financial disadvantage and incur the risk of giving up her sometimes perilous position along the gradient 
of value between sellers and buyers. 
6.2 Factors influencing self-employment: The nature of local markets 
The nature of local markets is an important factor mediating informal self-employment. Particularly in 
resource poor contexts, consumers are highly price sensitive and there is a strong need for affordable 
products. It is evident in Rapulu’s sourcing of poor quality cattle; Nosabatha’s lack of galvanising of her 
steel products (in a corrosive costal environment); and Simon’s reflecting on his need to use inferior 
materials in his cabinets. Markets are not only resource constrained they are often marked by 
informational deficits, such as Simon’s clients not readily understanding the premium for a more 
substantial product would lead to more durable cabinetry. He lamented the race to the bottom that marked 
kitchen cabinet making in the township, where the customers only focused on price. This means the space 
for high quality, or superior combinations of price and quality (i.e. value) are constrained and inhibited. 
Not only are informal markets in such a resource constrained environment marked by intense price 
pressure and informational deficits, they are also highly reliant on forms of interpersonal guarantee and 
relational based exchange. Not only are those in these markets unable to engage with the formal sector 
through forward linkages (lacking the ability to make themselves ‘visible’ to formal sector enterprises 
(through enterprise and VAT registration, etc.) they also lack the formalisation and sophistication to move 
beyond the social niches in which they operate. 
6.3 Factors influencing informal self-employment: Formal sector links 
Scholarship has emphasised the often hybrid character of impoverished livelihoods (Bebbington, 2000; 
Du Toit & Neves, 2006; Du Toit & Neves, 2009a, 2009b; Scoones, 1998), and those examining the 
informal sector have pointed to the importance of formal sector derived income for informal self-
employment. Indeed Devey, Skinner and Valodia (2005) emphasise the churning between formal and 
informal employment. The qualitative research showed many examples where the sustainability of 
informal sector activity was linked to a history in formal labour market engagement by a household 
member either present or past. The enterprise can benefit in a number of possible ways. It can benefit 
from the regular and predictable income in the form of wages or remittances entering the household, 
which are either used as seed capital (e.g. Zenzi) or operating capital for the enterprise (Zungiswa). 
Formal sector derived incomes can also generate a legacy effect, in which they contribute to informal 
self-employment even after a worker’s withdrawal from the formal labour market. In several cases, 
particularly those of late middle aged men such as Freddy, Raphulu and Nselo there was a prior history of 
formal labour market involvement, which resulted in accumulated savings or other employment related 
benefits (such as the proceeds of a retirement, provident fund or pension) which was used as seed capital. 





The example of Magaba and Neliswa illustrates how a death benefit or pension of their deceased, formal-
sector employed husband was a major source of income required to enter into informal economic activity. 
Accumulated benefits from formal labour market engagement were in some cases important lump sums of 
capital, and converted into productive assets (Nselo’s vehicles, Neliwas’s sewing machine). 
Having sketched out the importance of formal sector linkages, either present or past, to practices of 
informal self-employment three additional points ought to be emphasised. The first is to note that a 
number of enterprises are marked by sustained levels of activity but with relatively weak formal sector 
linkages, and do not accord with the two categories described above. These enterprise-household units 
had no discernible access (past or present) to formal sector sources of income, and include the examples 
of Nongazi, Sibongile, and Tenathi. In these specific cases the households typically had other distinct 
advantages, such as their ‘first mover advantage’ (Agarwal & Gort, 2001) (especially entrepreneurial 
activity honed under the adversity of apartheid) and/or access to increasingly valuable assets such as early 
acquisition of a particularly favourable township site during the final years of influx control. 
The second point is to note that while linkages with formal sector incomes are strongly evident in relation 
to formal labour market income, state cash transfers (particularly the higher value state old age grants or 
disability grants) can be put to very similar uses, albeit within the constraints of their comparatively 
diminutive size. At the very lowest levels of informal self-employment, the resource base provided by 
South Africa’s comparatively generous (by developing country standards) state cash transfers are 
discernible. 
The third and final point is that formal sector employment is not the only benefit which accrues from 
engagement with the formal sector; the acquisition of knowledge and skills is also significant and are 
discussed in what follows. 
6.4 Factors that influence informal self-employment: Education, 
training and legacies of human capital formation 
A key factor which mediates the success of many of the informally self-employed is their access to 
human capital, skills, and training. The potential benefits of formal education are evident in the case 
studies of Marley and Sizwe. Marley’s formal schooling, and Sizwe’s extensive post-secondary school 
education, gave both men a complex and usable selection of concepts to understand their economic 
activities. 
The quantitative data show that informal self-employment is not necessarily a refuge for the uneducated. 
As Table 13 shows, the educational profile of the informally self-employed is intermediate between those 
who are ‘not employed’ or casually employed, and those who are wage employees or are formally self-
employed. For instance, relative to those who are casually employed or ‘not employed’, a somewhat 
smaller proportion of the informally self-employed have no schooling. However, relative to those in 
formal self-employment or wage employment, a somewhat higher proportion of the informally self-
employed have no schooling, and a markedly lower percentage have some secondary education. 



















No schooling 12.8% 10.9% 8.6% 6.5% 2.1% 
Some primary schooling 22.7% 28.6% 27.3% 18.7% 12.0% 
Some secondary schooling 64.4% 60.5% 63.8% 74.4% 82.3% 
Some tertiary schooling 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 3.6% 
All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The educational profile of informal self-employment has a gender dimension, as indicated in Table 14. A 
somewhat higher share of women engaging in informal self-employment, have no schooling at all. 
Despite this the share of women involved in informal self-employment who have some secondary 
education is the same as that for men (i.e. about two-thirds). 
Table 14: Educational profile of women and men by involvement in informal self-employment 
 Women Men 
Not ISE ISE Not ISE ISE 
No schooling 12.1% 11.2% 9.4% 4.8% 
Some primary schooling 21.0% 24.5% 22.8% 31.2% 
Some secondary schooling 66.9% 64.3% 67.9% 64.1% 
All 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
While the educational profiles of women and men involved in informal self-employment are not 
dramatically different, the same cannot be said of women’s and men’s earnings from informal self-
employment. These earnings are strongly differentiated by both gender and educational attainment. The 
table below shows that for both men and women, the earnings from informal self-employment (meagre 
though they are) tend to rise steeply with higher education levels, but beyond this are consistently lower 
for women than for men per educational attainment category. 
Table 15: Mean and median annual ISE income, by gender and educational attainment 
 Women Men 
Mean income Median 
income 
Mean income Median 
income 
No schooling 1,306 300 1,605 700 
Some primary schooling 2,241 500 4,669 1,000 
Some secondary schooling 4,021 1,000 11,295 2,000 
 





What accounts for these differences? One possible explanation for the gap between women and men must 
be excluded, namely it is not because our categories are too broad, such that within each category (e.g. 
‘some primary schooling’), men on average have attained more education than women.7. Part of the 
explanation may be that women’s informal enterprises are less well capitalised than men’s, as shown 
above, and to that extent there is a positive correlation (the Pearson correlation coefficient between the 
replacement value of equipment/tools and annual self-employment income is 0.43). This in itself implies 
lower incomes for women. The question of why women’s enterprises are less well capitalised than men’s 
is perhaps to some extent answerable in terms of the superior access to formal labour market employment 
that men have historically enjoyed. 
Similar gendered patterns are evident upon examining average income from self-employment in relation 
to various aspects of literacy (see Table 16). While it is not entirely clear that a higher ability with home 
language and English facilitates higher earnings from informal self-employment, or is merely a correlate 
with higher earnings, the likelihood is that it is the former. A similar question can be asked about whether 
the individual has a driver’s license. 
 
Table 16: Mean annual ISE income according to various skill levels 
 Average income from informal self-employment… 
by reading 
level in home 
language 




level in English 
by writing level 
in English 
by whether 
one has a 
driver's license 
Not at all 1,401 1,110 2,234 2,241  
Not well 1,538 1,463 3,658 3,723 
Fair 4,679 4,572 4,268 4,542 
Very well 7,398 7,505 9,308 9,196 
No  3,056 
Yes 16,565 
 
Taken together, the relationship between education and skill on the one hand, and the earnings from 
informal self-employment on the other, are echoed in the findings from the qualitative work, namely that 
the informally self-employed tend to draw on whatever skills and experience they may possess in order to 
find and exploit a social and market niche. Therefore there was, unsurprisingly often strong continuities 
between the types of activities associated with earlier wage employment and the nature of the enterprise 
initiated later on. This was evident in Freddy’s work for a formal poultry producer prior to his 
establishing a poultry enterprise; Raphulu’s job as a driver and subsequent acquisition of tipper trucks; 
                                                      
7 For instance, in principle it could be that within the category of ‘some primary schooling’, the average man had attained more years of 
schooling than the average woman; however, such a possibility was checked and thereby excluded (not shown). 






and Nonelwa’s job as a cook and later the opening of her restaurant. However, the relationship between 
skill and reward appears to be strongly conditioned by gender, to the significant disadvantage of women. 
In the absence of some other explanation for this phenomenon it can be surmised that self-employment 
opportunities are constrained by gender roles, resulting in a tendency for women to end up in the 
‘elementary occupations’ of petty trading, as indicated above. 
However skill and human capital formation ought not to be conflated with formal schooling. A focus on 
formal schooling needs to occur alongside other forms of skills acquisition. Many of the qualitative case 
studies suggest a place for shorter duration skills training. Research informants such as David, Neliswa 
and Maxaba had all benefited from formal training, which was focused on specific technical skills such as 
bee farming, dressmaking and chicken farming respectively. This ought to be contrasted with more 
generic ‘business skills’ training (financial record keeping, etc.), about which informants such as Tenathi 
were far more ambivalent (judging it irrelevant to their small enterprises). Moreover a narrow focus on 
schooling and formal skills training can obscure other routes of skills acquisition and processes of human 
capital formation.8 
Processes of human capital acquisition are best conceptualised as existing along a continuum ranging 
from formal training to informal practices of skills acquisition. The latter entails a process of occupational 
socialisation and informal apprenticeship rooted in observation, practice-based learning and forms of 
local knowledge. These provide a potentially important foundation of entry into self-employment. These 
processes of informal apprenticeship were evident in the case studies of Tenathi (through her father); 
along with mechanic Zikhode (who learnt via observation), builder Thembela (informal apprenticeship) 
and Zungiswa (who was taught how to plough by his father). Within this category of informal induction 
into activities the cases of Sibongile and Marley are useful, because they worked alongside peers (her 
husband, and his Rastafarian cohorts, respectively), to hone their skills. The case of tinsmith Radebe 
displays the complexities of these processes of skill acquisition. Radebe was largely self-taught, having 
disassembled and studied through ‘reverse engineering’ the finished products of other more skilled 
craftsman. However this method had its limitations when attempting to master the technically tricky 
fabrication of right angle corners in tinplate boxes (in this case he deliberately sought out a more skilled 
tinsmith who could teach him). 
It is also useful to bear in mind that a key demand of economic activities which require the use of 
technology, is not only technical proficiency in using the technology itself, but also the skills required for 
                                                      
8Unfortunately, NIDS is weak on vocational and skills training. Arguably the most relevant question in NIDS appears in the education module 
and reads: “Have you successfully completed any diplomas, certificates or degrees outside of school?” However, there is no further information 
captured to indicate the relevance of this for the currently self-employed. This is in contrast to the LFS, which at one stage had a reasonably good 
training sub-module, which began with the following filter question: “Has …… been trained in skills that can be used for work, e.g. book-
keeping, security guard training, welding, child-minding?” From the 2005 September LFS, we know for instance that among black adults 
involved in informal self-employment and who have some primary or secondary education, those who received some skills training in the past 
have an average income that is roughly 40% greater than those who did not (own calculations). Interestingly, however, training is of no 
discernible benefit to those in informal self-employment who have no schooling, or who are illiterate, suggesting the importance of a basic level 
of education. 





maintenance. In resource-poor contexts of economic informality, where machines (particularly powered 
machines such sewing machines, motor cars, tractors, etc.) are often old, operated intensely and under 
harsh conditions or used with little provision for their replacement; a key demand of successful self-
employment is the task of keeping the machine concerned serviced and repaired. This is a key task that 
enterprise operators either needs to take on themselves or outsource. Examples of this include Nelsiwa’s 
constant strategising around getting her heavily used domestic sewing machines serviced, the rising 
challenges faced by Nselo in keeping his rural quqa pick-up truck taxi on the road, and Zungiswa’s 
crucial proficiency in repairing his tractors. In the case of Zungiswa, he anticipated drivers would be 
found to substitute for him if he found a formal job, but it is arguably the work of keeping the tractors 
running that is the key task of this enterprise. The occupational ‘backend’ of routine tractor maintenance 
and repairs is the effort exacted to be a successful ploughing contractor. 
Finally these forms of technical competence (sewing, fixing cars, fabricating tinplate, operating a tractor) 
are necessary but insufficient preconditions for the economic activities concerned. Successful self-
employment requires a high degree of business acumen. The context of informality required the skills to 
manage: customers, the pervasive demands for credit, social networks, and potential patrons and 
benefactors. Successful informal self-employment is therefore reliant on experience, training, technical 
competence and the careful management of social networks. These are discussed in what follows. 
6.5 Factors that influence self-employment: Social networks and 
social capital 
The preceding sections highlighted the role of physical and human capital in informal self-employment, 
and noted the strong gender dimensions of each. The conceptual primacy of social relationships and 
networks in this context has been the importance of social networks and relationships in relation to 
informal self-employment. The qualitative data suggests the importance of understanding the social 
dimensions of livelihoods and enterprise strategies of the poor.9 These concerns are variously 
operationalised, sometimes as social networks or ‘social capital’. 
The extent to which informal self-employment has a ‘social capital’ component, and whether this is an 
area in which women have an advantage, can be considered in relation to the quantitative data.  For this 
purpose, the NIDS dataset includes a number of variables that could be used to try to appreciate the more 
social dimensions to agents’ milieu and strategies. Two types of variables are potentially useful. The first 
questions that probe respondents’ perceptions of others’ trustworthiness, the second, questions that asked 
about respondents’ ‘associational life’. 
                                                      
9 This in turn harkens back to other studies’ take on the significance of ‘informality’, which is not merely a reference to the fact that many 
entrepreneurs fall outside the formal regulatory apparatus, but also suggestive of the idea that informal personal relationships form part of the 
strategies that make informal enterprises function at all (see e.g. Aliber, 2002: 3). 






The first question regarding trust reads, “Imagine you lost a wallet or purse that contained R200 and it 
was found by someone who lives close by. Is it very likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all to be 
returned with the money in it?” For purposes of the analysis, ‘likely’ and ‘somewhat likely’ were 
considered as affirmative answers (i.e. so that responses are binary). The questions tested are whether the 
informally self-employed tend to be more trusting than others, and whether there is a gender dimension to 
this. The findings are reported in the table below, with the general conclusion that there is no evidence 
that the informally self-employed differ from others, nor women from men, in terms of a tendency to trust 
other people. NIDS posed a similar question as to whether a ‘stranger’ would return the wallet or purse, 
and the results were similar (i.e. lack of appreciable difference between informally self-employed and 
others, and between women and men (not shown). 
Table 17: Proportion of women and men responding ‘yes’ to question regarding trust, by gender and 
ISE status 
 Women Men Likelihood that row 
shares are same 
Not ISE 77.6% 76.4% P > |z| =  0.123 
ISE 76.4% 75.4% P > |z| =  0.795 
Likelihood that column shares 
are same 
P > |z| =  0.627 P > |z| =  0.741  
Note: Statistical test for equivalent proportions. Here and elsewhere, ‘*’ indicates 10% (two-sided) significance 
level; ‘**’ indicates 5% significance level, ‘***’ indicates 1% significance level, and no stars indicates not 
significant at any conventionally recognised level. 
However, the situation is quite different in respect of ‘associational life’. ‘Associational life’ was 
operationalised using the NIDS data by means of the set of 18 questions asking whether the respondent 
belongs to various types of local associations (e.g. stokvels, burial associations, community gardens, 
sports groups, church groups, etc.). Excluded from consideration was a single question, regarding 
membership of the ‘tribal authority’, on the grounds that the meaning is ambiguous; the remaining 17 
questions were used. Two variables were created from this, of which one is a number between 0 and 17 
depending on how many associations/clubs/etc. the respondent reported belonging to, and the other is a 
dummy variable that is 0 if the individual belongs to none and 1 if they belong to one or more. Ultimately 
the latter variable was felt to be more useful, given that most respondents who do belong to these local 
associations belong to only one in any event. The table below accordingly shows the proportion of 
respondents who belong to one or more local associations, distinguishing again between the informally 
self-employed and others, and between women and men.10 The findings can be summarised as follows: 
                                                      
10A logical suspicion might be that the informally self-employed are more likely to join local associations because in particular they are likely to 
join traders’ associations. In fact one of the types of associations that the NIDS questionnaire inquires about is ‘informal traders groups’. 
However, it turns out that these attract very few members in total, moreover the results of the statistical tests reported here are effectively 
unchanged if one omits this type of association from consideration in determining the 0/1 dummy variable. 





  Women are more likely to be ‘joiners’ than men, but this is especially the case when considering 
women who are informally self-employed as compared to informally self-employed men. 
  Women who are informally self-employed are far more likely to be ‘joiners’ relative to women 
who are not informally self-employed. 
  Men who are informally self-employed appear to be modestly more likely to be ‘joiners’ relative 
to men who are not informally self-employed, however in contrast to the situation of women this 
comparison is not statistically robust. 
Table 18: Proportion of people belonging to local community-based associations, by gender and ISE 
status 
 Women Men Likelihood that row 
shares are same 
Not ISE 37.1% 35.2% P > |z| =  0.024** 
ISE 54.6% 38.5% P > |z| =  0.000*** 
Likelihood that column shares 
are same 
P > |z| =  0.000*** P > |z| = 0.301  
Note: Statistical considerations as noted below the previous table. 
The observation that those engaged in informal self-employment are more likely to involve themselves in 
local associational life holds true for each of the four geo-types, though for urban informal areas the 
comparison is not statistically robust (See table below). If one disaggregates by both geo-type and gender, 
then the comparisons noted above are maintained and are mostly statistically significant at the 5% level or 
lower. The evidence is conclusive that informally self-employed women participate in local associational 
life more so than other women, and more so than men who are informally self-employed (not shown). 
Table 19: Participation in local ‘associational life’, by self-employment status and geo-type 
 Rural formal Ex-Bantustan Urban formal Urban informal 
Not ISE 28.0% 35.3% 39.3% 39.2% 
ISE 51.5% 46.7% 49.8% 45.6% 
Likelihood that column 
shares are same 
P > |z| =  0.003*** P > |z| =  0.000*** P > |z| =  0.002*** P > |z| =  0.339 
 
Lest one imagine that this is a trivial or arcane issue, the analysis compared average incomes from self-
employment depending on whether the individual belonged to a local association of some kind or not, and 
by gender. The statistical test is applied to women and men separately (i.e. the comparison of interest is 
not between men and women but between women who do and do not belong, and for men who do and do 
not belong). More will be said about the income differences between women and men in the following 
subsection. The findings are astonishing. Women who belong to some kind of local association earn on 
average twice as much from their informal self-employment activities as women who do not, and the 






difference is significant at below the 2.5% level. For men, the situation is reversed: belonging to a local 
association is associated with an average income about half as great as that earned by those men who do 
not belong; this comparison is also significant at below the 2.5% level.11 What accounts for this stark 
difference is unclear from the quantitative data however it supports the contention that involvement in 
associational life is a particularly advantageous way in which women who are self-employed in the 
informal sector organise themselves. 
This finding can be related to insights concerning the gendered reconfiguration of impoverished 
livelihoods in contemporary South Africa. In the context of the rural Eastern Cape, Bank (2002) notes 
how it is women, rooted in the gendered networks of mutual assistance and community mobilisation that 
have historically proved particularly adept at positioning themselves relative to state and donor-led 
development interventions. Women, rather than men, demonstrate the nimbleness required to reconfigure 
both activities and organisations and to respond to a dynamic succession of development projects (e.g. 
early childhood development centres, school feeding schemes, agricultural and beading, sewing and 
various other income generating schemes). Whereas men, perhaps rooted in century-old cultural script of 
formal labour migration and prospect of toil in a fixed ‘job’, appear to be less accustomed to the 
improvisatory repertoire of livelihood-making, social-reproduction and the forms of associational life 
these demand. Therefore it is the women in this context who create and harness these forms of 
associational life to aid their informal self-employment, thereby compensating for much of the 
disadvantage they face. 
Table 20: Mean incomes from informal self-employment, by ‘associational status’ and gender 
 Women Men 
Does not belong 1,300 5,023 
Belongs 2,665 2,387 
Likelihood that column values are same P > |z| =  0.017** P > |z| =  0.019** 
 
One theme that arose in the course of the qualitative fieldwork for this study was migration and 
relocation. Of the respondents from rural Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, for instance, approximately half 
had spent much of their economic prime in Gauteng or the Western Cape, returning to their rural roots 
later in life and seeking to commence an enterprise there. Given the importance noted above as to 
associational life, one might wonder whether migrants experience a disadvantage in business relative to 
those informal sector entrepreneurs who are already well established in the area. While the income 
comparisons in this regard are inconclusive, there is strong evidence to the effect that women who 
                                                      
11 A non-parametric test comparing the median incomes was also applied, and the results support the t-test results noted above. Among women, 
median incomes of those who belong are higher with a probability of falsely concluding to that effect being 0.066. For men, those who belong 
earn less, with a probability of false conclusion being 0.107 (i.e. not quite within the 10% significance level). 





relocate are especially likely to involve themselves in the local associational life, and even more so if they 
happen to be pursuing informal self-employment. 
 Table 21:  Proportion of women belonging to local community-based associations, by relocation and 
ISE status 
 Not ISE ISE Likelihood that row 
shares are same 
Did not relocate 34.0% 47.5% P > |z| =  0.000*** 
Relocated 41.0% 59.7% P > |z| =  0.000*** 
Likelihood that column shares 
are same 
P > |z| =  0.000*** P > |z| =  
0.025** 
 
Note: No attempt was made to adjust for the fact that among respondents who indicated that they had relocated, 
some did so more recently than others. Neither was any account taken of the ‘nature’ of the relocation (e.g. from 
rural to urban or vice versa). 
6.6 Factors that influence self-employment: Economic governance 
Understanding the ‘right to trade’, and the manner in which the informally self-employed acquire and use 
it, is a crucial dimension in understanding informal self-employment. The ‘right to trade’ is bound up 
with larger systems of governance. Although much scholarship is traditionally concerned with aspects of 
state-based regulation, forms of informal, non-state based governance of economic activity are equally 
important (Meagher, 2010). Both forms of economic governance are considered in what follows. 
Regimes of economic governance are contextually rooted and spatially organised, hence they take on 
different forms at rural and urban sites. In the discussion that follows, some of the prevailing forms of 
economic governance at the rural and then urban sites respectively are considered. In contemporary South 
Africa a significant source of difference between the urban and former-homeland rural locales, is the 
institution of the hereditary chieftaincy. In common with much of post-colonial Africa, South Africa is 
characterised by bifurcated regimes of governance, and even citizenship. While urban inhabitants are full 
citizens of civic authority, rural residents of the communal areas are the ‘subjects’ of hereditary traditional 
authorities (Mamdani, 1996). In dispensing rural governance, the chieftaincy derives much of its 
authority, and exercises its power, in relation to three domains: the settling of minor disputes; attesting to 
the residency of local inhabitants; and the allocation of land. Despite rhetorical appeals to tradition and 
pre-colonial ‘culture’, traditional authorities have for decades effectively been minor paid administrative 
functionaries of the state. In the communal areas of the former homelands they have dispensed 
governance in geographical spaces where the state is often absent or unevenly present. 
In these locales the informally self-employed such as the quqa operator Nselo derive their right to trade 
from their residency. Hence Nselo explained a hypothetical new entrant to the quqa trade would have to 
live in the village, by securing a rural residential site, allocated by the local headman. This was in addition 
to other criteria, such as membership of the appropriate ‘van association’ with its attendant membership 
fees and fixed routes. Although the association is informal and ostensibly voluntary, Nselo thought it 






unlikely and provocative that anybody would attempt to operate a taxi without membership of the 
association. To do so would almost certainly evoke stern sanction. 
These forms of governance predicated on forms of traditional chiefly authority can be contrasted with 
urban sites. In both the small rural towns of Mount Frere and Elim, but particularly urban Khayelitsha, 
forms of civic authority associated with the modern state are more evident and coincide with denser 
agglomerations of state services. Traditional authorities are comparatively absent in these areas. Regimes 
of formal regulation associated with the modern state, including environmental health regulation 
(especially for food retail), land use planning (zoning, and specific spatial affordances for informal 
economic activity).Liquor regulations and road traffic law enforcement are particularly evident in the 
urban township of Khayelitsha, nestled as it is within a larger metropolitan area of Cape Town. 
Against this backdrop of differentiated forms of governance at the rural and urban sites, it is useful to 
consider the relationship between formal state-based governance and informal varieties. In practice, the 
systems of governance are often intertwined, and even forms of state-based governance are significantly 
shaped by informal (viz. non-state) based varieties. This intertwined or ‘nested’ quality of economic 
governance was evident in the rural site and included the ‘formal’ officially endorsed traditional 
authority, and the distinctly informal (the ‘van association’). Contoured by the specificity of the context, 
forms of authority and practices of economic governance have similarly intertwined characteristics at the 
urban sites. 
In urban Khayelitsha, recollections of the role of the community based civic organisations and street 
committees were prominent in historical recollections of the allocation of trading sites. These 
organisations were historically aligned to the anti-apartheid struggle, and represented important sources of 
governance in a context where the state lacked popular legitimacy and its authority was contested. 
Although the apartheid state and resistance to it have long since disappeared, significant aspects of 
informal, non-state authority endure to this day in the urban township. A local taxi rank in Khayelitsha 
provides a prime site to examine this. 
Research informants who worked in close proximity to the taxi rank (Neliwsa, Cynthia, Zikhode) readily 
identified the local ‘taxi association’, as an important source of authority. The voluntary association (it 
has no statutory basis) effectively runs the taxi rank, and the traders variously indicated they could appeal 
to the offices of the association to adjudicate disputes and deal with and deter criminals. Therefore 
hairdresser Cynthia remarked that the monthly ‘sweeping fee’ she paid to the taxi association, cleansed 
the area not just of litter but of the worst of the criminal depredations. Among research participants the 
taxi association was widely regarded as a source of governance and a buttress against unsanctioned claims 
in the form of victimisation by criminals. In a context marked by informality, the local taxi association is 
therefore an important vector of local governance. There was a clear spatial dimension to this dynamic, 
with its power and authority concentrated in close physical proximity to the taxi rank, and waning as it 
grows more distant. Finally, it is marked by the interpenetration of formal and informal authority, and 
systems of economic governance that characterise many of the spaces occupied by the informally self-





employed. The taxi rank is located on municipally owned land and is nominally overseen by a municipal 
official, yet the association effectively controls the rank and the state’s influence is somewhat limited, 
particularly during periods of episodic, violent contestation. 
The dynamic and intertwined quality of much economic governance in the informal sector is also evident 
in relation to other domains such as, road traffic law enforcement of the rural truck taxi (quqa) and the 
township liquor trade. The first example is the case of quqa driver Nselo. During the research period, an 
accident with mass fatalities of commuting schoolchildren catalysed stringent enforcement of traffic law-
enforcement. Drivers of quqa’s are required to hold a ‘Public Driver’s Permit’ (PDP), and Nselo’s 
expired permit was the source of difficulties with the traffic police. However while current road traffic 
regulations permit the transportation of passengers in the load bed of a truck, they may not be carried for 
gain (i.e. as fare paying passengers), yet this regulation is routinely overlooked across much of rural 
South Africa. In the focal research site of the rural Eastern Cape, traffic authorities began enforcing the 
requirement for a PDP, but continued to overlook the prohibition against carrying fare-paying passengers 
in loadbed of trucks. When questioned on this, the local traffic authority ascribed the parochial tolerance 
of the pick-up truck quqas to residents of the area being poor and unable to afford a safer mode of 
transport. 
Even this law has a variegated local application. The local quqa drivers could only travel (the 
predominantly unpaved roads) between a town and its surrounding villages. They tacitly understood that 
to venture on a longer distance trip to an adjacent province, would violate local selective application of 
the law and tempt the invocation of the routinely overlooked regulation and legal sanction. The formal 
regime of road traffic regulation, and its codified edifice of law, was therefore subjected to a shifting local 
interpretation and intelligibility, in which formal statute was accommodated to a local reality. In this way 
regimes of economic governance often have a hybrid, spatially contingent quality and are manifest in 
ways generally understood by both the enforcer and the enforced. 
At the urban site, the regulation of the township liquor trade provided an example of a recalibration of 
informal practice in the face of shifting state regulation. The township liquor trade has long been an object 
of state regulatory concern and rather uneven enforcement. Research participants such as Nogazi and 
Zama had for years engaged in various practices such as maintaining low stock levels (to minimise 
confiscatory loses) and surveillance of the street to elude the police, as they sought to operate with 
discretion and minimise complaints from adjacent neighbours. This repertoire of activities was widely 
understood to be part of the challenge of operating a shebeen. However, towards the end of the research 
period in 2010, policing departed from long established practice of simply raiding shebeens, and focused 
on the wholesale and transportation of alcohol. In response Nongazi scaled back her operation 
considerably, while Zama engaged in a cat-and-mouse game of evading enforcement efforts. He engaged 
multiple confederates to purchase more than the police-prescribed five crates of commercially brewed 
beer (deemed appropriate for personal consumption or ‘traditional ceremony’ use). Zama would drive five 
men to the local wholesaler and each would present their identity book to ostensibly buy five crates for 
him. Sustaining the ruse required Zama to arrange to store the surplus stock with his proximate 
neighbours: all of which made for an exhausting exercise and simply expanded the number of 






confederates he had to reward.  Unsurprisingly, Zama complained this was adversely affecting his 
enterprise. 
The ‘nested’, dynamic and hybrid quality of the relationship between formal and informal economic 
governance, presented in the above examples serves to challenge the notion of a firm and binary 
distinction between formal and informal, state-based and non-state regulation. Instead economic 
governance representatives are syncretic; they are a patchwork quilt of what Guyer (2004) calls 
‘formalisms’. Enterprises and activities are enmeshed or ‘embedded’ in twin contexts of communal and 
social networks on one hand, and the overarching context constituted by the state on the other. This 
quality is a ‘mixed embeddedness’ (Kloorsterman, Van der Leun and Rath, 1999), which marks much of 
the economic informality is particularly pronounced in a context such as South Africa where, unlike much 
of the rest of the African continent, the state (and the formal economy) are far from absent or ‘hollowed 
out’ (Bayant, Ellis & Hibou, 1999). 
Finally, central to varieties of informal economic governance is enforcement through violence or the 
threat of violence. This is best illustrated by South Africa’s foremost informal sector industry: the 
minibus taxi industry. Taxi association’s operate, to quote a report of an official state inquiry, “…like a 
modern day mafia with the power to kill people who disagree with them and threaten their interests” 
(Western Cape Provincial Government, 2005, 111). Accounts of the industry document the extraction of 
tribute by taxi associations, the amassing of vast war chests and the hiring of covert assassination squads 
to murder rivals. 
In the qualitative empirical material collected in this research, several of the case studies documented the 
use of violence, or the threat of violence. Hence, the key to much informal self-employment therefore 
entails the ability to manage violence and similar such redistributive claims. Much violence in the South 
African context has a strongly relational quality (where the perpetrator and victim are known to each 
other). In statistical terms much of it is committed by poor people on other poor people and therefore can 
seldom be reduced to perpetrator’s instrumental calculations of material gain (CSVR/DSS 2008). In the 
course of the research, accounts of violence were evident in relations to claims of communal jealousy, not 
infrequently accusations of witchcraft and the informally self-employeds’ on-going task of managing 
unsanctioned or redistributive social claims. While much of the academic writing on the informal 
economy in Africa tends to exoticise the informal sector, Meagher (2009) notes that violence is often a 
response to enduring economic adversity and regulatory retreat. In the context of the minibus taxi industry 
discussed earlier, this is an explanatory concept that even official accounts support. The report of the 
official inquiry explicitly identifies how violence is enabled by a regulatory vacuum that marks the 
minibus taxi industry (Western Cape Provincial Government, 2005). 





6.7 Factors that influence informal self-employment: Infrastructure 
and services 
The data supports the contention that infrastructural provision is an important enabling factor for much 
informal self-employment. Basic services and the provision of services such as trading spaces, refuse 
removal and electricity were important to many, and virtually all of the larger food or beverage retailers 
depended on refrigeration of their wares. While the role played by the provision of infrastructure was 
evident in both urban and rural sites, it was particularly dramatic in the rural sites which had recently 
received electricity. Cool drink seller Magalama traced the convergence of several factors (capital from 
her state age grant, urban remittances, the building of a house and, crucially, the electrification of her 
village), as factors that enabled her cool drink vending. Maxaba similarly ‘self-provisioned’ herself 
around water supply by paying a contractor to illicitly plumb a connection into a water pipeline, thereby 
facilitating her agricultural production. The benefits of the irrigation were very apparent, in the expanse of 
her green market garden, amidst the autumnal colours of the surrounding landscape. At the urban sites, 
Zenzi’s polony vending was enabled by her prime location on the station concourse where she was both 
protected from the inclement Cape weather and the close proximity of the station security guards which 
served to deter criminals.  However the absence of infrastructure can also provide some of the small 
interstices for the operating of small enterprises. In the case of Mamjoli her acquisition of a gas powered 
fridge, and crucially the resources and labour to continuously replenish the LPG gas cylinders that 
powered it, was a major competitive advantage in an un-electrified rural village. It is likely that the 
extension of the state’s electrification programme to her deep rural village will lower the barriers to 
operating a fridge, and precipitate new entrants into the petty retailing and selling of food and beer. It is 
conceivable that electrification will therefore spur new enterprises, intensify competition, eroding 
Mamjoli’s competitive advantage. 
Against the backdrop of the upgrading of informal settlements in urban Khayelitsha the cases of Radebe, 
Thejiwe and Nongazi point to the importance of infrastructure. As does a counterfactual case of the 
consequences of its loss, by tinsmith Radebe, when his residential and workshop shack was demolished in 
a process of ‘de-densification’.  Although his newly allocated concrete block house was weatherproof and 
larger, his case study details how it proved to be an inadequate site from which to work. Not only did his 
new unfamiliar, proximate neighbours object to the hammering emanating from his home workshop, he 
was now far from his prime vending site. He sought to overcome these constraints by building a rough 
stall from scrap materials on a road reserve, which was repeatedly demolished. 
The essential point here is that much informal self-employment is honed over time in small and fragile 
spatial, social and livelihood niches. Processes of infrastructure development which see changes in the 
built environment frequently precipitate changes in prevailing social arrangements. While the provision of 
improved infrastructure may, on aggregate, represent an improvement in beneficiaries’ standards of living 
and future ability to engage in informal self-employment, it can also be highly disruptive of existing 
activities. 






6.8 Factors that influence informal self-employment: Credit and 
savings 
The issue of credit, both the managing of claims for credit and securing of credit are key factors faced by 
many of the informally self-employed, and can critically mediate their success. The pressure to grant 
credit to impoverished customers is intensely felt by many of the informally self-employed. This strong 
demand for credit ought to be understood against widespread practices of extending credit in a resource 
deprived context. It is a reality reflected in the vast range of financial instruments on which the 
impoverished African typically relies. Detailed financial diary based inquiry showed an average of 11 
financial instruments (both formal and informal) that were used (Collins 2005; Collins, Morduch, 
Rutherford & Ruthven, 2009). In addition, requests for credit and responses to these requests are 
inextricably social and hence patterned by the architecture of social networks, and the dynamics of 
managing these networks, as discussed earlier. 
Responses to customer requests for credit generally vary along a continuum, ranging from capitulation on 
one extreme to resistance on the other. Certain respondents such as Sibongile, Nongazi and Freddy often 
vigorously resisted extending credit, but others such as Maurice, Aubrey, Rasta, Radebe, Nosolomzi, 
Zungiswa and Neliswa granted varying levels of credit. Of those who granted credit, some such as 
Neliswa maintained carefully written records and strategically sold her shoes where she was not locally 
resident. She reasoned her customers would be more inclined to honour their debt to her if she was 
relatively unknown and outside the local circuits of social claims and entitlements. On the other hand, 
Radebe and Nozolomzi engaged in elaborate procedures to vette potential creditors. Radebe’s sales 
employees recorded debtor’s cell phone numbers and accompanied them to their homes to verify 
residential addresses. Similarly, Nosolomzi and Nonelwa were willing to extend credit to those with solid, 
formal sector jobs. Nosolomzi verified the employment of teachers by enquiring after their employment at 
their schools. Some research participants such as Sizwe, Thembela or Sibongile had in the past extended 
credit, but were now disinclined to do so due to the difficulties in collecting debt. Builder Thembela even 
contemplated changing his trade to the manufacture and vending of welded items to anonymous buyers in 
town, outside the networks of village life. In all of the above cases the management of debt and debtors 
generally relied on one of two broad strategies. The first is to resist or deflect requests for credit and 
evade customers (or potential customers) claims and entitlements. The second strategy, in 
contradistinction, relied on various kinds of diligent vetting, petty surveillance and even a process of 
building the ‘weak links’ (Granovetter, 1985) required for inducing payment from recalcitrant debtors. 
Although credit constraints have been identified as hindrances to informal self-employment in the 
literature (Cichello 2005, Chandra & Rajaratnam, 2001), the empirical material suggests this to be a 
complex issue. While some research participants describe themselves as in need of creditor microfinance 
others resisted this idea. Hence Sibongile in 2007, in anticipation of the expansion of her enterprise, had 
saved up a considerable sum of the money required. Although frustrated in this ambition by her divorce 
and loss of her property, she subsequently used her savings to fund the construction of a new shop. 





Sibongile was generally critical of supplier credit and what she believed to be the extortionate interest 
rates involved. She doubted her ability to service the debt, and turned it down. It is important to 
emphasise that enquiries about credit and microfinance took place in a context where microfinance is 
regularly touted in relation to the problems faced by those in the SMME sector. It is therefore not always 
apparent how large a problem credit constraints pose to the informally self-employed, or if they simply 
know this to be a form of assistance they can plausibly expect from resourced outsiders. Hence Nselo’s 
2006 request to the research team that he needed credit to fix his wrecked vehicles was undercut by the 
fact that he both held a variety of formal sector financial instruments, and subsequently consolidated his 
assets by selling off the wrecked and unproductive vehicles. 
With regards to savings and risk management there is evidence of rotating savings societies being used as 
risk management and savings vehicles, and of funeral insurance being widely held amongst the 
respondents. In this way the management of money earned from informal self-employment derived 
money was channelled into savings instruments embedded in the realm of tangible social reciprocity. 
Ownership of formal financial sector savings products (bank fixed deposits, commercial endowment and 
annuity products) was limited to particular older men with histories of formal employment. While there 
did seem to be an anecdotal increase in the number of bank accounts held amongst the previously 
researched informants, risk management instruments such as short term insurance, disability and income 
protection cover were largely unknown amongst the case study informants. This dearth is significant and 
points to a key aspect of the vulnerability of the survivalist self-employed, and impoverished South 
Africans in general. Their marginality is reflected in their vulnerability to risk, as they typically have 
limited access to markets for financial intermediation, illiquid assets (such as livestock, communal land 
and township properties) and have risk-sharing mechanisms that are inefficient or poorly hedged against 
shocks such as natural disasters or adverse macroeconomic events (shack fires, spikes in food prices, 
currency devaluations) (Devereux, 2001). Devereux attributes this poor access to risk mitigation 
instruments to ‘information asymmetries, chronic poverty, lack of collateral, covariant risk and high 
transaction costs’ (514). Risk continues to be a major constraint on informal self-activity. As Cichello 
suggests, it makes people reluctant to engage in informal self-employment because they do not wish to 
give up the mutual support and social reciprocity. 
In conclusion informal self-employment is influenced by a structural context of linkages, local markets, 
human capital, social networks, gender dynamics of local governance, the provision of infrastructure, and 
issues of debt, credit and savings. These factors, against the backdrop of the larger structural context, 
social networks and larger household trajectories shape the prospects of the informally self-employed. 






7. The impact of state-endorsed programmes on SMME 
support and development 
This chapter discusses the impact of the state (and state-endorsed) programmes which aim to support 
small and micro-enterprise in South Africa. These data were collected largely from face-to-face 
interviews and workshops conducted at the research sites, and from a review of secondary sources such as 
policy documents. While the findings were diverse and views expressed by policy makers were many and 
varied, for analytical purposes the findings are categorised into seven key thematic areas. Firstly this 
chapter examines the limits of state support for the survivalist self-employed. Secondly, enterprise 
support organisations are examined. The chapter thirdly signposts the importance of appropriate skills 
training, before proceeding to examine local (particularly municipal) government and support for the 
informally self-employed. The chapter then examines the place of co-operatives as a modality for SMME 
support, before, reflecting on the challenges of policy co-ordination and finally considering the on-going 
pressures towards formality. 
7.1 The limits of state support for small scale survivalist self-
employed 
At the outset it needs to be recognised that there are substantial limits to support directed at survivalist 
enterprises. Most survivalist enterprises are engaged in retail under extremely adverse conditions, and 
have constrained prospects of growth or up-scaling. Several commentators have identified the disjuncture 
in much SMME policy discourse, between the recognition of the inherent limits of the sector, and the 
kinds of policy recommendations that are subsequently advanced (Rogerson, 2000, 2002; Driver et al. 
2001; Von Broembsen, 2008). Related to this is the often implicit notion of a business continuum or 
‘ladder’, which several (Napier et al, 2001; Von Broembsen, 2008) criticise as a rather heroic assumption, 
ungrounded in the pragmatic constraints faced by the small scale, survivalist informally self-employed. 
The majority of SMMEs are small survivalist enterprises, with limited prospects for growth or 
employment creation. This calls into debate the extent to which they are able to benefit from enterprise 
support, as opposed to interventions targeted at human and social development more generally. 
7.2 Enterprise support services: Prospects and constraints 
The research revealed that SMME support organisations often work hard to serve their targeted clients, 
despite the constraints they frequently face. At the urban sites, these organisations deliver a range of 
enterprise support services, whereas at the focal rural sites there appears to be a greater preponderance of 
support for co-operatives(often with a focus on the agricultural and light manufacturing sectors). The 
nature of these enterprise support services, in the focal research sites, is discussed in what follows. 





In the Eastern Cape research site in Mount Ayliff, DTI’s Small Enterprises Development Agency (SEDA) 
supported and registered a total of 15 co-operatives, 12 of which were funded by Alfred Nzo District 
Municipality and Umsimvubu Local Municipality. In addition SEDA contributed towards the training of 
various groups of beneficiaries in Mount Ayliff. This training and the numbers of beneficiaries involved, 
give a sense of local economic conditions and prospects: 15 bed and breakfast entrepreneurs were trained 
in health safety; 75 in advice on how to secure tenders, 75 in financial management and 75 in basic skills 
development and management. SEDA also reportedly assisted a local computer school with registration 
and accreditation. SEDA's self-reported success in the area must however been seen against the backdrop 
of a dearth of enterprise support in Mount Frere and Mount Ayliff, and the fact that it is the only 
organisation rendering non-financial (i.e. non-loan making) support to SMMEs. Furthermore, as the 
beneficiaries of the training were not interviewed, it is difficult to assess its efficaciousness. Yet, the 
views of hawkers affiliated to Mount Frere Traders Association are illustrative; most traders who had 
been beneficiaries of SEDA support found bookkeeping training of mixed utility. Two respondents went 
as far as to dub it 'useless'. They both expressed a desire for financial and loan assistance, and reflected on 
their difficult relationship with the all-important local municipality. The local municipality had 
demolished the informal stands from which they trade, and reportedly did not include them in discussions 
around zoning and trading space allocation. Several informants argued that this negated the potential 
benefits of SEDA training. These issues will be discussed further in the section on Skills Training below, 
and illustrate the sometimes dichotomous experience of informally self-employed on the ground, in 
relation to the actions of the state. 
Local inquiry also reflected some of the limits of SEDA’s activities. The rural service centres of Mount 
Ayliff and Mount Frere only had a single business advisor until 2009; by 2010 it had two business 
advisors, but one adviser was un-replaced while on maternity leave. Tasked with serving the 
geographically dispersed Mount Frere and Mount Ayliff areas, and clients in need of intensive business 
mentoring, it would appear that current staffing levels are inadequate to address the needs of these 
communities. 
However SEDA registered some modest successes in Thohoyandou, Limpopo Province (complemented 
by the Limpopo Business Support Agency (LIBSA)) which offered similar support. In Thohoyandou, 
SEDA helped aspiring co-operative members draft business plans and access finance. Current beneficiary 
enterprises included vegetable and poultry farming, egg production, and some modest garment 
manufacturing. Amongst the 15 businesses that LIBSA reported having successfully ‘incubated’ in 2010, 
were some in vegetable production, catering, bed and breakfasts, and construction and hairdressing 
enterprises. LIBSA had also run a ‘Youth Entrepreneurs’ competition, where entrants submitted business 
plans, and the winning plan received R200 000 towards implementation. 
Away from the smaller rural towns, in the large metropolitan site of Cape Town most beneficiaries of 
state enterprise support were individual entrepreneurs in the retail and service sectors. In Cape Town, a 
key player was Real Enterprise Development (Red Door), which ran a successful ‘voucher’ programme, 
co-sponsored by the City of Cape Town (CCT). The voucher programme funded independent service 






providers to help aspiring entrepreneurs draft business plans and develop the requisite skills.12 
Cumulatively, Red Door offices reported supporting 782 beneficiaries in 2010 (exceeding the planned 
target of 713). The bulk of beneficiaries were mentored (551), but other categories of assistance included 
help in developing business plans (231), conducting enterprise health checks (15) and assistance with 
branding (24)13. 
Inquiry also revealed that Red Door had experimented with a novel activity targeting small scale 
survivalist beneficiaries, who are often beneath the threshold of enterprise support services. From March 
2005 to March 2006, it hosted a competition whereby a large number of microenterprise ‘winners’ 
received R1000 towards their businesses, but crucially entrants were not required to formalise their 
enterprise. In addition Red Door introduced a financial assistance programme (viz. Red Finance), which 
benefitted only 82 entrepreneurs (out of the 310 target), before it was suspended under uncertain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, despite not meeting its stated target, Red Door has assisted significantly 
more aspirant entrepreneurs on a larger scale than documented amongst other support enterprises. 
Unsurprisingly, Red Door had more staff, relative to the one or two enterprise development staffers in the 
Mount Frere and Mount Ayliff SEDA. However, even in the populous urban township of Khayelitsha, 
Red Door’s Khayelitsha branch had only four business advisors, with only one of them mobile and able to 
visit clients at their premises. 
Despite some of the success stories associated with SMME support organisations, many grappled with a 
number of weaknesses which hampered their efficacy. Apart from the familiar obstacles of resources and 
staffing, enterprise support services were reportedly constrained by a relative dependency on provincial or 
national government departments for operational prescriptions. They also grappled with rigid inclusion 
criteria for clients. These selection criteria limited the organisations’ ability to tailor their offerings to 
conditions on the ground, and served to exclude potential clients. The question of how to screen potential 
beneficiaries by their scale remains a vexed issue. Many suggested that current screening techniques 
within enterprise support are not entirely reliable and identifying appropriate individuals is a somewhat 
hit and miss affair. Some informants associated with SEDA in the Western Cape initially indicated in an 
interview that they had a paper based instrument to gauge applicants entrepreneurial attitude’ and 
orientation, but subsequent inquiry saw officials disavowing this, as attempts to find this elusive 
screening instrument failed. Despite this, there seemed to be a strong desire for such a screening tool. 
In discussing the limits and constraints of SMME support services, it is also important to reflect on the 
fact that their location within local communities could see them drawn into parochial rivalries and 
political contestations. Enterprise support services frequently had to navigate political intrigue at the local 
level. For instance, in Limpopo, traditional leaders were perceived to be interfering with the work of 
                                                      
12A similar approach is used by the Gauteng Enterprise Propeller, which is an agency of the Gauteng Provincial Government. 
13Beneficiaries could receive more than one service. 





service providers, through pressing for particular initiatives or sets of socially connected beneficiaries. In 
the context of urban Cape Town local political contestations were particularly strongly felt in the lead up 
to the 2011 local government elections. Some incumbent officials suggested that the African National 
Congress (ANC) aligned officials had claimed Red Door as their political initiative, and argued their 
particularly constituents ought to be well represented amongst its beneficiaries. These claims were 
articulated in a context where the local Red Door service providers maintained close working 
relationships and co-operated with the (DA-led) local administration. The precise veracity of these claims 
is of less relevance than the fact that, on occasion, the programme and the potential beneficiaries’ that 
were entitled to participate in it became refracted through the lens of political rivalries. Finally there was 
also the suggestion that even amongst the relatively scanty services there was a degree of duplication 
between service providers. 
7.3 Facilitating access to appropriate skills and training 
Skills development and training was identified as an important area of SMME development, and was a 
need expressed by officials and policy making informants within data gathering workshops. Despite this 
stated need, training was far from problematic. Many respondents noted the apparent disconnect between 
the content of training courses and the demands of entrepreneurial activities. While enterprise support 
practitioners frequently argued that training needed to incorporate a firm focus on individual mentoring 
over time in order to be effective, courses were often of relatively short duration. Hence there is a tension 
between the need for training interventions to support aspirant entrepreneurs over a relatively lengthy 
time frame, with the relatively truncated duration of (often short) courses with negligible ‘hands-on’ 
components. 
In addition, courses often focus on generic business skills such as book-keeping, business management 
and business plan writing, rather than offering specific, often technical, skills. Beneficiaries also noted 
that programmes seldom extended to the final step of direct assistance without securing the financial and 
material assistance they required. 
Different role-players in the enterprise support different, domain articulated, ideas about who ought to be 
charged with delivering training programmes, and at what level. For example, some suggested that the 
Department of Basic Education ought to include entrepreneurship in primary school curricula. Against the 
backdrop of ascending levels of state endorsement for Co-operatives, driven particularly by DTI and the 
Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (GOGTA) a Co-operative Academy had 
been proposed, in mooted partnership with the Ministry of Higher Education. It was therefore unclear 
where the foci of entrepreneurship training ought to be, and what combination of primary, secondary and 
tertiary educational institutions it ought to involve. Presently, enterprise support offerings remain 
relatively disconnected from formal educational institutions, existing school curricula and articulate 
poorly with pathways to further training. 
Some stakeholders in enterprise support services suggested that learning in partnership with the private 
sector or even directly from the private sector might be more effective than a narrow focus on classroom 






based instruction. They argued that entrepreneurs would benefit from the skills transfer and market access 
available through these arrangements. While it seems intuitively plausible that striking a better balance 
between theory and practice would benefit fledgling SMMEs, it remained unclear how these kinds of 
interactions would be incentivised or institutionally supported. While affirmative procurement and black 
economic empowerment (BEE) may offer some points of policy leverage, broad appeals to corporate 
beneficence are likely to be of limited effectiveness. 
Given the experience of support organisations documented above, there is ample scope to build on their 
successes and tackle the problem areas, such as resourcing, operating prescriptions, key criteria for 
including, articulation with local authorities and education and training. 
7.4 Municipalities: A focus on support or regulation? 
Local municipalities are not only the key contact point for citizens to access state services, they also carry 
an important developmental mandate. With regard to SMMEs support and development, metropolitan and 
district municipalities are expected to design SMME strategies and regulate SMMEs. However their 
contribution to SMMEs is potentially awkward as they are seldom intended to be service providers but 
rather co-ordinate service delivery from different departments and spheres of government departments 
(Fray, 2006). Furthermore SMME strategies are also not necessarily implemented by district 
municipalities, but rather by local municipalities (who in turn do not devise the strategy). These divisions 
create ample scope for SMME support to ‘fall’ between these various spheres of government. 
SMME strategies detail how the municipality intends to co-ordinate service delivery to their local 
populace. However looking at how these are operationalised offers insight into how municipalities 
actually address SMME development. The issues afflicting municipalities, and their ability to offer 
enterprise support range from the general institutional and resource constraints that many municipalities 
face in relation to the poverty of their residents, to their relatively unfavourable spatial location along with 
specific issues pertaining to SMMEs. The specific nature of each municipality predisposes it to certain 
choices, preferences and resource allocations. For example, well-resourced metropolitan municipalities 
are better able to engage in programmes that attract investment. In contrast, rural municipalities (district 
and local) are likely to focus on poverty alleviation, because not only do they have a largely poor 
population with meagre or non-existing income14, but opportunities for enterprise development are often 
rather limited as well. In rural municipalities, the local economic development (LED) departments or 
units often have inadequate budgets or staff, whereas urban municipalities generally have better resourced 
LED divisions. Many smaller, rural municipalities have severe financial constraints; some are dependent 
on the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) for funding, and some 
render no SMME services at all. For example, the Umsimvubu Local Municipality actually generates very 
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little revenue in contrast to the Makhado Local Municipality which has a similarly poor rural population, 
but is closer to Louis Trichardt and therefore able to generate more revenue. In contrast, the metropolitan 
municipality of the City of Cape Town is comparatively resource rich. 
Against the backdrop of constraints and differences in material endowments within municipalities, Local 
Economic Development (LED) stands out as the main mechanism for delivering services to the SMME 
sector. Therefore the extent to which LEDs are resourced and staffed depends on the level of resources 
the municipality presides over. 
Understaffing is also a key issue for rural municipality LEDs. At the time of the research, the Makhado 
Municipality had two LED officers and a part-time administrator and the Umisimvubu municipality had a 
single LED officer, manager, deputy manager and administrator. By contrast, the City of Cape Town had 
a well-developed LED with several departments, including officials focused on spatial aspects of 
regulation and direct enterprise support, etc. 
The types of activities undertaken by LED officials also depended on their different inclinations in 
making difficult choices between poverty reduction on one hand and economic growth on the other 
(Loetvoet and Freund, 2006). At the time of the research rural municipalities such as Umsimvubu were in 
the process of switching their focus from poverty alleviation projects to economic growth projects. By 
contrast, activities in the City of Cape Town largely epitomised economic growth models. In terms of the 
specific research sites, a flagship project in Mount Frere, saw the Umsimvubu Municipality undertake two 
feasibility studies (at a cost of R200 000 each) on a value addition project for peach processing and an 
agricultural pole (wood preserve) treatment plant. 
With regards to the Makhado Municipality, it was in the process of compiling a database of SMMEs in 
the area under its jurisdiction. Officials regard this as a starting point for understanding existing SMMEs. 
Once completed, it was anticipated to help the Makhado Municipality to serve SMMEs within its 
jurisdiction better. The municipality also established the Makhado Traders Association and acts as the 
secretariat for the association (although it was unclear what the association had achieved to date). 
Enquiry within the smaller rural municipalities saw informants within rural municipalities describe co-
ordination problems with their district counterparts and even argue that that district municipalities 
provided them with insufficient LED financing. For example, the Makhado Municipality reportedly 
received a R400000 LED budget per annum, while the Vhembe District Municipality (of which the 
Makhado Municipality is part) had a substantially larger budget and reportedly spent LED funds on 
several expensive high profile events such as a land summit. Similar contestations by the local 
municipality in relation to the District Municipality were evident at the Umsivumbu Municipality. 
Officials claimed to have not received a disbursement from the Alfred Nzo District Municipality and 
lamented the absence of a SMME Strategic Plan, despite the fact that it is a requirement for all district and 
metropolitan municipalities. Officials at the Umsivumbu Municipality indicated their preparatory work 
toward an (ultimately aborted) Department of Agriculture supported Massive Food project, and the 
construction of vending stalls for traders; which were all to be completed on its shoe string budget. 






By contrast, the Cape Town Metro Municipality is comparatively well resourced, and has solid 
programmes in place to support nascent enterprises. As already discussed, the City of Cape Town created 
a voucher programme, and ran a number of Business Centres. 
Although municipalities are meant to regulate and support all SMMEs within their area, in practice it is 
the street vendors, hawkers, and those who trade from municipal land and city centres who receive the 
most attention. The informally self-employed who operate from private residences, particularly township 
homes, are typically neither the recipients of support nor are subject to law enforcement efforts. The 
greater visibility of traders in public spaces is therefore a double edged sword, as they are more likely to 
be both the subjects of enterprise support and of trading by-laws enforcement. Metropolitan 
municipalities including the City of Cape Town’s try, to varying degrees, to regulate informal businesses 
operating in townships. Inevitably, SMMEs respond strongly to by-laws that affect them, with many 
small scale entrepreneurs feeling that the enforcement of by-laws is the only attention they receive from 
their municipality. 
Municipal officials’ understanding of enforcement and regulation are also of interest. In the City of Cape 
Town the enforcement of municipal by-laws sometimes put entrepreneurs on a collision course with the 
municipality. Despite this, officials in several parts of the municipality, including Land Use Planning and 
even Local Area Economic Development indicated they generally try various dispute resolution routes 
before enacting by-laws, and use legal enforcement as a last resort. However, conversations with officials 
did at times reveal regressive attitudes such as the belief that operators avoided registering their 
businesses in order to avoid paying taxes (commercial property rates) as well as an inclination to view all 
enterprises as in need of registration, even in one memorable case, the vendor selling vetkoek (fried dough 
buns). On the other hand, traders articulated that they view that they are not included in LED plans and 
that the well-resourced metro’s engage largely with organised groups like the business chambers and 
NGOs. 
Similar dynamics were evident in the smaller rural municipalities. In Mount Frere the municipality 
enforces a Street Trading by-law which aims to regulate hawkers along the N2. The Street Trading by-law 
was drafted and implemented in terms of the Business Act of 1991, and the ‘community services’ 
department enforces the by-laws. The municipal officials claimed traders are extensively consulted and 
that permits are issued in consultation with hawkers. However this was an account disputed by the traders 
who complained of the unilateral and capricious enforcement of the by-law. Not only were trading stalls 
demolished, and container stalls removed, stock was confiscated and heavy fines imposed. Traders argued 
that when by-law enforcement is harsh and un-conducive to business development, integrates the little 
LED support they do receive. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in Makhado, despite the municipality arguing that hawkers are on the 
local LED board and can therefore take up such issues. However, hawkers in both Makhado and Mount 
Frere felt that the municipality did not take consultation seriously, and the LED forum was not functional. 





In Makhado, groups of traders complained that the municipality hardly meets with the traders’ 
organisation even though it spearheaded the establishment thereof. 
If community organisations do not feel heard they tend to be suspicious of the motives of municipalities 
involving organisations in LED forums. While the LED forum is supposed to be of a multi-stakeholder 
nature, where issues of local economic development are discussed and a plan of action is adopted and 
implemented, many traders argued it simply endorsed predetermined council decisions. Parahanse and 
Goldman (2006: 03) succinctly warn of this: “Community participation in programmes would appear to 
be limited and contact seems to be at the level information provision, discussion and seeking 
endorsement”. 
In conclusion, at municipal level, while the larger metropolitan councils are better resourced and therefore 
better able to support SMMEs, SMMEs encounter the same problems with municipal by-laws. The stated 
LED aim of supporting entrepreneurs and formalising informal businesses is often contradicted or 
undercut by the way municipalities impose spatial limits on traders, handle disputes harshly and 
frequently ignore trader inputs. While the interests of the self-employed are frequently opposed, such 
contradictions need to be better resolved if SMMEs are to grow and become vehicles for further economic 
and employment growth and job creation. 
7.5 Co-operatives: New models for support 
Co-operatives are prominent in accounts of future modalities to support SMME development. The Co-
operative Incentive Scheme (CIS) predominated in DTI officials accounts of support to the informal 
sector. The state strongly supports co-operatives because of their potential to tackle the challenges of 
poverty and unemployment. They are seen to be particularly well suited to rural based beneficiaries. The 
Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS), introduced by DTI, aims to incentivise and facilitate co-operatives, 
but provinces are expected to adapt the co-operative strategy in line with their SMME strategy. Therefore 
in drafting SMME strategies, provinces have leeway whether or not to include informal enterprises. At 
the time of the research the Eastern and Western Cape Provinces had developed co-operatives’ strategies, 
and Limpopo was in the process of doing so. Limpopo officials particularly favoured the co-operative 
model and articulated the belief that it could make a significant contribution to the economy if properly 
supported15. Many successful recipients of business support in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape Provinces 
were co-operatives. 
In the context of this study, and in relation to the task of supporting nascent enterprises, co-operatives 
were mostly manufacturing and agricultural worker co-operatives. Worker co-operatives dominate the 
South African SMME landscape and are defined by worker members owning and controlling the co-op on 
the basis of ‘one member one vote’ (Philip, 2003: 4). A less common variety of co-operative in South 
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Africa is the user co-operative, wherein the co-op benefits its members by delivering services, but they do 
not usually work for the co-operative. 
Despite the valorisation of co-operatives they have limits as an organisational form. In practice such 
structures can have difficulty delivering the expected results. However, in the focal research sites, co-
operatives experienced many difficulties such as problems managing complex organisational and group 
dynamics and the demands of balancing up ‘off-take’ with business viability. In worker co-operatives all 
members are owners, managers and workers and have to juggle with the contradictory tasks of collective 
entrepreneurship. Also, because very needy people often constitute the co-operatives, income generated 
may be used up without crucial savings being set aside. This negatively impacts on the survival and 
viability of the enterprise. 
These are not unknown dynamics. Philip identifies (2003, 20) how the most common problem in co-ops 
is that they start with an oversupply of labour, relative to their productive base, and relative to the 
absorption capacity of markets they are targeting. Furthermore, the motivations and resources of co-
operative members are varied and sometimes un-conducive to achieving the goals set out. Beneficiaries 
are known to engage with co-operative models in ways that facilitate social consumption (e.g. to 
accumulate money in order to make a specific purchase) rather than entrepreneurship and productive 
activities. In these cases the co-operative typically collapses under the weight of off-take, generous 
salaries and consumption. There was the suggestion that many beneficiaries also adopt co-operative 
models to access municipal or state financial support, when they would actually prefer to be a partnership 
or sole proprietor. As one SEDA official wryly noted, ‘co-operatives are good in accessing money but bad 
at running a business’16. 
Formed in order to access funding, many co-operatives teeter under the demands of collective 
management and run out of funds to keep them going. Inadequate funding is further exacerbated by a lack 
of market access, as many co-operatives are poorly linked to their prospective markets. Co-operatives and 
support organisations typically have to make some efforts to address market access problems. These 
include suggestions that co-operatives should work in partnership with the private sector, which has 
established markets for their products, or partner with the private sector as suppliers. However these 
relationships can also be fraught with power imbalances and exploitation if they are not equitably and 
adequately addressed. 
In addition, while local government officials could readily see the desirability of co-operatives not simply 
producing raw products, but rather processing and adding value to them, in practice most co-operatives do 
not have the facilities or equipment to do this. For example, numerous co-operatives involved in 
agriculture tend to sporadically saturate the market with fresh produce. They are unable to further process 
fruit and vegetables without further investment in the premises, equipment and in meeting phytosanitary 
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demands. Constrained in their inability to add value, producers can only differentiate their products in 
terms of price, which makes for slim profits. 
Finally against the backdrop of co-operatives as part of the states SMME strategies, much more thought 
ought to be given to how to make them viable, especially given the constraints highlighted here. 
7.6 Policy review and coordination 
In their efforts to overhaul SMME policies and legislation, national and provincial officials often 
acknowledge the limited impact of existing government-endorsed SMME programmes along with the 
need to remedy the disjuncture between policy and legislation on the one hand, and implementation on 
the other hand. Policy review and harmonisation in the SMME sector of national and provincial 
government, involves different ministries with different priorities. For example, while the DTI 
emphasises SMME competitiveness and support, the Department of Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs may emphasise governance and poverty alleviation; with the proposed establishment 
of a Co-operatives Training Academy, the Department of Higher Education may be involved in certifying 
institutional qualifications. Therefore, co-ordinating the different levels of policy review to develop a 
more comprehensive understanding and framework is crucial. As Rogerson (2010, 483) identifies: “There 
is a pressing need for closer cooperation between all LED stakeholders so as to avoid duplication of tasks 
and to establish complementary roles both for different government departments and for other 
stakeholders”. 
In this respect the Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGDS) is potentially useful because it 
links the work being done by national departments and local municipalities, and ensures national policies 
are suitably adapted to provincial realities. PGDS informs provincial SMME strategies which in turn 
inform district and metropolitan municipality SMME strategies, and ultimately implementation at the 
local municipality level. Against the backdrop of national policy cascading down to local level, co-
ordination between the different layers of government is crucial. However, co-ordination is frequently 
missing and fragmented, with policy makers and implementers operating in isolation. 
The bulk of this next section will focus on the review of co-operatives. A few issues hamper SMMEs 
support, including centralisation, implementation and monitoring. At national level there appears to be 
much consensus that sound policies are in place, but implementation, particularly at local government 
level, remains a problem. However, as already highlighted earlier, many different problems afflict local 
government, and detract from its ability to deliver on its mandate to support SMMEs. In some cases, 
support to SMMEs does not comply with legislation, which seems to not be monitored by national and 
provincial government. For example, Red-Door (in Khayelitsha, Cape Town) said it terminated Red-
finance in 2010 because SMMEs were not paying back their loans. 
Furthermore as most support organisations do not provide financial support for SMMEs, several 
informants at policymaker workshops felt that SMME funding was too centralised (in bodies like the 
Industrial Development Organisation and Kula Enterprises). However, the criticism of centralisation of 






contradicting views expressed that more integration is needed; integration and centralisation often go 
hand-in-hand. 
With regard to DTI's massive review of co-operatives, the policy reviews are all predicated on the 
assumption that SMMEs, co-operatives in particular, can do well if properly supported and co-ordinated. 
In addition to the review, the enthusiasm for co-operatives has seen a Co-operatives Amendment Bill 
promulgated, which seeks to streamline or integrate different organisations that contribute to developing 
and supporting co-operatives, including state organisations that provide financial and non-financial 
services17. The bill proposes, among others suggestions, establishing a Co-operatives Tribunal, a Co-
operatives Academy and a Co-operative Development Agency. 
The proposed National Co-Operatives Training Academy is intended to capacitate co-operative members 
through training and issuing accreditation such as diplomas and degrees. It is meant to develop curricula 
and register them with institutions of higher learning (in terms of the Higher Education Act of 1997) and 
also partner with higher education institutions to conduct research. However, including entrepreneurs in 
higher education (an issue emphasised by policymakers in workshops and interviews) is a complex 
matter. Specifically, higher education will only be available to those entrepreneurs who already have a 
Grade 12 certificate; while most self-employed do not18. Furthermore, the necessity for the academy is 
unclear, as existing institutions such as universities of technology, further education and technical 
colleges or universities could develop the necessary SMME training programmes by building on existing 
programmes instead of reinventing the wheel. Existing institutions also already have the capacity to 
execute the work which the bill proposes the Co-Operatives Training Academy undertake. The proposed 
academy is likely to face many co-ordination issues because it will cascade down through the Provincial 
Co-Operatives Training Academies and district offices, and will also involve the Department of Higher 
Education, therefore this may not be the best model for improving skills training for SMMEs. 
7.7 Recognising informality or imposing formality? 
Despite concerted efforts by state officials to make SMME support work as effectively as possible the 
focus of interventions seldom extend to small scale informal enterprises. With regards to DTI support 
services, provinces have the discretion to include small scale informal enterprises in their SMME 
strategies. Apart from the novel ‘1000X1000’ initiative, under the auspices of Red Door in Cape Town, 
informal enterprises receive little concrete support from the state. There appears to be limited recognition 
that many of the informally self-employed are either unable or unwilling to formalise, or grow in size. As 
informal enterprises are an important part of the livelihood strategy of the poor, the acknowledgement is 
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needed that not all informal enterprises can be absorbed into the formal system, but that these structures 
might still benefit from particular types of support. Hence more research is needed to establish their needs 
and how these can be delivered. In countries with weak business environments the labour productivity of 
informal firms is comparable to the formal firms, however in contexts with a stronger business 
environment (higher levels of service provision and regulatory enforcement), growing firms are more 
likely to benefit from registration, and consequently are more likely to be registered (Gelb, Megistae, 
Ramachandran, Shah, 2009). 
 
The state would prefer for all informal enterprises to formalise, for a myriad of reasons, including its 
ability to ‘see’ them (if they grow large enough) and collect revenue from these enterprises. Growing 
enterprises run by aspirant ‘opportunity entrepreneurs’ also offer the prospect of employment 
opportunities. By contrast, survivalist entrepreneurs tend to be dismissed by many state-based actors as 
having little potential to contribute to the economy, and are described as being motivated primarily by 
personal consumption. Officials can sometimes articulate regressive attitudes, such as the memorable 
expression that survivalists are ‘sucking from government’ and their operators are in the realm of 
‘welfare’ and accordingly the concern of the Department of Social Development. Survivalist 
entrepreneurs are therefore recognized and validated only so far as their potential to graduate into 
opportunity entrepreneurs. Currently, informal enterprises have to be willing to formalise and grow in 
order to access state support. However, for many marginal enterprises, formalising may well carry high 
opportunity cost, and place high burdens for engaging with bureaucratic processes, yet offer the business 
operator relatively little in the way of incentives. 
7.8 Conclusion: The policy terrain 
In reviewing current policies affecting the informally self-employed, state responses can be 
conceptualised as varying along a continuum ranging from, at one pole, interventions intended to support 
SMMES, to the imposition of regulations at the other. The challenge of state-policy towards the informal 
sector consists of delivering appropriate forms of support to nascent enterprises (consistent with the 
state’s developmental mandate) on one hand, while checking impulses to heavy-handed, exclusionary or 
inappropriate forms of regulation on the other. 
At a local government level, the research has identified the manner in which municipal LED offices could 
be better resourced in order to provide better support for emergent enterprises. Municipalities need to also 
be encouraged to consider how they can reconcile this support for nascent enterprises with their other, 
typically regulatory functions (land use planning, traffic, health by-law enforcement, etc.). For many in 
the informal sector their interaction with local government unfortunately vacillates between the adverse 
consequences of enforcement and neglect. Related to this is the need to better think through appropriate 
responses to both support and enable small scale enterprises that are unable or unwilling to upscale or 
formalise. 






Further areas of attention for officials in all spheres of government, include how to deliver appropriate 
training at scale, particularly the forms of skill-based competencies that many of the informally self-
employed desire. The contemporary policy enthusiasm for co-operatives also needs to be underpinned by 
careful consideration of their potential limitations, including how to reconcile complex forms of collective 
management with entrepreneurial practice, and how precisely they will articulate with markets. A 
requirement which hangs over many of these points is the need for additional research. 
Therefore, the policies directed towards SMMES and the informally self-employed ought to make explicit 
the preferred model of SMME development, what is expected at each sphere of government, and what 
services will be rendered by which organisations and institutions. In particular policy makers ought to 
consider: 
  Whether, and how, to encourage more inclusive programmes of SMME support at the local 
municipal level. 
  How to ensure that skills acquisition programmes articulate with the favoured institutional models 
of support (such as co-operatives). 
  How support organisations can themselves be better supported with resources and appropriate, 
but flexible, criteria for selecting and serving clients. 
  How to collaborate with other line departments and sectors (such as Education) to enable the sorts 
of enterprise and activities that the state seeks to promote. 
 





8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This concluding section synthesises the research findings, and offers a number of policy 
recommendations. This section firstly offers a broad overview of general considerations which ought to 
inform policy responses to the informal sector, following which more detailed policy recommendations 
are presented.  These are organised according to a three part typology described by Manning (2008) of 
policy responses to the informal sector that seek to: enhance productivity; shape the institutional context 
and finally supporting human development and welfare. 
8.1 Overview: Policy recommendations 
This overview frames several overarching first principles, concerning how economic informality ought to 
be understood and responded to. State-based actors and those concerned with enterprise support services 
ought to: 
  Understand the limits of the concept of ‘the informal sector’ or ‘informal economy’.  Although 
the concept of informality has wide currency and is useful in many contexts, use of the concept 
needs to be tempered by realisation of the extent to which the concept is indistinct, contested and 
limited. The formal and informal sectors are highly interlinked through commodity flows, 
production linkages and practices of employment, therefore uncritical use of the informal sector 
or economic concepts is problematic because it can deflect attention away from the extent to 
which the informal sector is influenced by factors and dynamics fundamentally outside of it, in 
the realm of formality. 
  Understand that those in the informal sector are orientated towards highly diverse motivations 
and objectives. There is a need to understand that diverse motivations drive the informally self-
employed, and that these small scale survivalists have very different objectives, capacities and 
potential for growth, relative to aspirant entrepreneurs. 
  Ensure that the distinction between entrepreneurs and small scale survivalists is adequately 
understood by state based actors. There is a need to ensure that the differences between the small 
scale survivalists and aspirant entrepreneurs is communicated to, and understood by frontline 
state-based actors, in order to facilitate optimal design, targeting and referrals between various 
interventions. 
  Ensure both small scale survivalists and aspirant entrepreneurs are adequately targeted by 
appropriate interventions. Interventions directed towards the informally self-employed ought to 
be carefully disaggregated in order to support both aspirant entrepreneurs with the potential for 
growth, and smaller scale survivalists reliant on informal economic activities to sustain or 
augment their immediate livelihood needs. 






  Conceptualise support for the informally self-employed or informal sector at multiple scales or 
tiers of intervention. As informal self-employment is a complex and multidimensional 
phenomena, it is useful to think in terms of multiple scales or tiers of intervention. These include: 
the larger macro structural economic context; the intermediate realm of enterprises and 
institutions; and finally the microstructural context of impoverished individuals enterprise 
operators and their households. 
  Conceptualise support for the informally self-employed in expansive terms. As the informally 
self-employed are a large and disparate group, it is helpful to think of varieties of interventions 
targeted at them in terms of three core domains. These may include productivity and output 
enhancing interventions; institutional environment focused interventions; and finally individual 
development and welfare enhancing interventions. These three varieties of intervention are 
elaborated on in what follows. 
8.2 Productivity and output enhancing policy interventions 
South Africa is a country with a relatively well developed business environment where formalisation and 
registration generally carry marked benefits to enterprises (such as VAT refunds, bureaucratic ‘visibility’ 
to formal sector suppliers, access to services and the formal financial system, etc.). Larger enterprises 
therefore tend to either be, or become, more formal as they grow. There is however scope for productivity 
and output enhancing polices to support nascent enterprises are growing or exhibit the potential for 
growth. To this end, the following policy recommendations - directed towards state based actors 
concerned with the informal sector – are advanced: 
  Focus beyond the immediacy of SMMEs, and look at the influence of the larger economic context. 
Opportunities for informal self-employment and SMMEs are constituted against the backdrop of 
a concentrated, monopolistic and vertically integrated core South African economy.  Informal self 
employment is therefore crucially shaped by various aspects of state economic policies. 
Policymakers ought to therefore be aware of the limits of responding to informal SMMEs by 
narrowly focusing on these small scale enterprises or individuals. To do so risks losing sight of 
how the larger macro structural context shapes economic activity and opportunity. 
  Re-examine trade and industrial policies which serve to erode opportunities for small scale or 
informal sector producers. Much current trade and industrial policy supports capital intensive 
growth enterprises, such as aluminium smelters or automotive assembly. These often rely on 
hidden state subsidies (such as cheap electricity, subsidised infrastructure or import rebates) yet 
generate comparatively low levels of employment and few opportunities for small-scale 
producers to enter value chains. Conversely, sectors which have traditionally offered low skill 
employment such as manufacturing (e.g. the garment and textile industries) have perhaps not 
received sufficient support and policy input to check their waning over time. These trade and 
industrial polices contribute to South Africa’s growth trajectory of employment un-intensive and 





capital intensive growth.  This not only fills the ranks of those thrown back into survivalist self-
employment, it also constrains the points at which the informally employed can enter the value-
chains as industrial outworkers, sub-contractors, etc. 
  Re-examine monetary and fiscal policies which undermine the employment generation capacity of 
the economy. Capital intensive growth undermines the capacity of the economy to absorb labour 
or create opportunities for informal employment. This lack of labour absorbing capacity is 
arguably further deepened by a volatile and overvalued currency. These dynamics contribute to 
the pool of the unemployed thrown back on survivalist, informal self-employment. They serve to 
create an economy more starkly dualistic than it might otherwise have been. 
  Re-examine other aspects of state policy and intervention that serve to marginalise and exclude 
informally self employed people. Apart from the overarching macro economic context, there is a 
need for the state to avoid reproducing the conditions that marginalise informally self employed 
people, across an array of domains.  Small-scale retailers, producers and service providers with 
the capacity to upscale are frequently beyond the purview of state policy which tends to be 
focussed on larger market actors. For example, smallholder agricultural producers with a capacity 
to bring surpluses to market are often excluded by a policy bias towards large scale commercial 
agriculture across an array of policy domains (including agricultural policy, local spatial planning 
and retail regulation).  
  Develop and refine the capacity of state based actors to understand the reasons why many of the 
informally self-employed resist formalisation. It is important to accurately understand the 
dynamics by which those in the informal sector remain outside the ambitions of formalisation and 
regulation (typically business and tax registration). Where informal enterprises are small or 
precarious, formalisation and regulatory compliance are often unfeasible, untenably onerous or 
hold no real benefit. In these cases state based actors, particularly the local ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ at the forefront of dealing with the informal sector ought to be able to recognise and 
acknowledge these limits. They ought to understand to failure to formalise in terms of these 
limits, rather than as an act of evasion or criminality. State based actors therefore need to be 
capacitated to develop a nuanced sense of formalisation, and the need for the subjects of their 
interventions to be in a position where formalisation is both desirable and beneficial. 
  Disincentivise the evasion of regulation by enterprises that are able to comply: Where enterprises 
are of an appropriate scale to formalise, state based actors ought to support formalisation and 
processes of regulatory compliance, because to neglect to do so would begin to erode the benefits 
of formalisation.  Formalisation and regulatory compliance ought to be supported by making the 
benefits of compliance outweigh the costs through the twin strategies of, firstly, making the costs 
of compliance low (by reducing costs, complexity and opportunity costs), and secondly, 
enforcement, sanction and addressing the factors that incentivise evasion. 
  Develop polices and interventions which support accumulation, and the acquisition of assets by 
the informally self employed. There is much scope to develop policies and interventions which 
support accumulation through skills and asset acquisition. Several of these may be implemented 






even in the absence of enterprise formalisation and business registration. Output and productivity 
in the informal sector ought to be enhanced by supporting the provision of the following to the 
sector: capital and microfinance; risk management mechanisms and insurance; and finally, 
mechanisms for contract enforcement. 
  Consider providing support to the informally self-employed by using points of policy leverage 
within existing formal sector supplier networks. Existing suppliers (with whom many SMMEs 
have strong backward linkages), ought to be encouraged to support higher productivity activities 
or investments within the informal sector. This would extend beyond the support many formal 
sector firms already confer to downstream informal sector operators through, for example, credit, 
marketing and merchandising support. Two key mechanisms for achieving this type of support 
would be appropriate incentives and judicious state regulation. An example of the latter would be 
the requirement formal sector enterprises create opportunities for small enterprise operators as a 
condition of entry into historically underserviced markets or geographical areas.  This can be 
done through the cross subsidy of services (e.g. cellular telephony), trading spaces (in commercial 
property developments, such as township shopping malls), or support for partnerships with local 
equity partners (e.g. in agriculture or retail). 
  Support the building of forward linkages from the informal to the formal sector. The extensive 
backward linkages from the informal sector to the formal sector are unmatched by forward 
linkages from informal enterprises to formal enterprises.  There is much scope to support the 
development of these forward linkages.  These ought to be prioritised in relation to one of two 
broad categories of enterprise or activity. The first are enterprises focused on high value, niches 
products and services often targeted at distant yet lucrative markets, such as craft or high value 
agricultural commodities (Philip, 2010). The second are products or services consumed locally 
and therefore are typically targeted at (often impoverished) parochial markets, including for basic 
foodstuffs, household consumables and personal services. 
  Recognise, support and regulate intermediators or ‘brokers’, as key figures to link informal 
producers to the formal sector. Brokers, intermediators or ‘middlemen’ are potentially key 
figures in mediating forward linkages between small scale producers and the formal sector. They 
can provide support to overcome the often considerable administrative, informational and 
marketing barriers which small scale producers typically face (von Broembsen, 2010).  Policy 
ought to therefore focus on supporting the development of broker or intermediation services to 
the informal sector.  Particularly in sectors where intermediators have not already emerged 
through market forces, the efficiency and profitability of broker services could be improved by 
supporting the agglomeration of brokers or producers.  Policy ought to also be concerned with 
regulatory mechanisms to check potentially opportunistic and exploitative behaviour within these 
often unequal intermediatory relationships.  
  Continue to examine state procurement as a tool for growing SMMEs. In the context of high 
levels of state expenditure and outsourcing, state procurement provides a fertile terrain for some 





small scale producers or service providers to grow.  Although constrained, and probably 
inapplicable to the smallest of SMMEs, existing policies of affirmative procurement ought to be 
more firmly incentivised, supported and administered to source from SMME producers and 
service providers.  Obvious domains include security, cleaning and maintenance services, as well 
as the potential of smallholder agricultural producers to supply state run residential institutions 
(educational, health, correctional services), particularly in rural settings.  
  Deepen the capacity for oversight to monitor emergent opportunities and risks to the informally 
self-employed, associated with new technologies, products or processes. There is scope for state 
based actors (pre-eminently the DTI) to consider how to enhance their capacity  to proactively 
monitor emergent technologies, products or processes which are likely to impact on SMMEs and 
the informally self employed.  The objective of this market oversight would be to examine how 
potentially positive effects could be harnessed, and ensure that these are not unduly monopolised 
by incumbent, formal sector players, or rolled out to market on terms which preclude those in the 
informal sector from benefiting. Particularly novel technologies, products or processes, or those 
with a ‘game-changing’ or ‘leapfrog’ quality (i.e. the capacity to radically supersede existing 
arrangements), ought to be of particularly policy interest. An example of this may be found in the 
contemporary convergence of payment systems and cellular telephony, and the ability of these 
systems to reach the historically unbanked. 
8.3 Institutional arrangements 
This category of policy recommendations is focused on building or optimising the institutional 
environment in order to support informal self-employment. 
  Understand systems of local economic governance and consider harnessing them. There is a need 
for policy makers to understand systems of non-state governance which prevail within the 
informal sector, that often eclipse state-led regulatory efforts and crucially shape the terrain on 
which economic activity occurs.  Examples of these include minibus taxi associations and, in 
many rural locales, traditional authorities.  Where appropriate these forms of governance ought to 
be contained or harnessed (through enforcement and inducements) in order to improve the 
environment in which informal self employment is undertaken (e.g. using minibus taxis as a 
feeder service for urban transport systems). In this process caution needs to be exercised to ensure 
that efforts at regulatory capture do not heighten the potential for conflict by creating regulatory 
vacuums, and that the emergent systems of local level economic governance are not simply 
‘captured’ by narrow or elite interests.  Finally, these efforts to capture and harness existing 
systems of informal non-state based economic governance ought to be tempered by a careful 
assessment of the potentially regressive forms of power and authority (such as patriarchy or 
lineage), and violence, that sometimes underpin them.  
  Enable the formation and strengthening of business associations. There is scope to consider how 
to facilitate the formation and strengthening of organisation to represent the interests of the 






informally self-employed.  Currently, existing organisations are small, relatively unorganised, 
geographically isolated, reactive and issue-based.  Greater coherence and comprehensiveness in 
the organisation that represent the sector would benefit both those in the sector and the state 
officials tasked with its governance.  Although state based actors are not optimally placed to 
engage with this activity, there is a need to consider how to facilitate a strengthening of 
organisations representing the needs, interests and perspectives of the informally self employed.  
There is much scope for civil society, and other non-state players in these tasks. 
  Encourage a greater awareness on the part of state based actors as to how the provision of 
services can disrupt the delicate livelihood ecologies within which economic informality occurs. 
Infrastructure and housing provision is often strongly desired by beneficiaries and frequently 
represents a substantial improvement in their quality of life. Yet there is much scope to consider 
how these services could be provided in ways that avoid disrupting the social networks, access to 
working spaces and markets that many of the informally self-employed rely on. For example the 
physical housing stock provided under current urban housing programmes and spatial zoning 
regimes typically makes little provision for working or vending spaces:  to the ultimate detriment 
of informal economic activities.  Sensitive development would therefore balance the provision of 
infrastructure with preservation of the narrow niches the informally self-employed often occupy 
in their livelihood generating activities.  
  Carefully examine the pros and cons of alternate forms of institutional arrangements for informal 
self-employment such as co-operatives. While co-operatives are a modality which currently 
enjoys great policy traction for organising and supporting those in the informal sector, use of this 
institutional form ought to be tempered by careful consideration of the potential disadvantages of 
co-operatives, including their demands for managerial sophistication and transaction costs. Many 
of the disadvantages of co-ops are further magnified by the demands of running a production co-
operative in a resource poor context where demands for income are pressing and persistent.  
  Re-examine the divide between business support and financing, in enterprise support services. 
Many recipients of enterprise support found the divide between business support and financing 
somewhat counter intuitive, it made the resulting services more difficult to use than they could 
have been. There appears to be scope to bring (non-financial) business support and financial 
support (microcredit and credit) into closer alignment, even if these functions continue to be 
provided by different entities. 
  Remedy existing capacity problems constraining current systems of enterprise support. The 
research suggests that levels of personnel and resources to which enterprise support services have 
access are relatively unevenly distributed and patchy even across the relative small selection of 
research sites. As these services have the capacity to support higher and more lucrative levels of 
informal self-employment the considerable potential benefit of their provision, needs to be 
balanced with the cost to the state. 





  Remedy some of the mismatches, gaps and areas of duplications in existing systems of enterprise 
support. There is scope to consider how to remediate the mismatches and areas of duplications in 
enterprise support services directed towards the informally self-employed.  These include, but not 
limited to, the mismatch between the nationally and provincially provided enterprise support 
services, both in terms of polices and resources.  Closely related to this is the need for better co-
ordination between these services. 
  Prioritise support for business support services at local level. Local government is the optimal 
scale for SMME enterprise support and LED interventions. Yet despite this, much local 
government, especially smaller rural local municipalities, are under capacitated and relatively 
ineffectual at supporting local enterprises and economic development. There continues to be 
scope to consider how to support local municipalities to think and act beyond the regulation of 
street trading, in their responses to the informal sector. 
  Encourage meaningful local participation in enterprise support and LED initiatives.  State 
officials at local government level ought to be firmly encouraged to ensure meaningful public 
participation of the informally self-employed in local economic and spatial planning. In addition, 
LED and traders forums need to not only be established and also sustained over time. This will 
provide a conduit for on-going dialogue between those in the informal sector and local officials 
tasked with its administration. 
8.4 Human development and welfare enhancing interventions 
In cases where the informally self-employed are vulnerable, marginalised and marked by poverty, their 
survivalist orientation and the small scale of their activities typically place them below the threshold of 
traditional enterprise services. In these cases the following human development and welfare enhancing 
interventions, which seek to mitigate vulnerability, support human capital acquisition and break cycles of 
low returns to activities and assets, are appropriate policy responses. 
  Recognise the limits of enterprise support for the small scale, survivalists and target them with 
appropriately differentiated interventions. There is a need to recognise that for the smallest and 
most vulnerable of the survivalist self-employed there are limited points of influence using the 
traditional levers of enterprise support. Instead interventions which recognise and target them as 
vulnerable, workers, citizens or potential beneficiaries of social protection, represent the most 
optimal of policy interventions. 
  Recognise that those working in the informal sector are also ‘workers’ and may be reached by 
workplace protections. There are substantial limitations to viewing the informally self-employed 
as entirely distinct from those in the formal sector. This is due to the fact that there are strong 
production linkages between the two sectors; many individuals churn between formal and 
informal sector employment; and many in the formal sector work under precarious conditions 
largely indistinguishable from those in the informal sector. For these reasons, those in the 






informal sector ought to be viewed and treated as ‘workers’, and as far as practicable employment 
protections extended to those in the informal sector.  This can be done incrementally first 
reaching groups of workers who are easier to access, such as those casually employed in the 
construction or minibus taxi industry.   
  Examine the possibility of extending work-based socialised entitlements to informal sector 
workers. Despite the difficulties involved, consideration ought to be devoted to extending work 
based social entitlements such as unemployment insurance, death, disability and maternity 
benefits to those in the informal sector. These socialised entitlements will then better cover those 
who churn between the formal and informal sector. Significantly, similar interventions such as 
extending minimum wage and unemployment insurance to domestic workers have met with a 
relatively high degree of compliance and success (Altman, 2008). 
  Recognise the important role of the social wage in supporting the small scale informally self-
employed. Policy makers and officials ought to be encouraged to think beyond the dichotomy of 
‘welfare’ versus ‘self-employment’, and acknowledge the manner in which the existing social 
wage and systems of social protection are particularly effective at reaching the small scale 
survivalists and mitigating their vulnerability. 
  Recognise that many of the small scale self-employed are social grant recipients, and that social 
grants income is crucial to their economic activities. Policy makers ought to be encouraged to 
recognise the manner in which social grants are used to fund or capitalise small scale survivalist 
self-employment. Many impoverished and economically marginalised grant recipients leverage 
their state cash transfers into low levels of productive economic activity, thereby increasingly 
aggregating individual and household welfare. This process is greatly facilitated by factors such 
as the unconditional and cash based nature of existing transfers. Proposals for conditional cash 
transfers, vouches, etc. need to be viewed cautiously, as they are likely to erode the scope of these 
small scale survivalists to leverage their grant income in these livelihood-supporting ways. 
  Maintain a focus on safety and security. The informally self-employed are particularly vulnerable 
to crime, and the fear of crime is a crucial factor shaping individuals reluctance to engage with 
self-employment. Improvements in safety and security are potentially effective ways of 
supporting the informally self-employed.  This can be accomplished through an array of means 
including effective policing, supporting efforts to build or sustain social cohesion and 
constructing appropriate physical urban environments (with, for example, suitable storage, 
lighting and a measure of passive surveillance),  
  Recognise the existence of particularly vulnerable social groups (such as women and non-South 
African citizens) and consider targeting them. Informally self-employed women ought to be 
recognised as especially vulnerable and in need of targeted assistance. Not only do women 
generally have less access to capital than men, they typically need to balance their activity with 
domestic demands. Similarly there is evidence of foreign traders being subject to xenophobic 





attitudes and actions from both the general public and officials.  These specific vulnerabilities 
need to be recognised and the focus of appropriate action in policy and practice.  
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Appendix 1 Qualitative case studies 
Elim district (Limpopo province) 
Maurice (Spaza shop operator) 
A genial man in his thirties, Maurice ran a small spaza shop but had aspirations to study agriculture at a 
local FET college. In addition to running his store, he was completing his matric. He hoped to study 
agriculture and engage in farming (within the district) once he completed all his studies. Married with two 
young children, Maurice’s wife (also matriculated) worked as a domestic worker in the district in order to 
diversify their income streams. She was uninvolved in the modest spaza shop. Their two children (aged 1 
and 5 years) were usually looked after by Maurice’s mother in law during the day. The spaza shop was 
reportedly relatively unremmunerative, averaging a profit of R500 per month. This was augmented by 
Maurice’s wife’s monthly wages (R800) and the R500 worth of child support grants they receive. 
In terms of the spaza shop, it was opened by Maurice in 2006, and sold basic consumables such as bread, 
chips, sweets, raw fish and cell-phone airtime. He also had a public phone on the premises. When asked, 
Maurice readily accounted for his economic activity in terms of his passion for it and ‘love for people’. 
His self-presentation exuded an air of dignity and respectability which perhaps belied his relatively young 
age. He readily explained how he served on different committees of his Pentecostal church, but had 
subsequently downscaled his involvement in order to devote attention to the spaza shop. In terms of his 
employment history, he had worked a number of menial yet formal sector jobs, including time as a 
labourer for Coca-Cola and at a supermarket in Louis Trichardt until 2005. His affability and willingness 
to learn saw him progress from a labourer to an informal (viz. unqualified) ‘electrician’ in the 
supermarket. Maurice explained he would have preferred employment in the formal sector, but after he 
lost his employment in 2008 he opted to open his modest spaza shop. Although it is well located, he 
readily conceded that he competed with at least four other spaza shops in the surrounding area. 
His customers lived in the surrounding peri-urban village, including, particularly a settlement named 
Shele. A major competitive strength he enjoyed was the prime location of his enterprise alongside a by-
road. Maurice sourced much of his stock from nearby Louis Trichardt, to which he travelled at least daily 
(sometimes twice daily) at R8 per trip. He purchased items for resale from various shops, bread at the 
local SPAR Supermarket (when busy he purchased over 20 loaves daily). Although he ran the shop 
largely single handed, he got the teenage children of his relatives to help tend it during his daily absences. 
He routinely gave them a ‘reward’ R10 for two hours for their efforts. 
When pressed, Maurice estimated he had about ‘400’ customers a day (and although his was a busy spaza 
shop, this seemed to be an overestimate). He estimated his daily net income to have been R250 (therefore 
monthly turnover in the region of R7500), but with profit at R500 per month. In addition he extended a 
fair amount of credit: he gave a cumulative monthly amount of up to R600 (which he reported having no 






problem collecting). Maurice was unable to explain his relative success at collecting debt. Furthermore as 
his account of the modest enterprises profitability was not internally consistent, they were perhaps 
overstated (contrary to the more common tendency to underestimate or understate profitability). 
Maurice used a bank account for savings (which he explained was ‘for the spaza’). Along with his 
agricultural ambitions, he (perhaps in response to the interview questioning) articulated an aspiration to 
build a formal shop. He had identified sourcing vending machines for airtime and prepaid electricity as 
key resources. With regards to the right to trade he readily indicated that he had no ‘license’, but wished 
to obtain one. As part of his agrarian ambitions he was well versed in the local co-op initiative (which is 
predominantly agricultural production focused) and extolled the virtues of their cheapness to register 
(although it is unclear how this would benefit him). 
Aubrey (Spaza shop operator) 
In his thirties, Aubrey was unmarried with a fiancé and child. He lived with his parents, and ran a small 
spaza shop in the village (his fiancée lived with her mother, in an adjacent village). With an employment 
history as a clerk, and informal employment in jobs such as gardening and working at a carwash, he saved 
some income and opened his spaza shop in 2009. He sold the usual food stuffs and consumables (bread, 
chips, eggs, airtime, and paraffin) and had a cell phone based public phone handset. His customers were 
the surrounding community, along with staff and students at the local college. He established his spaza 
shop (despite describing it in the philanthropic term, ‘to help the community’), during a period of erratic 
and poorly remunerated informal employment. 
Aubrey was resident at his parent’s house, living with his mother and two sisters (one schooling; the other 
at college), and he estimated he contributed between R250 to R300 to the household income, and R150 to 
his fiancé for their child. His mother also brought in income from a community project of approximately 
R500. Although he expressed a desire to accrue sufficient resources to establish a household of his own, 
this ambition was tempered by the fact that his income was relatively constrained. 
Aubrey ran the spaza shop by himself, but his distant (non-resident) brother and sister helped him for 
which he rewarded them with ‘lunch money’. He sourced his stock at Louis Trichardt wholesalers, using 
buses and taxis for transport. While the bus cost R15 return, a taxi cost double that sum; with low 
margins, he tried scrupulously to catch the bus. He did stocking every Friday and Monday, and estimated 
a profitability of approximately R1600 a month, but tempered this by indicating he frequently made far 
less. 
There was a discernable spike in his sales on state pension payout days. Aubrey did not give much credit, 
only to social grant recipients on days immediately preceding the grant pay-out. He also kept no financial 
records (seemingly relying on his memory to recall the debt he was owed). Although his enterprise was 
not lucrative, and there were a number of other spaza shops in the general locale, they were relatively 
distant. His right to trade in the village was secured verbally from the local tribal authority. Although, in 





response to the interviewer questioning he articulated a desire to eventually own a shop at a mall in the 
local town, his enterprise and focus appeared decidedly more modest and survivalist at present. 
Significantly, he indicated that if he were offered a job, even a relatively modestly paying one, he would 
consider giving-up his spaza shop in order to take it. He understood the regularity of the resource flow 
associated with (more formal) employment, and desired it. 
Alina, Maria and Salminah (Fruit and vegetable hawkers) 
This enterprise consisted of a group of three busy female fruit and vegetable hawkers who occupied a 
prime location at the busy Elim taxi rank. Sourcing much of their produce from the local farmers (via 
intermediaries) along with purchases from formal shops, they sold a seasonal combination of bananas and 
avocado pears, alongside the staples of potatoes, tomatoes and onions. Although they vended from what 
appeared to be a public taxi rank (controlled by the local municipality), they describe their modest scrap, 
corrugated-iron and wood stall as privately owned. They readily explained that they neither had (nor 
required) a licence or approval from any local authority. For the use of the roughly hewn, un-
weatherproofed stall they paid the ‘owner’ a sum of R40 monthly, and had occupied their current position 
for several years. 
Profit margins could be solid, with a crate of avocadoes at R40, turning R80 in sales (100% profit). The 
repackaged quantities of seasonal products were affordable to the passing, working class market (for 
example a packet of six avocado pears costs R10). Bananas costing R50 a box sold at R80, generating 
R30 profit. The women had a clear sense of the profit margins of the various items of fresh produce, but 
explained that the profit margins shifted with the seasonal repricing of stock (for instance, tomatoes easily 
shifted from R75 to R95 a crate over the course of several weeks). Furthermore the three stall holders 
consumed items from their stalls, particularly when they face the prospect of the produce becoming over-
ripe. As a group, they appeared relatively candid, and estimated that with the solid volumes they made 
anything from a paltry R20 to a more solid R100 per day (on a good day). Although there was stiff 
competition from other fruit and vegetable hawkers, they argued that through working long hours they 
could make a profit. They also worked synergistically (with somebody always available to tend the stall, 
even when the others went off to source more stock or run other errands). Pricing and deciding on the 
package sizes of the agglomerated products were issues they carefully discussed amongst themselves. 
Although the three vendors pooled their costs and profits, they were reluctant or unable to explain this in 
detail. They appeared to strive to ensure they put commensurate amounts of operating capital into the 
enterprise, and extract similar levels of income out of it. As with many small enterprises, it was difficult 
to isolate and readily quantify ‘profit’. 
In terms of the history of their enterprise, the three women used as seed capital the social grants income 
they had received or had access to (this included the state old age grant of one of their parents, and their 
accumulated child support grants). Grant income was still occasionally used as operating capital to source 
more stock, and in anticipation of the payment of their grants they would divert the sum that they would 
normally save to restock on consumptive items. Grant income therefore became a fungible ‘operating 
capital’ for their enterprise. 






The women explained their reliance on hawking, with recourse to their poverty, and highlighted that they 
were the principal breadwinners for each of their households. They reported no significant associational 
life (they belong to no hawkers association, etc.) and had no training in business. However their personal 
histories indicated each to have previously engaged in petty retail. 
Fifty three year old Alina was a widow with three children, the youngest of whom was still attending 
school. She had previously sold vetkoek (fried buns) and fried fish from the taxi rank, which was a well 
supported enterprise but constrained by the cost of fuel and cooking oil. Disinclined to speak extensively 
about her home environment, she indicated she was the sole breadwinner, but was sometimes assisted by 
her older children. She described herself as relatively atomised in terms of kin relations, and unsupported 
by the rest of the extended family. 
The second woman was Maria, a married woman in her late thirties with four sons (16; 13; 10 and 3 years 
old). Her middle-aged husband was poorly employed as a labourer with some ‘Indian’ shopkeepers. She 
thought her contribution to the household was higher than that of her husband, she emphasises that they 
are highly reliant on the three child support grants (received for the youngest boys) to satisfy the need for 
schooling related expenses such as school clothes and shoes. Maria had a ‘standard 8’ (viz. grade 10) and 
had previously sold manufactured goods on a consignment basis including plates, tables, chairs and 
Tupperware. She had given this up because of the cost involved and her difficulty in collecting debt from 
her customers. She thought the relatively credit-free nature of fruit and vegetable retail had a distinct 
advantage when retailing to an impoverished clientele. This, despite the fact that the previous, higher 
value, durable goods she sold carried higher profit margins. 
Finally, 39 year old Salminah had four children, and was separated from her partner. Her children 
included a 21 year old daughter (studying via Unisa), and three schooling children (an 18 year old 
daughter, 11 year old son and nine year old daughter). She relied on her income from hawking, two child 
support grants and an erratic sum (perhaps R200) from the father of her children. Salminah had a 
comparatively low Standard 7 education, and had previously generated income by selling food items 
(sweets, chips, atcha, apples, and oranges) at a local school. She found the money from fruit and 
vegetable hawking more lucrative than what she earned selling foodstuffs at the school. Finally she 
described her extended family as relatively unhelpful, and preferred not to ask them for help. The oldest 
daughter looked after the younger siblings, enabling Salminah to work. 
Mavis and Nancy (Dressmakers) 
Somewhat sombre Mavis and ebullient Nancy operated from a stall at the Elim taxi rank, where they 
sewed and sold dresses. Relatively new, they began their business in November 2009. They sold largely 
to commuters, but also occasionally attract the custom of passing tourists. They made both religious 
(Christian congregational) uniforms, and traditional dresses in the Venda and Shangaan style. These 
garments had the advantage of not being subject to the Asian sourced imports of regular apparel. They 
were both trained at a public institution (a project called Marongwa) in Njelele for six months, but 





received no formal accreditation (the trainers apparently left abruptly at the conclusion of the course). 
They had neither registered their business, nor approached one of the local enterprise support bodies 
(LIBSA OR SETA) for assistance. They did indicate though, that they obtained (a rather large) start up 
loan of R30 000 from a mashonisa (informal loan shark), of which they had repaid R3900 to date.  Their 
indication that they repay R800 or a minimum monthly sum of R500 seemed inconsistent with the scale 
of repayments mashonisa typically demand. 
The women sourced their material at a large fabric retailer in Louis Trichardt, to which they travelled via 
taxi (R20 return). The material they use was comparatively inexpensive. A skirt selling at R80 may return 
close to R60 profit, while a ‘traditional dress’ retailing at R200 contained a modest R30 of material (the 
profit of R170 payed for the detailed sewing work). They were adamant about asking for a 50% deposit 
for all orders. ‘No-deposit, no-order, no-business’ they chortled in unison. The women estimated their 
collective profit at the busy seasons of December and Easter (school holidays and urban dwellers 
returning home, mean many traditional ceremonies and marriages are conducted) at between R500 to 
R1000. They indicated that they simply shared the profit. This sum also excluded a final cost, the rent 
paid to the owner of the stall (R150 per month), and included the electricity required to run their sewing 
machines. The two dressmakers brought their own plastic chairs and table to the stall. 
Although there were a total of six dressmakers in the immediate environs of the taxi rank, the women 
denied that they competed against each other. They indicated that they frequently referred customers 
between each other. They calibrated these referrals according to how busy they were, along with their 
sense of who could best produce what the customer wanted. 
The two dressmakers were of different ages. The younger woman, Mavis was in her early thirties, and 
was a single mother to three children (the eldest 12, the youngest 4 years old). She lived with her mother, 
and four siblings (two of her adult siblings were unemployed; her youngest sibling was still schooling. 
Her mother was head of the household, which relied on her deceased father’s formal sector pension for its 
subsistence. Mavis met Nancy at the sewing course, before they decided to go into business together. 
42 year old Nancy was divorced with three children. The eldest worked as a nurse, the younger two 
teenagers were still in school. The younger children were overseen by Nancy’s sister during the day after 
school. With a large number of siblings, some of who were employed (mechanic, policeman), Nancy 
subsisted on a variety of resources. These included money from her various siblings and pension-
receiving parents, the child-support grants her children received and the proceeds of her sewing. Although 
she was far from affluent, the exuberant Nancy gave the impression of being embedded in an extended 
network of familial support. 
  






David (Bee and crop farmer) 
Late middle-aged David was socially confident and candid, and was interviewed on his temporary plot on 
a land reform project farm, approximately 10km from Elim and adjacent to a township. He was 
moderately resourced (he had a bakkie), and occupied the sole residence on this section of the farm, 
behind it a fenced off garden and maize field. His modest (mud-walled) home was unusually far way from 
the main cluster of structures adjacent to the road. He explained that he had a residential site on a 
proposed RDP development in the local township, but preferred to live at his current site to engage in 
agricultural production. 
David had three main sources of livelihood: subsistence agricultural production (predominantly maize), a 
market-orientated vegetable market garden, and bee-keeping. In addition he earned a modest wage for 
managing the orchard of the land reform project (of which he is a project beneficiary). He likened the 
return from his bee-keeping to that of the vegetable production, and highlighted their obvious synergy 
(pollination of the vegetables and orchard). 
He became involved in bee-keeping when a ‘bee-foundation’ from Cape Town, interested in land reform 
beneficiaries, recruited them. The foundation offered training and supplied 10 boxes, and other essential 
equipment (protective gear, etc.). As the farm had numerous blue-gum trees, it was well suited to bees. 
David found the bee-keeping activity particularly favourable because it required relatively little time and 
effort (apart from the regular checks of the hives for dampness and ants). While some of his hive boxes 
had been stolen in the past, at the time of the interview he had 21 boxes (having been supplied with more 
boxes). Harvesting took place two or three times a year, and required the help of his wife and one other 
individual (he harvested, while the next individual held the bucket into which the hive’s frame was put, 
and the third operated the smoker). 
The ‘bee-foundation’ had closed down, but the ARC (Agricultural Research Council) took over David 
explained. He had since received additional training (this time in business skills and the technical task of 
assembling the bee-hives). Although he normally cleared the frames of honey with a sieve, he had been 
visited by the ARC with a manual centrifuge in the past. In 2009 he sold 500 bottles (a total turnover of 
R16500, excluding his costs such as bottles and labels). He sold both locally, and further afield (David’s 
cousin took bottles back to Gauteng and sold them on his behalf). 
David’s enterprise had been supported by the agricultural extension service from the ARC, as they 
provided material for the hive boxes, training and the promise of further assistance with marketing. With 
their encouragement David tried to produce cough syrup (honey, propolis and a little cheap brandy), and 
had been thinking about producing candles and plastic honey filled straws as sweets for local school 
children. The agricultural support service assisted setting up a bee-keeping co-operative. Despite the fact 
that it had an unwieldy and large number of members, all of the locally resident ARC trained bee-keepers 
belonged to it. David aspired to build up to a manageable portfolio of 50 boxes. These were supplied 
unassembled by the project, making him disinclined to assemble them himself. He thought bee-keeping to 





be relatively uncomplicated and was critical of the disinclination (in his words ‘laziness’) of many of the 
other land reform project beneficiaries on the farm, who did nothing productive with the land. 
David lives with his wife and four ‘grown-up’ children (one was working in Pretoria, another studying 
and the two teenagers were locally resident in the village). In terms of his employment history he worked 
as a policeman from 1980 to 2002 all over the country (Hillbrow, Port Elizabeth, Randburg, and Messina) 
until being injured in a car accident. After a year-long recuperation, he left the SAP with a pension and 
joined the land claimants group. David readily described his life as better than when he was a policeman, 
despite the contestation amongst the land reform recipients on the farm and its mixed successes in 
maintaining the erstwhile levels of agricultural production in a project beset with various problems (for 
example large numbers of beneficiaries and relatively patchy agricultural support). 
Freddy (Chicken farmer) 
53 year old Freddy occupied a plot strategically close to an intersection on the main Louis Trichardt - 
Elim road. His plot consisted of a cluster of buildings including a chicken-battery, from which he made a 
comfortable living selling chickens. Starting his enterprise in 2003, he built the moderately large chicken-
battery (approximately 25 meters long) himself. Freddy bought batches of day old chicks reared them and 
sold them after six weeks. He typically raised 400 chickens, but raised this number to 1000 before the 
busy Christmas season. 
His clients were local people who mostly purchased live chickens for their own consumption (hawkers 
only bought from him at Christmas time), at R45 each. There was competition in the chicken trade within 
the larger district. Although some of these competitors were cheaper than him, Freddy’s competitive 
advantage was his proximity to a number of settlements. This saved his customers the expense of travel, 
and they still paid less than they would at the supermarket in the local town. Freddy was dismissive of 
extending credit to customers, viewing it as very difficult to collect. 
Freddy had three employees in his moderately intensive enterprise. Reluctant to discuss profit Freddy 
initially denied that he made any (despite the fact that the scale of his enterprise was amongst the largest 
in the sample of cases studies). Response to further inquiry into the economics of Freddy’s chicken 
production revealed the following: After paying for the day old chicks, medication, electricity (for the 
heater) and feed, gross margins on a batch of 400 birds can approach R9000. Annualised at five batches 
per year, gross margins are over R50 000. The existence of a strong local demand is a crucial part of the 
chicken-battery based production. This is because the economics of chicken production are finely 
balanced: keeping fowls fed on commercial feed after their six week maturation, rapidly consumes any 
potential profits. 
Freddy reported having little contact with the state or state funded organisations. He had not tried to 
source any assistance for his enterprise even from the state because ‘they need a group of people’. He was 
vague on tax registration, but indicated he had issued IRP5s for his employees and paid a bookkeeper a 
small monthly sum to maintain his records. He gave the impression of being very casual and unsystematic 






in relation to bookkeeping. Freddy had previous cordial interactions with the local headman (traditional 
authority). 
Freddy was locally resident with his wife and eight children (three of whom were married adults; five at 
school). His homestead was within sight of his roadside compound, a few minutes drive, or a longer walk, 
away. None of his children were casually involved in the business and the household consumed relatively 
moderate levels of chicken as ‘off-take’. Yet despite this Freddy was reluctant to draw full time family 
labour into the enterprise, he preferred hiring employees, while his children schooled and then grappled 
with urban based labour markets. 
Although Freddy had no formal training in business or chicken production, his employment history 
revealed the antecedents of this choice of enterprise. Freddie worked in Johannesburg from the late 1970s 
to late 1980s as a driver for a chicken producer. In this time he learnt the trade from informally observing 
and talking to other workers (he never actually was involved in tending the chickens). This job also 
provided him with the initial capital injection from his provident fund pay-out. Even during his time 
working in Johannesburg his family were locally resident and maintained the (food) ‘garden’. Moderately 
resourced, he had a light truck (essentially for hauling chicken feed) and augmented his broiler business 
by selling firewood (cut by others elsewhere). 
Raphulu (Cattle farmer, butcher shop, and ‘eating house’ owner) 
A spritely man in his sixties, Raphulu lived in Limpopo village and owned a cluster of buildings adjacent 
to the main feeder road outside Elim. Enclosed by a high wall with a parking lot, the buildings included a 
large butchery, an informal abattoir and ‘eating place’ (a cavernous room with rudimentary furniture, 
which served a limited selection of meals and alcohol). The enterprise had recently benefited from the 
extension of the tarred feeder road to a national highway, which resulted in a commensurate increase in 
traffic. Raphulu and his family engaged in a number of additional business activities including the rearing 
of cattle (he has approximately 90 head grazing on both communal and leased land) and goats (roughly 
20), along with the transporting of sand (with two tipper trucks he owned) and concrete block making 
(using the river sand). Rapulu’s wife and daughter were integral to these enterprises, and assisted with 
running the abattoir and butchery on a full time basis. 
In terms of his enterprises, Rapulu’s butchery was started in 2002/2003 and was in the name of his wife 
(they reasoned she would be better placed to secure state support, but none had been offered). Although 
he bought in pre-packaged chicken to sell from his butchery, Rapulu’s core focus was beef. Rapulu’s 
cattle production, abattoir, butchery and ‘eating house’ were vertically integrated (livestock reared, 
slaughtered, retailed and/or cooked). Yet the situation was slightly more complex than this picture of a 
tidy value chain suggests. Many of the cattle slaughtered in the abattoir (which served only him) were 
purchased by Rapulu externally either from locals (i.e. African smallholder farmers) or at commercial 
auctions (largely from white commercial farmers). Commensurately, Raphulu sold many of his better 
quality cattle on auction rather than slaughtering and retailing them himself. Raphulu explained this 





apparent contradiction (selling his own cattle, buying in others) by describing how the local market was 
highly price sensitive and therefore required a ‘lower quality’ meat. He explained: “You see the people 
from here are not able to see the difference. They think meat is meat”. With Rapulu having previously 
invested in a Bonsmara bull and heifer to improve his herd, his better quality meat would simply not fetch 
an appropriate price locally. 
Rapulu slaughtered approximately one beast a week (costing R5000-R6000 if purchased on auction), 
annually 10-15 of the cattle slaughtered were his own, and furthermore he sold 16 of his cattle at the 
commercial auction in 2009. Rapulu complained his profitability was undermined by the high monthly 
costs he incurs including: electricity (for refrigeration) of R1900, R500 a trip for livestock transport from 
the auction, (a fixed price for one to four cattle, cleaning consumables, etc.) and a paltry license fee (it 
was unclear precisely who he paid this to for his seemingly unregistered informal abattoir). He summed 
up his profitability by explaining that if he bought a head of cattle for R5000, it made approximately 
R1500 profit (from which his other enterprise costs needed to be met). Alongside the beef he estimated he 
sold 10 boxes of chicken per month. A rough estimate gave him a gross annual margin of R41 000 on the 
butchery (this excluded his costs such as his wife and daughter’s wages), and R56 000 from livestock 
sales on auction. 
In terms of his employment history Raphulu grew up in the district, he and his family were forcibly 
removed from an adjacent farm when he was a child. He later migrated to Gauteng, and worked as a bus 
driver for twenty years until returning with a retrenchment package to the district in the early 1990s. With 
his accrued capital, and experience as a driver, he started a haulage business. It was at this point that he 
acquired his current business site (for a sum of R12000). With the savings from his haulage business he 
was able to open the abattoir and butchery. Construction led to a detour into block (‘brick’) making, 
including the acquisition of the block-making machine. He made the bricks himself with family and hired 
labour (he hired a builder for the more skilled work of construction). He acquired much of the butchery 
and refrigeration equipment at auctions. Having never received any training, he was entirely self-taught in 
slaughtering and butchery skills. He did not think it was difficult to adequately master these skills. 
Apart from his locally resident wife and daughter who worked in the enterprise, Raphulu had another 
adult daughter undergoing vocational training in Pretoria. Although she received a small stipend attached 
to her training, he continued to support her financially in anticipation of her potentially improved, formal 
employment prospects. 
Diana (Dressmaker and fashion designer) 
Diana was a confident but understated woman in her late 40s. She owned and ran a dressmaking and 
tailoring business in the heart of Elim, and described herself as a ‘fashion designer’. She operated her 
business from a ground-level shop in Elim’s ‘old mall’. She rented the space for R760 per month. It was 
formerly the site of a Chicken Licken (one could still see the stools and the service counter), but she 
shared the space with a photocopy business which was operated by someone else. The area around the 
‘old mall’ bustled. On the other side of the building was the town’s main petrol station; there was also an 






expansive gravel area which accommodated some parking, hundreds of traders, and a few handfuls of 
skilled artisans like Diana, mostly operating from small shacks. At the edge of the gravel area was the 
town’s main taxi rank. Opposite the ‘old mall’ was a new, larger, and somewhat fancier development 
called the Huybeni Mall, which was opened in 2007. 
Diana and her family resided in a ‘bond-house’ in the one part of the Elim/Shirley/Waterval complex 
which comprised a formal township, namely Waterval. She lived there with her husband, a policeman, 
and one of their three children. The husband’s salary was the household’s main source of income. Their 
other two children resided in Gauteng, where one was working and the other studying music. It was from 
their house in Waterval that Diana started her business in 1997. She moved to her current premises in 
2004, largely to increase her visibility and thus assist with marketing. 
Diana and her four employees (all of whom were women who had been with her for some years) designed 
and sewed a wide variety of garments, including traditional Venda robes, school uniforms, church 
uniforms (ZCC), evening clothes, and wedding gowns. The focus was on women’s clothing; however 
they also mended men’s clothes. Although there was a reasonable sample of the kinds of clothes they 
produced on display in their shop, Diana and her crew worked largely on orders, most of which appeared 
to be from the end-user. The stated reason was to do with money: Diana required a deposit from the client 
which is used to purchase the fabric, thus in the absence of orders she did not have the resources to 
proactively acquire the materials necessary to develop significant stock. However, it was likely that the 
reason also had to do with her business strategy, which was to cater to people’s specific needs and 
produce high quality, rather than compete on price. Her market was the residents of the local community, 
although the traditional Venda robes were largely sold to foreign tourists. 
In a typical month, Diana and her team would produce and sell roughly 40 items. These ranged from 
school uniforms which could go for as little as R55, to wedding gowns which typically fetched R450. In a 
typical month, furthermore, the operation grossed about R4000, but it tended to vary between R2700 and 
R5000. Diana paid her staff about R350 to R400 each per month; the reason it varied was by mutual 
agreement, whereby in good months the fee was higher and in poor months lower. Diana appeared to take 
home around R700 to R1000 per month, though it was difficult to know for certain. 
Diana received modest support from her husband in the form of transporting her sewing machine (when it 
is in need of repair) to the repair technician in Makado town (formerly Louis Trichardt). However, she 
made this trip herself frequently enough in order to purchase fabric and other necessities, and for these 
trips she reported using public transport. Diana did not rely on her children for labour, nor had she in the 
past. Amusingly, if/when her own children needed, say, a school uniform, she would have it made in her 
shop but her husband would be expected to pay for it. 
Diana had interacted with the Small Enterprise Development Association (SEDA), but establishing the 
exact nature of this interaction proved difficult. Diana was awaiting SEDA to share with her a business 
plan that it said it wished to produce on her behalf, and was also waiting for training (e.g. in book-





keeping). But it would appear that Diana’s main interest was in accessing a loan with which she could 
purchase more sewing machines, for this she had been required to create a co-operative. The four other 
co-operative members included family members who were not materially involved in the business, and 
not her employees. This co-op was officially registered in 2009. 
Diana was actively involved in the ANC Women’s League and serves on NAFCOC’s (National African 
Chamber of Commerce) provincial executive. Diana saw her involvement in these organisations as a 
means of learning more about how the world works, but also potentially as a source of information about 
new markets. It was difficult to discern to what extent she relied or hoped to rely on members of these 
organisations to become clients. 
Ultimately, Diana aspired to grow her business, employing more people and acquiring more machines. 
She anticipated that her dream would progress over the next several years. She did not perceive her 
current market to be significantly limited.  






Khayelitsha (Western Cape Province) 
Nongazi (Spaza shop, shebeen, braaied meat business operator) 
Late middle-aged Nongazi and her partner ran three distinct enterprises in the large township of 
Khayelitsha. From the prime trading spot along a busy road close to the taxi rank, they operated a small 
shebeen (an unregistered bar) from the front room of their large shack. From a shack across the road 
(which they also owned), they ran a well-established spaza shop. Finally, in the late afternoon and over 
weekends they braaied (barbequed) and sold meat from the front of their spaza shop to passing 
pedestrians. Estimating the profitability of the enterprises was difficult, especially with high and regular 
levels of ‘off-take’ of food from the spaza shop. However in 2007 they had sufficient surplus to save 
weekly (R500 via a stokvel) and acquired assets such as a cheap second-hand bakkie (pick-up truck). 
Running the three adjacent yet distinct enterprises required two to three people’s labour. In the past 
Nongazi’s children would return from school and prepare to braai the meat; they continued to do this as 
they aged into adulthood. Nongazi’s daughter routinely helped out at the spaza shop while Nongazi’s 
partner frequently tended the shebeen (he was close to its restrained, elderly clientele who were 
uninterested in pool tables or loud music). As her partner was neither long-standing, nor the father of the 
children, the enterprises and two properties were widely acknowledged to belong to Nongazi. 
By 2009 this dynamic cluster of enterprises underwent a number of changes. Firstly Nongazi, like many 
unlicensed shebeen operators had long been accustomed to evading the attention of the police (by being 
discreet, controlling unruly patrons and keeping small quantities of alcohol), but law enforcement efforts 
had intensified over the last two years. Secondly, while Nongazi always had concerns about being a 
victim of crime she now lamented that one of her teenage sons had fallen into delinquency and petty 
crime. She was particularly apprehensive that he (and perhaps her property) would be subject to ‘people’s 
justice’ (vigilante attack). Thirdly, amidst the redevelopment of the local area (the demolition of the 
ubiquitous shacks and construction of low cost formal housing) the shebeen had to be downscaled and the 
operation of the spaza shop somewhat disrupted. The difficulties in continuing to run the shebeen, 
combined with the opportunities afforded by the new construction work, saw Nongazi’s partner abandon 
working within the household economy and become a casually employed plasterer. 
The redevelopment of Nongazi’s section of the township necessitated other forms of strategising. 
Redevelopment entailed the upgrading of tenure (through the allocation of title deeds); in response to 
which Nongazi carefully strategized to overcome the prohibition on holding two title deeds. She 
summoned her married adult daughter from Gauteng, who signed for the title deed, before she returned to 
her home in Johannesburg. 
In terms of her employment history Nongazi arrived in Cape Town in the mid 1980s, having previously 
worked in a store in Johannesburg. She lived with her sister and engaged in the dirty and un-lucrative 
work of selling ‘smilies’ (cooked sheep heads) for several months, before moving to Khayelitsha with its 





first waves of resettled residents. She was readily able to draw on her prior experience of retail, and sold 
fruit, vegetables and beer from her shack to the construction workers building the first of the townships 
infrastructure. At this point she secured permission from the local street committee to move her fruit and 
veg stall (the nascent spaza shop) to the then vacant stand across the road, and started preparing cooked 
meat for the late afternoon passing trade from this location. The three businesses, running for over two 
decades, had clearly benefited from her experience of trade and her early acquisition of an attractive 
trading site. 
Tenathi (Hardware and second hand furniture store operator) 
Middle-aged Tenathi occupied a rambling double storey shack on a busy arterial route into Khayelitsha.  
She used the upstairs portion of her shack as her residence, while the street facing section of the ground 
floor contained a jumble of basic hardware supplies, second-hand building materials, furniture and 
clothes. At the back of the shack was a warren of rooms where sangomas (traditional healers) 
independently consult clients.  Although they did not pay rent, their presence attracted potential customers 
and, perhaps, deterred criminals. 
Tenathi sourced her hardware supplies from a range of wholesalers and stores in Cape Town: salvaged 
building materials (timber, windows and doors, roofing) from auctions, demolition yards or transport 
contractors, second hand furniture and general household goods (appliances, etc.) at auctions. However 
she was flexible and kept an eye open for new opportunities, so a range of novelty tune-playing 
Valentines Day mugs appeared amongst her goods one year, and later basic grocery items were stocked in 
response to the opportunity presented by the closure of an adjacent spaza shop. Synergies similarly exist 
with other businesses. Capitalising on the proximity of the sangomas, Tenathi also sold toiletry products 
(petroleum jelly, body-lotion, etc.) adulterated with special medicinal herbs. Similarly if Tenathi lacked a 
certain hardware item, she would direct clients to her father’s smaller hardware stall across the road (and 
vice versa). 
The pricing of goods and giving of credit was a complex matter. With hardware goods, the major task was 
to source tolerable quality amongst the cheap Eastern-produced offerings for the cost sensitive township 
customers. Tenathi often sourced single types of items (nails, locks, paint) from individual stores. With 
regards to auction goods, she bought old and solid goods cheaply and added a substantial margin (around 
300%). The surrounding shacks, built from salvaged materials, routinely leaked and flooded in the Cape 
winter rains and were subject to the ever-present threat of devastating fires which saw their inhabitants 
disinclined to invest in good quality consumer durables. 
In terms of credit Tenathi was careful to secure a deposit greater than her purchase price, and 
demonstrated little motivation to proactively collect outstanding debit.  She therefore sought to profit, 
even if the customer defaulted. She also used price information strategically to affect arbitrage between 
the purchase and selling price of second hand goods. Prices were not recorded on items, but rather 
Tenathi proffered them in response to a ‘potential buyers’ queries. She explained she did this because her 
customers would offer substantially less than an indicated price, but the traders (who occasionally offered 






her a complete bakkie ‘job lot’ to buy) would elevate their asking prices if they saw her margins. 
Estimating Tenathi’s profitability was difficult, but when pressed she ventured that her turnover was as 
high as R10 000 a month (although this seemed to be out of synch with her modest scale and may have 
been overstated). 
By 2010 the redevelopment sweeping through this section of Khayelitsha precipitated a number of 
significant changes. Firstly Tenathi demolished her shack in anticipation of receiving a new concrete 
block house, but her neighbour (encroaching on her newly demarcated plot) was tardy in removing his 
shack. The resultant delay saw Tenathi live and vend her meagre selection of goods from a temporary, un-
weatherproofed one-roomed corrugated-iron shack. In addition Tenathi was preoccupied by the ‘calling’ 
(from the ancestors) she was receiving to become a sangoma. Finally, she foresaw a declining taste for the 
cheap, soiled consumer durables she had long sold amongst the aspirant new homeowners. Her 
relationship with the sangoma’s who previously also shared her space also changed. The head sangoma 
had died in a car accident and Tenathi was at pains to engage with rituals and propriation (in part to 
demonstrate her lack of complicity in his death). 
In terms of her history, recently widowed Tenathi arrived in Cape Town with a young infant in the 1980s. 
She initially sold sweets, and was sternly mentored by her father to plough profit back into the enterprise 
business. Like her father she started selling hardware materials from in-front of her own shack, before 
building up her present day stall in the 1990s. She proudly reported having never worked for an umlungu 
(white person). She apparently never secured a licence or permission from anybody to run her business. 
Furthermore although she had completed a six month long entrepreneurship course, she thought she had 
learnt the most from her father. Tenathi expressed a preference for a hardware stall to the spoilage 
associated with food vending or the diminutive margins of a spaza shop. Although she conceded the 
spectre of ‘jealousy’ hung around her (relatively) successful business, she explained she sought to control 
this by keeping a low profile and not ‘wandering around’. 
In terms of her domestic arrangement, several of Tenathi’s children used to help out at the stall but they 
would often pocket the money. All but the eldest adult child were now living with relatives in the Eastern 
Cape. Tenathi reported not to have employees, but routinely paid a young kinswoman from her parent’s 
small sums to tend her stall. Finally as Tenathi’s business had operated in synergy with her father’s stall 
across the road, she had helped her parents rebuild their business when it burnt down. While her father is 
elderly and frail, her mother kept very busy sewing, beading and worked as a sangoma.  





Neliswa (Dressmaker, shoe seller and healer) 
Middle-aged widow Neliswa sewed traditional ‘German-print’ (a Javanese-style print on heavy blue 
cotton and a staple of customary Xhosa attire) for the traditional matrimonial market, and sold her wares 
from a stall at a taxi rank in Khayelitsha. Alongside her dresses she sold the other items of apparel that 
make up the dress of a married Xhosa makoti (headscarf, blanket, shawl, petticoat, etc.). In addition to 
this activity, Neliswa sold shoes in a more distant Cape Town township and engaged in early morning 
Zionist-Pentecostal healing rites at her Khayelitsha shack for ‘donations’. 
Neliswa used her deceased husband’s formal workplace pension as capital to start selling clothes 
(purchased from adjacent KwaZulu-Natal), from her rural home in the rural Eastern Cape in the 1980s. In 
the 1990s she and her children came to Cape Town (initially for her to access medical care). She 
continued sourcing clothes for resale from distant Durban, while living with her sister. It was at this time 
that she completed an eight week long sewing course and started making the traditional apparel. German-
print wear is unique in not being subject to the same Asian-sourced competition as other garments. 
During this time the monthly payments from her late husband’s work, were crucial in enabling her 
household to continue to subsist, while she paid course fees, travel costs and purchased a second hand 
sewing machine. In 2007 she estimated she made R1500 a month from sewing, a figure that rose sharply 
during the busy holiday periods of Easter and Christmas. Although 2009 was disrupted by extensive 
travel to the Eastern Cape (for family funerals and her son’s initiation rites), when she did work she 
routinely exceeded this figure. Opportunistically sourcing cheap, scrap fabric and stuffing she also 
innovated by making a batch of firm, well-stuffed bed pillows. 
Apart from her sewing, Neliswa also capitalized on her knowledge of the shoe factories/importers in 
distant KwaZulu-Natal. On average she travelled five or six times per annum to Durban or 
Pietermaritzburg, buying up to R2000 worth of stock. By 2007 she also carried a large debtor’s book 
(worth about R4000) for shoes which she and her sister sold, in a more distant Cape Town township. She 
favoured this site, as it was easier to collect debt where she was unknown, because people ‘don’t come 
with stories’ (i.e. evade payment). She continued to do this into 2009, but found collecting debt a 
challenge and preferred selling for cash. 
Despite the fact that she and her sister lived in adjacent shacks and had several children (some of whom 
were adults) Neliswa generally avoided using family labour within her enterprise. She paid a non-kin 
employee R600 month to tend the stall, while she often sewed at home. Non-kin employees, Neliswa 
explained, were not only more compliant, they were less inclined to neglect their responsibilities or 
pocket the proceeds from the stall than her daughters or nieces (a son would push the handcart to and 
from the stall, but selling dresses was a female vocation). While Neliswa would custom-make garments 
on request there was a sense of individual craftspersonship and fashion fair, with customers routinely 
referred between the rows of dressmaker stalls at the taxi rank. Paying a nominal rent for her crude, open 
fronted stall, Neliswa attributed the lack of crime at the site to the presence of the taxi rank. She indicated 
the taxi association not only deterred criminals they could also adjudicate disputes (with customers or 
employees) as necessary. 






Marley (Fruit and vegetable seller) 
In his late twenties, Rastafarian Marley worked long hours running a fruit and vegetable stall adjacent to a 
primary school in Khayelitsha. He was initially resident several streets away at his mother’s house, but 
spent long hours at his vending shack (it had a rudimentary bed and cooking facilities). By 2009 he had 
purchased a shack of his own. Marley supported a girlfriend and young child who live elsewhere. 
To source stock Marley relied both on middle-men dropping by to offer stock, but also used his 
unroadworthy car to travel to the municipal fresh produce market. The fruit and vegetable trade is highly 
seasonal and sales spike on the Friday payday, but Marley estimated he made up to R800 profit per week, 
or R3300 in a good month. Marley worked very long hours (sourcing stock before dawn, and closing well 
in the evenings to sell to commuters returning home). Despite this he ran the stall single-handed, and was 
generally disinclined to draw in kin (such as his brother) to tend the stall. He described his brother as 
somewhat unreliable. When Marley’s car ran more reliably he could sometimes be induced to use it as a 
taxi, for special trips out of Khayelitsha; however Marley’s fruit and vegetable business was his core 
focus, and crime and cash flow his recurrent concerns. 
The diminutive Marley described how he and a competitor united to catch and beat up a notorious local 
thief in 2007. Marley had however attracted the attention of the police, because of the associations of 
Rastafarians with dagga (marijuana). He described himself as ‘harassed’ by a particular policeman 
(Marley had previously received court warnings and paid ‘admission of guilt’ fines for dagga possession). 
At the end of 2009 Marley was again arrested on his way home by the same policeman. Incarcerated 
overnight and then released without charge, Marley’s abandoned car was ransacked of its valuable stock 
(Marley saw the policeman as complicit in this). Even worse, his very public arrest and detention, 
emboldened thieves to clear out his vending shack of all its contents (including the light bulbs, he 
remarked). 
With regards to cash flow, in 2009 Marley purchased a second hand shack some distance away from his 
vending shack. He did this to secure greater independence from his mother (with whom he lived), but also 
in anticipation of the area eventually being upgraded to formal, low-cost housing. Owning a site would 
entitle him to a new house. He lamented the fact that the money diverted to purchase the shack meant he 
could not repair his decrepit car, which limited his ability to source stock, dampened his business and 
ultimately reduced his income. Marley agonized aloud over how to prioritise his limited income streams. 
In terms of his employment history Marley had an unusually favourable history of educational attainment 
(matric from an elite working class urban school), and proffered a sophisticated analysis of his small 
enterprise (a high turnover, ‘volume’ businesses). After completing his secondary schooling, he worked in 
a similar fruit and vegetable business with other Rastafarians. By the time the partnership disintegrated, 
he saved up money to buy materials to build his vending shack and opened his current business. At the 
beginning of the research period Marley readily attributed his motivation and effort to the Rastafarian 
ethos of self-sufficiency. But by early 2010 he temporarily gave up his vending to work for a construction 
company. Intending to work for six months, he wished to save money to plough back into his fruit and 





vegetable enterprise (to acquire a secure and respectable looking steel shipping container (‘dirty looking’ 
shacks being increasingly incompatible with the upgraded township). He only worked for a week. Not 
only did the affable Marley intensely dislike the experience of working for others without using his own 
initiative, he was ultimately stymied by the loss of his ID book (which prevented him from opening a 
bank account to receive his pay check). 
Zenzi (Polony vendor) 
A young, attractive, recently married Xhosa woman, Zenzi sold small packs of chips and pre-packaged 
polony at a busy railway station concourse alongside a new township shopping centre. Crowded with 
train and taxi commuters, the concourse is lined with vendors selling products including food, DVDs, 
herbal medicines, religious paraphernalia and clothes. Zenzi started hawking the small R2.50 rolls of 
polony in early 2007 after being drawn into the business by her neighbour. Zenzi bought R75 worth of 
polony (50 individual units) about three times a week, with each batch generating a R50 profit and sold as 
a take-away snack. She also sold a few small packets of chips (for a paltry R3 of profit for every 50 packs 
sold) largely because ‘everybody else does so’ and she did not want to loose potential customers who also 
wanted this. The lucrative polony was sourced in an industrial area of the city, accessed by train for a R27 
weekly return ticket. The ubiquitous and marginally profitable chips were bought from a local township 
wholesaler. She typically tried to arrive early at the station to find one of the few positions under cover, 
and in close proximity to a security kiosk. 
Zenzi arrived in Cape Town in 1999, after unsuccessfully seeking domestic work she looked after her 
child while her husband held a menial but solid formal sector job. Zenzi was introduced into selling 
polony by a close friend, neighbour and clanswoman. Her friend accrued savings to buy a R1000 second-
hand fridge by the time she resigned as a domestic worker. Zenzie’s friend also learnt where to source the 
special pre-packaged polony. This was a secret jealously guarded by the other vendors, and required 
persistent enquires and more than one failed foray into the industrial heartland of Cape Town. After first 
setting herself up selling polony, the friend mentored Zenzi (who borrowed R100 from her husband to 
buy stock). Zenzi’s friend also allowed her to store stock in her fridge and they strategised on the optimal 
placement of their respective vending positions (using upturned milk crates as display stands). As the 
more dynamic and exuberant of the two women Zenzi’s friend usually sold out of her polony first. 
Although she disavowed the idea that she did anything special, when pressed she described her repertoire 
of exaggerated friendliness when dealing with customers (i.e. hearty greeting, building rapport, playing 
with customer’s children etc.). Zenzi’s friend estimated them to each make between R200 to R300 a week 
(comfortably more than she did as a domestic worker). Although she had undoubtedly been an important 
benefactor to Zenzi, both of them selling polony allowed the women to pool their efforts and made it 
more difficult for potential competitors to enter. 
The two women collaborated closely, typically taking turns sourcing the polony while the other tended 
both ‘stalls’. Zenzi also tended her friend’s stall when she went to buy the pre-packaged trays of fatty 
meat that she sold alongside her polony. A third woman, vending newspapers, looked after the polony 
when both women had to run errands; in return, they sold her newspapers in her absence. Zenzi’s three 






year old child was at a crèche, but as she and her friend worked into the rush hour return of the early 
evening, the child was either picked up by the neighbour’s teenage children or Zenzi’s husband. Finally 
the two women were members of a rotating stokvel (mutual savings society). 
The women did not extend credit to customers, with the exception of the other vendors who sold from the 
station concourse and were paid at the end of each week by their employers. Both women continue to 
scrupulously avoid revealing the secret of where to source the polony, despite constant enquiries. 
Although Zenzi’s friend was the innovator in the polony selling enterprise, they both readily understood 
that more competition would easily undercut their tidy polony profits. With regards to their prime selling 
position with security guards and the regular cleaning services, the women paid no rent for it, nor did they 
secure permission to trade there. When asked about her plans for the future, Zenzi explained that she had 
a friend who sold toys and novelty items in another part of Khayelitsha and that they contemplated 
sharing the source of their products, so they could both diversify their wares. 
Zikhode (Taxi mechanic) 
Gaunt and with the scarred face of a fighter, forty-five year old Zikhode was one of a small grouping of 
men who repaired and serviced vehicles (primarily Toyota Hi-Ace/Siyaya taxi minibuses) alongside a 
Khayelitsha taxi rank. They worked on a large concrete slab exposed to the weather and surrounded by a 
range of mostly automobile orientated, steel shipping container based enterprises (spare parts, panel 
beating, auto-electrician, etc.). 
Although they shared some tools they effectively worked as individual contractors hired by the taxi 
owners (or their drivers). The informal mechanics had little discernable form of collective organization, 
and rather uncommonly, none of the collective savings (such as a stokvel) or risk sharing arrangements 
found amongst various occupational groups in the informal sector. This was an omission or absence of 
solidarity a (female) fieldworker ascribed to their gender. The individual mechanics did not specialize in 
particular jobs or components, and mainly undertook routine servicing and basic repairs. More complex 
mechanical repairs simply entailed the replacement of the larger components (engines, drive trains, 
gearboxes) with reconditioned units for the ubiquitous vehicles. Sourcing all parts was the responsibility 
of the clients (i.e. the mechanics simply provide labour). Earnings were highly variable, but a good day 
could see a man make R100 to R200. Zikhode appeared to be making enough money to engage in daily 
expenditure on hot lunches, and the regularly purchase of alcohol. 
Zikhode and the mechanics extended little credit to their customers. They were also unaligned to the taxi 
associations which control individual ranks and routes, and amidst a period of association feuding 
(including the exchange of gunfire) they continued to work. Like most of the informal mechanics Zikhode 
was entirely self-taught, having learned by observation. He was concerned about his inability to work on a 
new generation of larger, more technologically complex vehicles being introduced under the auspices of 
the state’s new Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. Not only was the vehicle’s warranty tied to dealer-





servicing, conducting repairs required electronic diagnostic machinery. Zikhode desired training to secure 
accreditation, thereby enabling him to ‘get a job’ (i.e. secure a job in the formal sector). 
Zikhode’s ambition to get a (formal) ‘job’, was much hampered by the fact that for much of 2009 he was 
imprisoned and awaited trial on hijacking/theft charges (accounts were contradictory). Visited in prison 
Zikhode insisted on his innocence and ascribed his arrest to a case of mistaken identity. Released from 
imprisonment in late 2009 (seemingly on bail, again accounts were unclear), regular meals and the 
absence of alcohol saw a healthy looking Zikhode return to work at the taxi rank. He however now saw 
the hand of ‘jealous’ neighbours in his recent incarceration. 
In terms of his household, Zikhode lived with his parents and nine younger siblings, making limited and 
clearly delineated contributions to the household economy. He contributed to groceries but readily 
disavowed responsibility for his younger siblings. Absolved of independent living costs, and with 
relatively uncomplicated domestic arrangements, a fair proportion of Zikhode’s modest income was left 
to his own discretion. He had two children with an estranged partner; the children were living with his 
aunt in the rural Eastern Cape. His occasional visits to the Eastern Cape saw him put in a bit of work at 
the local taxi ranks there to maintain his income. 
Radebe (Tinsmith). 
State old age pension receiving Radebe lived by himself in Khayelitsha, but rather unusually supported a 
wife and family (with grown-up children) resident in the rural Eastern Cape. Radebe had a fairly marginal 
history of employment (farm based labour), but had taught himself tin-smithing. Manually (with hand 
tools alone) he dexterously fabricated items from tinplate, which were sold via employees at several sites. 
His utilitarian wares were extremely well-made and included specialized products such as large goat-
sized cooking pots adapted from 44 gallon oil drums, and a range of utensils and strainers used for 
brewing traditional sorghum beer. His products were noteworthy for the fact that formal sector derived 
equivalents are either inaccessible or expensive. 
Despite being a relatively lucrative and skilled niche manufacturing activity (he routinely remitted more 
than his entire unspent state old age pension home), Radebe faced a number of constraints. The first was 
his constant difficulty to secure workshop space. Amidst the redevelopment of the township (he was 
randomly selected to be relocated as part of the ‘de-densification’ of the shack settlement). His newly 
allocated, concrete block house was not only far flung and distant from viable vending points it was also 
amongst similarly relocated strangers. The new and unfamiliar neighbours were far less tolerant of the 
incessant noisy hammering from his home workshop, which they complained was an affront to their 
respectable new suburban homes. Radebe sought to solve this problem by building a rudimentary shelter 
alongside a busy arterial route from which to both work and vend, but the structure was soon demolished 
by the municipal authorities. By 2009, disinclined to over-invest, he built an even more rudimentary 
structure (of scrap wood, plastic sheeting and cardboard) elsewhere, and sought to concentrate his 
activities there. 






A second major constraint was Radebe’s difficulty sourcing the sheets of printed or coated metal he 
required (tin, zinc and aluminium sheeting). In the past, intermediaries (associated with a local 
development project) helped him source this material, a task he readily drew members of the research 
team into. However by 2007 it was apparent that the scrap tinplate he coveted was increasingly scarce, 
amidst the rising efficiencies of industrial automation (less wastage) and formal tendering out of scrap 
metal collection by local canning companies. The canning companies were also increasingly disinclined 
to allow material emblazoned with corporate branding to enter the market place, and sully their ‘brand 
equity’ (as a company official explained). The difficulties of engaging with these sources of material were 
only exacerbated by Radebe’s lack of English or Afrikaans language skills, his low levels of literacy and 
limited social confidence. 
A third and final dynamic was Radebe’s relationship with the three elderly women he routinely employed 
to sell his wares (for a low wage and with commission). Their relationship was fraught with mistrust and 
punctuated by his perennial accusations that they were swindling him. Over a period of several years they 
oscillated between falling out and reconciling with him. Their efforts were often constrained by the 
demands of vending alongside tasks such as caring for grandchildren. Selling on credit also required 
recording customer’s details and accompanying them to their residential site (in order to verify their 
address). 
Sibongile (Spaza shop, take away food, liquor seller) 
Sibongile was a middle aged woman who ran a spaza-shop, which sold liquor and prepared take away 
foods from her large residential site in Khayelitsha. An early resident in Khayelitsha, she began the 
business with her then husband in the mid-1980s. They grew the business, and separated in the late 1980s. 
Well positioned and close to several schools, Sibongile’s business made as much as R2000 profit per 
week. Sibongile also successfully funded the tertiary education of several grown-up children in the 
middle class professions of teaching and nursing. Although resident elsewhere, Sibongile’s relationship 
with her husband was cordial, and until 2009 the ‘takeaway’ (i.e. not for consumption on the premises) 
liquor she sold was his. Sibongile hired a distant relative in the enterprise and paid him regular ‘pocket 
money’ but disavowed his employee status. Her household ate from the spaza shop, with high levels of 
food ‘off-take’. 
Sibongile’s husband, from whom she had long been separated, made his livelihood by supplying several 
‘satellite’ shebeens with liquor, using his battered bakkie (pick up truck). A sickly late middle aged man, 
with a much younger wife and small child, he also ran a shebeen from his own shack, a few kilometres 
away from Sibongile. Yet by 2009 running a shebeen was becoming an increasingly perilous undertaking. 
Not only had Sibongile’s husband and his patrons been subject to a vicious armed robbery, strenuous 
efforts were being made to regulate the township liquor trade by the police. Sibongile’s husband not only 
gave up supplying other shebeens, he began engaging in an elaborate ruse of enlisting multiple 
confederates to buy and transport the permissible amounts of alcohol. 





Sibongile’s enterprise also underwent a number of significant changes in 2009 due to flux, both personal 
and communal. After two decades of separation Sibongile and her husband formally divorced. This meant 
the comparatively large township property, occupied by Sibongile, was split between them (apparently 
the court rejected her request for alimony or maintenance). Sibongile’s ex-husband was allocated the 
sprawling shack-structure house and shop she had previously occupied; Sibongile was allocated the 
adjacent site. She quickly harnessed a housing development grant and some accumulated savings to begin 
building. Although the impetus for concluding a divorce after the long separation were not entirely clear, 
it coincided with a state-driven effort to redevelop the shack settlement and hence formalize indistinct 
tenure arrangements. This physical reconfiguration of their property holdings precipitated substantial 
changes in the enterprises. 
Sibongile previously saved a tidy sum (approximately R30 000) to extend her business, she diverted this 
sum to build a double storey shop and house. Meanwhile her ex-husband, having taken-over Sibongile’s 
old spaza shop, had it overseen by a member of his extended family. However it proved marginal, and by 
2010 Sibongile's ex-husband had let the shop out to Somali traders. Somali traders demonstrating high 
levels of retail prowess had steadily been taking over much of the township spaza shop trade. These 
developments placed Sibongile in a difficult position, as the formidable Somali traders were now 
competing alongside her (from her erstwhile business premises). In response, Sibongile refocused her 
efforts on producing cooked foods including her speciality, deep-fried dough buns (‘vetkoek). In the 
context of widespread hostility by incumbent spaza shop owners towards the ascending Somali traders, 
Sibongile was sanguine and their relationship co-operative. The Somali traders consumed her ‘vetkoek’ 
while she purchased flour in bulk from them. 
Nosabatha (Welder) 
Nosabatha was a 31 year old woman, who ran a successful small enterprise manufacturing burglar bars 
and security gates from the double garage of her township home. Her husband was a self-employed 
mechanic and panel beater. He had not only taught his wife to weld, he also drove her to sites to install 
her completed products. She reportedly installed her custom made products all over the larger Cape Town 
metropolitan area. Nosabatha relied on word of mouth referrals; along with her prominent working 
position (potential customers stopped to talk to her in the double garage, much like the researchers did). 
She sourced dimensional steel (rods, tubes, bars) in the adjacent working class suburb, but for large orders 
an industrial supplier delivered. Customers sometimes sourced the steel themselves to control costs, but 
could seldom negotiate with Nosabatha’s trade discount. 
Nosabatha’s finished burglar bars and gates were either welded onto doors and window frames or bolted 
onto walls. Although she indicated she could arrange ‘galvanizing’ (industrially applied zinc coating for 
rust resistance), the township clientele neither requested nor would pay for this. Pricing was generally 
calculated on the basis of ‘double gain’ (i.e. 200% of the cost of the steel, added to the steel cost), with 
extra charges for transport to distant sites. Nosabatha articulated great enthusiasm indicating she would 
not give up her well established enterprise for a formal sector job, and that she made between R5000 to 
R10000 monthly profit. 






Nosabatha and her husband had a number of savings instruments (including stokvels in which they 
invested R2000 per month), and a number of formal life insurance products. They generally transacted 
and paid their suppliers in cash, and never bought material on credit. Nosabatha typically demanded a 
50% deposit and generally did not struggle to collect debt. She estimated customer defaults occurred only 
two to three times annually, often when a customer lost their job. In addition, Nosabatha would relax the 
deposit requirements under certain circumstances (e.g. a state employee who needed security bars after a 
burglary). In these cases she or her husband scrupulously vetted the potential customer (such as 
confirming that they were teachers at a local school). Customers were routinely warned that if left unpaid 
for the bars would be repossessed, but they seldom acted on this threat. 
Nosabatha intermittently employed up to three men; a driver, a painter and a general helper. In addition 
she and her husband worked over the annual Christmas holiday when returning to the Eastern Cape. They 
received telephonic orders which they fabricated in Cape Town, but they also took the welding equipment 
and spare material back to their home village. They repaired vehicles and fabricated burglar bars in the 
un-electrified village by renting a generator to power the arc welder. Although a female welder sometimes 
elicits attention on account of its novelty value, Nosabatha vehemently argued woman made better 
welders because they were tidier than men. 
In terms of her personal history, Nosabatha migrated to Cape Town from the rural Eastern Cape after 
completing her schooling in the late 1990s. She married and had two children in the early 2000s. Initially 
she was involved in a township beading project, but found it entailed too much work for the modest 
returns. After watching him work, she learnt to weld from her husband in 2002. Although she modestly 
claims to have only become very skilled by 2008, she was working independently within a month of 
being trained. At this time her mother in law would come to their house to look after her small children. 
At this time the children were school going and even without Nosabatha present they did not require 
much care in the afternoon. In 2009 Nosabatha sought out information about VAT registration and 
business training from the researchers, and by 2010 she enrolled in an entrepreneurship course. She 
aspired to run a formal business premises (on a specific busy township corner), sell steel to other welders 
and tend for large, state and corporate contracts. 
  





Pelepele (Trailer fabricator / repairer) 
Located in a low-cost, block-housing section of Khyayelitsha, Pelepele was both the name of an 
individual and his (manufacture, repair and rental) trailer enterprise. The business was conducted from a 
large open-sided corrugated iron shed, with the rest of the residential plot piled high with old trailers in 
various states of disrepair. Pelepele’s trailers were fabricated from steel, with the ancillary components 
(springs, axles, wheels, tow hitches, taillights), purchased commercially. The resultant trailers were towed 
by a minibus taxi’s along the 3000km return route between Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape. 
Pelepele also rented out the occasional trailer (R500 for a trip to the Eastern Cape, or locally for R160 
daily). Fridays were a particularly busy day for trailers with people travelling to the Eastern Cape for 
weekend ceremonies and funerals. In addition, there was a strong seasonal dynamic, with demand spiking 
during the busy holiday periods of Easter and Christmas. 
The eponymous Pelepele was elusive and spent large portion of his working day away from the 
workshop, haggling with potential (taxi-owner) clients, sourcing materials and components or grappling 
with the bureaucracy of roadworthy tests, to get his finished products legally registered. The fabrication 
work was predominantly done by two casual employees, who were paid per job. The fabrication relied on 
handheld power-tools and an electric arc-welder, and seemed only moderately complicated (essentially 
welding together a frame, attaching a drawbar in front and suspension mounting points underneath). The 
completed trailers were commercially powder-coated (painted) to give them an appearance of a formally 
manufactured product. In addition to fabrication Pelepele also repaired trailers. Requiring a deposit if new 
components were required, many trailers remained uncollected by their owners, and were gradually 
cannibalised for spare parts. 
Alongside the two young casual employees worked a middle aged man named Joseph. Formally trained 
as a sheet metal fabricator, Joseph shared the facilities and tools to produce his own products (welded 
household items such as, pot stands, TV brackets and burglar proofing). He did not compete directly by 
working on trailers and vehemently denied being their ‘boss’, although he mentors the younger men in the 
finer points of metal work. 
In terms of the history of the enterprise, Pelepele was the son of the late founder. His father learnt to make 
trailers during his employment in the coach building industry two decades before, and ran the township 
business until his death several years ago. With a standard trailer selling for around R10 000, the profit 
potentially amounted to several thousand rand per unit. However the enterprise was in slow decline for a 
number of complex reasons. 
Firstly, Pelepele explained that having upgraded to more expensive vehicles during the state’s ‘taxi 
recapitalization programme’, taxi owners had less cash at their disposal. Related to this, many taxi owners 
complained that the mooted integrated transport system within the municipality was a threat to their long 
term sustainability. Secondly, Pelepele no longer enjoyed a virtual monopoly on trailer rentals and 
production, as others in the township now rented trailers out. Thirdly, attractively priced trailers (at 
around R7000) were being imported and sold through a national chain of mass discount stores. Although 
run by younger men, the trailer business took place alongside a large formal spaza shop owned by 






Pelepele’s mother. It was she who encouraged Joseph to keep an eye on her son’s business, as she worried 
about its decline. 
Vavile (Fruit and vegetable vendor) 
Vavile was an elderly man who lived with his wife (several years his junior), an adult daughter, two 
grandchildren and disabled stepson in the urban township of Khayelitsha. In 2007 construction on their 
RDP-type house stalled for several years and it was left little more than an uncompleted shell. The 
household’s living conditions were particularly abject as they occupied a dark and damp lean-to shack at 
the back of the partially constructed house. 
Vavile married unusually late, had a comparatively unfavourable history of employment, and sparse asset 
holdings. During 2007 the household subsisted on the meagre wages of his domestic-worker wife, the 
small-scale vending of fruit and vegetables along with two social grants (stepson’s disability grant; 
Vavile’s social pension). In terms of his history, Vavile worked as a farmworker and casual construction-
worker for most of his adult life, before he started vending fruit, vegetables, peanuts and loose cigarettes 
in his middle age, in the 1980s. Assisted by his wife, he sold these at a local train station for a decade 
(well into the 1990s). During this time his wife augmented their income with seasonal fruit-picking on the 
commercial fruit farms of the Western Cape. As Vavile aged and his wife’s health deteriorated, they had 
given up the vending at the station, the early morning rising (to go to the fresh produce market) and long 
hours out in inclement weather having become increasingly intolerable. By the 2000s they began vending 
from a rough stall (cobbled together from scrap wood, iron and plastic sheeting), along a busy arterial 
route leading into Khayelitsha. Well positioned to sell to passing pedestrians, the wide road verge also 
enabled passing vehicles to easily stop. Alongside Vavile’s stall were two others. He denied a competitive 
relationship existed between them and 
indicated that the vendors referred customers between the stalls as they often stocked different 
merchandise. They also jointly sought to protect themselves against the depredations of thieves. 
By 2009 Vavile had avoided the expense and trouble of travelling to the distant fresh produce market, and 
instead bought his stock produce from a large wholesaler in Khayelitsha. He worked every weekday and 
on Saturday morning, with his adult daughter frequently taking over from him during the evening return 
rush. Estimating his profit to be R40 per day in 2007, he (rather cryptically) updated this to ‘over R100 a 
week’ in 2008. Quantifying profitability ought to be viewed with caution: Vavile was unsure, kept no 
written records, sold a shifting array of differently priced seasonal fruit, and the household consumed the 
perishable stock as they became too ripe to sell. Vavile indicated that he had no intention of expanding his 
fruit and veg stand, as all profit from the stand was ploughed back into buying groceries for the 
household. 
The enterprise was also defined by the limits of elderly Vavile’s energy. Although his adult daughter 
helped out, she was constrained by the demands of caring for her young children, and her own pregnancy 
related ill-health. The residence of Vavile’s intellectually-impaired, disability grant receiving stepson was 





inconsistent with cultural precedent, but his need for care (after the death of his maternal grandmother 
with whom he was previously living) and the resources of his grant facilitated this pragmatic 
arrangement. By 2009 the household successfully saved their grant income and mustered the labour 
required to complete their dwelling. They bought building materials such as concrete blocks and second 
hand roofing, and paid a skilled neighbour to do the work they were unable to do themselves. The 
completion of the house not only represented a marked improvement in the quality of their 
accommodation (against the wet Cape winter weather) it also represented a substantial investment in 
urban domesticity and respectability. Much of the household’s subsequent saving and strategising went 
into the credit based purchase of various consumer durables and furniture, for the new home. These 
efforts underscored the multigenerational household’s firm commitment to urban-based residence, as they 
had no rural homestead or livestock of their own. Vavile explained that his daughter would inherit the 
house from him, a house they built with the social grants and the fruit and veg selling. Vavile explained 
that they used the grants to build while they ate the proceeds from the stall. 
Cynthia (Hairdresser) 
With dual South African and Zimbabwean ancestry mid-thirties Cynthia and her sister ran two ‘hair 
saloons’ close to the Khayelitsha taxi rank. Contained in converted steel shipping containers, the sisters 
established the enterprises five years ago after moving from Zimbabwe as economic conditions 
deteriorated. Cynthia and her sister had formal hair dressing qualifications which they thought 
distinguished them very favourably from many of their local competitors. She proudly displayed a 
certificate for a province-wide hair styling competition she had recently won. 
Cynthia first worked for a Congolese refugee, running a hairdressing salon before starting her own hair 
‘saloon’. She purchased her shipping container based salon from a Ghanaian hairdresser in late 2004 for 
the not inconsiderable sum of R10 000. She relied on accrued savings, and loans from several family and 
friends to fund the purchase, but was vague on the precise details. The converted shipping container was 
fitted with counters, large mirrors, and a hair washing basin and assorted posters and promotional 
material. Despite its professional appearance the steel container was extremely hot to work in during the 
mid-summer. Cynthia’s consumables not only included a plethora of shampoos, conditioners, ‘relaxers’ 
and ‘treatments’, they also included synthetic hair, which would be woven as extensions into client’s hair. 
Many of the more elaborate hairstyles on offer were complex, time consuming, and therefore relatively 
expensive to produce. These services ranged from ‘cornrows’ (taking 90 minutes, costing R150) and hair 
extensions (around R300), all the way to tight braids which could take several hours to create. In addition 
to the regular flow of customers who had their hair attended to, Cynthia sought to position herself as a 
wholesaler of a range of ‘ethnic’ (sic) hair care and synthetic hair extension products by vending them 
from her container. Alongside her, two hairdressers occupied another container she was renting and were 
paid commission for every client served. 
With the 2008 xenophobic attacks still fresh in her memory, Cynthia described how their proximity to the 
taxi rank and the weekly ‘cleaning’ fee of R60 they paid to the local taxi association saw them protected 
by the taxi owners. She kept the business closed during the violence, but unlike many other 






Zimbabwean’s elsewhere in Khayelitsha her container was not looted. She did not think that the taxi 
association members were free of the xenophobic impulses of the other residents, but explained that as 
business was good around the taxi rank nobody wanted to disrupt it. 
Cynthia sent regular remittances to their family (approximately R600 monthly, sent in the US dollar 
equivalent via Western Union to Zimbabwe). However her father was temporarily resident with her as he 
sought medical treatment in Cape Town. Cynthia readily understood that her personal appearance was 
bound up with her professional identity and explained she regularly spent money on costume jewellery, 
fashionable clothes and various hairstyles. A comparatively large expense for her was the solid house she 
and her sister rented at a middle income enclave within the township. Although comparatively expensive, 
Cynthia explained that it was difficult and tense living in the surrounding areas as she was not only a 
foreigner, but perceived to be comparatively wealthy. She therefore chose the expense and inconvenience 
of daily travel further afield. 
Cynthia resisted requests by her clients to give them credit, and explained that it was extremely difficult 
to collect and resulted in quarrels. She extolled the virtues of ‘foreigner’s’ work ethic and willingness to 
work long hours, and contrasted this to South Africans. She explained that she and her sister would like to 
one day return to Zimbabwe. 
Simon (Cabinet / furniture maker) 
Simon was a man in his early 30s who manufactured furniture (predominantly kitchen units and 
wardrobes) from his steel shipping container in Khayelitsha. He was a Nigerian, who came to SA in 2003 
lived in Johannesburg for a year before moving to Cape Town. He had started a succession of small 
enterprises, including shoe repairs and hairdressing, before diversifying into cabinet making. He ran three 
hairdressing containers with employed staff, but after these were looted in the xenophobic violence of 
2008 he consolidated his activities into cabinet making. 
Simon manufactured cabinets and ‘kitchen dressers’ out of cheap fibreboard, he used to sell these for 
R1800 but more recently others were selling them for R1200 so he dropped his price. He explained he 
used to make things of better quality, but they were too expensive for his poor clientele. He therefore 
relented and used poorer quality board and fixtures to compete with the others (The equivalent items 
would be R3000 at a formal furniture store on instalment, he estimated). Simon had a sophisticated ability 
to explain his market and indicated that it would make sense for buyers to spend more on obtaining a 
durable product, yet the township market was so price sensitive all his customers looked at was price. He 
felt distinctly uncomfortable with the quality of his products. 
In terms of his self-employment he began with shoe repairs but said it felt more like a hobby, done for 
low returns (R5 or R10 at a time). He lamented that the low returns were ‘undignified’ and it was an un-
conducive profession to maintain into ones old age. The hairdressing business turned greater returns but 
required more staff (employed on a commission basis) and had made him vulnerable to the attacks of 





2008. He had, by this time done a six month construction and carpentry course, before enrolling for a 
cabinet making course in 2006 at a Khayelitsha based training NGO. Although he paid a course fee of 
several hundred rand, it was heavily subsidized and good value at the price he said. While he readily 
conceded his skills were at best only average, he was rather critical of the other students and their work 
ethic. However although the carpentry and cabinet making have not proved to be as lucrative as he 
imagined, he was optimistic that the returns may increase in the future. When asked about his future 
aspirations he explained how he wanted to have a small company with employees, both making products 
and selling raw material (boards, fixtures, etc.) to others. He imagined retiring to his hometown of Akwe 
in Nigeria, although he now had two children with a local woman here. 
His container-based business was looted during the xenophobic violence in 2008, in full sight of his 
neighbours. This was an extremely stressful time, and afterwards he was forced to sell his assets 
(including his old car) to repay his debt to people who had paid deposits and lay-buys for furniture. 
During this period he had people extort money from him too. He was circumspect about trusting anybody 
anymore he said. With regards to credit, he sold on lay-buy rather. He had previously given credit but 
people would return to the Eastern Cape and he would not be able to trace them. If he did track down 
defaulting debtors they would claim to have lost their job. If he tried to repossess items they would 
demand the deposit and instalments already paid be returned. Simon was reluctant to press customers on 
this as ‘people kill if you make too much noise’. He typically hired a bakkie to deliver items that had been 
paid for. 
In terms of his personal history, Simon was from a lower middle class family and completed his 
schooling and did business administration and management courses at a polytechnic in Nigeria. He came 
to South Africa in 2003 because of ‘personal problems’, he described himself as too ambitious to accept a 
modest job through family connections. He initially arrived in Johannesburg, sought out his church and 
sold sweets and cigarettes. However he accrued little in a year and was reluctant to return home empty 
handed. Moving to Cape Town, he fared better with vocational training and his succession of three 
enterprises. Although he lamented that several of his contemporaries who had migrated had fared far 
better than him. When discussing the commercial acumen of the foreigners, Simon noted that locals were 
inexperienced at selling and trading compared to people from West Africa. 
 
  






Mount Frere district (Eastern Cape Province) 
Nselo (‘Quqa’ taxi operator) 
Nselo was a man in his late fifties who ran a small pick-up truck based (‘quqa’) transport business from 
his comfortable rural homestead in an Eastern Cape village. The bakkie (pick-up) carried 10 tightly 
squeezed passengers on wooden benches under a fibreglass canopy in its load-bed. It operated the 20 
kilometre trip on rough and unpaved roads to the local town, for a few rand per passenger. Prior to 2009 
Nselo owned three bakkies in various states of repair: the first the canopied passenger quqa, the second a 
battered goods transporting bakkie, the third a bakkie wrecked by an errant driver who absconded with 
the earnings. By 2009 Nselo had consolidated his enterprise in the single passenger quqa. 
Earlier in the research period Nselo reported gross returns between R200 to R300 a day, of which 
approximately R80 to R100 was fuel. However he complained around rising fuel and maintenance costs, 
along with declining daily trips (amidst increasing local competition). Gauging the precise profitability of 
Nselo’s transport business was difficult, because the maintenance costs for the old vehicles operating on 
unpaved roads was high, and provision for depreciation non-existent. Typically a quqa business would be 
run by an older man with a single vehicle, purchased with savings built up during previous formal sector 
employment. The demand of coaxing maximum use out of an old vehicle is a key task, and the enterprise 
typically lasts as long as the (invariably second-hand) vehicle operates under the harsh conditions. The 
activity therefore cushions the inexorable draw-down of a finite set of resources. 
When Nselo ran both passenger and goods delivery vehicles, he effectively had two different enterprises, 
entailing membership of two different informal associations. Each association with its own ‘joining fee’ 
and Nselo thought it unlikely that anyone would attempt to trade without belonging to the appropriate 
association. While the delivery van could take clients and their goods (hardware materials, livestock, 
furniture, etc.) to their chosen destination, the passenger quqa only travelled the association’s route 
between his village and the town. The right to trade was therefore incumbent both on membership of the 
association and local residency. 
Nselo’s parents were both local teachers, this and a spacious rural homestead marked him as part of the 
local petty elite. In terms of his employment history he had both a ‘standard nine’ from a mission school 
and a comparatively favourable history of formal sector urban employment (a working life of clerical, 
security and driving jobs). It was during this period he acquired both a house in a Gauteng township 
(currently occupied by his son), and rather unusually, a Sotho wife. Nselo’s enterprise therefore grew 
from his urban employment (where he gained literacy, capital and driving skills), but also relied on the 
beneficence of local elite kin (teachers) as he bought their second hand vehicles as they were disposed of. 
When he ran more than one vehicle Nselo employed drivers in an arrangement he found highly 
unsatisfactory (they withheld earnings and damaged his vehicles). Later he consolidated to a single 
vehicle he drove himself, but by 2009 his failing eyesight and increasingly unfavourable attention from 





the local traffic authorities began to constitute considerable impediments. Nselo’s wife, an outsider to the 
village with a ready preference for cosmopolitan Gauteng over village life, mooted learning to drive 
herself. However this was also a proposition unsupported by Nselo. Household finances were an 
unusually and explicitly contested issue between the couple. Finally, a disability grant receiving kin 
member, and later a distant relative of Nselo’s were resident within the homestead, but were widely 
understood not to be the responsibility of Nselo’s wife. The distant relative was tended to by her own, 
waged caregiver. 
Magaba (Chicken farmer) 
Magaba was a middle aged woman engaging in comparatively high levels of smallholder agricultural 
production including a ‘chicken business’ for several years. Married into a respectable village family, she 
was a widow and occupied a sprawling rural compound while supporting eight extended kin dependents. 
Although her attire and deportment suggested a ‘traditional’ Xhosa matron, she combined this social role 
with that of a dynamic chicken entrepreneur. By 2010 she was beginning a piggery from her rural 
homestead. 
Magaba began her chicken business four years previously by teaming up with two other women and 
jointly buying R600 worth of hatchlings, to raise and sell. After successfully doing this, an organisation 
(an NGO) offered each woman a week of poultry training and a start up loan of R800. With regards to the 
chickens, she sourced hatchlings from a commercial supplier, in the nearby Mount Frere, raised the birds 
and sold them in the village. Unlike Magaba, her collaborators struggled with four monthly repayments of 
R240, and never succeed, but Magaba raised 100 birds monthly (a number that doubled over the busy 
Christmas season. The youngest chicks occupied a pen in the warm cooking hut, the older birds another 
hut. Although unable to readily quantify her profit, Magaba sold approximately 90 birds monthly (at R60 
each). Consuming approximately R500 – R600 of commercial chicken feed a month, this potentially 
represented a gain of over R3000 a month. Magaba enhanced the profitability of the enterprise by 
augmenting commercial feed with her own maize, ground up in a newly purchased hand mill. 
Magaba’s commitment to agrarian production is further evidenced by her green vegetable garden, which 
starkly contrasted with the fallow gardens and dry grass of the surrounding winter landscape. The 
cultivation of the garden is greatly aided by a tap in her yard. In response to the research team’s enquires 
she cheerfully explained how she ‘tipped’ (bribed) a contractor working on a nearby water pipeline, to 
illicitly connect the tap. She sold a relatively small surplus of vegetables and priced her products 
according to an ‘urban parity pricing’ (what they cost in town), but without the charge they would incur to 
bring them back on a quqa (rural bakkie taxi). 
In light of a recent veterinary illness that decimated chickens in the district, Magaba explained that if she 
lost her birds, she would buy another batch of chicks the next month anyway. Just because one batch dies 
does not mean subsequent batches will, she resiliently argued. It is not micro-finance Magaba thought she 
needed, it was training in poultry illnesses. 






Magaba’s history points to some of the factors that facilitated her self-employment. Married into a 
respectable village family, her husband was formally employed in Johannesburg (a long-service 
certificate hangs on the lounge wall). He discouraged her from working outside the village, and prioritised 
his remittances to building the homestead (which Magaba oversaw). When Magaba’s husband was 
murdered in Johannesburg seven years ago, she received his death benefit (of approximately R200 000). 
Not only did this sum help to smooth the cash flow of her business and build a comfortable homestead, it 
enabled her to support her four children and two grandchildren. An older daughter (along with two 
nieces) was attending college in Butterworth, and Magaba had paid tuition and living expenses for the 
preceding two years. Having successfully made it to their third year of study, the children secured loans 
from the state bursary scheme. Magaba had also recently acquired responsibility for a niece and nephew, 
and oversaw the construction of a mud block house for them. Finally on returning in 2010, Magaba was 
aligning herself with a proposed ‘piggery project’ being driven by an external NGO funder. She had 
already overseen the construction of a roofed piggery on her property. At the conclusion of the interview 
a fieldworker remarked that Magaba seemed to embody all the traditional rural virtues of courtliness, 
hard-work and social reciprocity. 
Thembela (Builder) 
Thembela lived with his wife and five children in a rural village where he worked as a building 
contractor. He was known to be skilled and built throughout the district, hired by villagers to build their 
houses. He built in concrete blocks, or more frequently sun-dried mud bricks, following which he laid the 
rafters and roof. A modest, single roomed house (approximately 6 x 4 meters) would cost R2500 in labour 
and takes approximately two to three weeks to complete, while a compact four roomed house cost about 
R8000- R9000.  Plastering the walls cost extra. Thembela was also able to install ceilings and electrical 
wiring. He did not draw any of his children into construction (they were reportedly schooling), so 
Thembela normally employed two assistants: one mixes the mud-mortar, the other assisted Thembela by 
handing him blocks or bricks. Each was paid R45 a day in 2007 and R50 by 2010. Thembela estimated 
that once he paid his two workers, he could hypothetically earn an average of between R900 and R2000 
during a busy month (particularly in the period from May to September before the summer rains start). 
However, this was difficult to quantify, because once they paid a deposit clients paid him irregular 
instalments, often over many months. In the past pensioners had partially paid in livestock. Finally, 
building work is seasonal, mud bricks cannot be laid during the summer rains. 
Typically the client who commissioned Thembela would be responsible for securing the plot, water (for 
the mortar) and the building materials. Concrete blocks were trucked to the village, or more commonly, 
mud bricks were made by local residents. Thembela owned scaffolding and smaller hand tools, but 
wheelbarrows, picks and spades were typically borrowed from clients. Although Thembela reported being 
able to sketch out rough plans on paper, a client typically scratched out on the ground where he wants the 
house and Thembela specified the quantities of materials required. The client (or their representative) 
would also show Thembela in-situ where the doors and windows were to go. 





In terms of his history, Thembela worked at a hardware store in Mpumalanga in the late 1980s. He was 
retrenched from this job when the store closed, but in this time had learnt all about building materials and 
how to estimate quantities. He was able to simply look at the dimensions of an envisaged structure 
scratched on the ground and specify the length of corrugated iron roofing required. Thembela served an 
informal apprenticeship of a year with a village builder, before starting to work for himself. Having no 
formal training, he reported that he ‘needs training’, or more accurately formal accreditation for the skills 
he has. He speculated that this would not only enable him to leave the village and secure better jobs, but 
he would be able to work on bigger developments such as state housing projects and schools within the 
district. 
In 2007 Thembela was quite sanguine about credit and his ability to collect it. He was willing to start 
building on credit and before getting a deposit, and received the balance in payments. He hypothesised 
that if faced with non-payment he would complain to the local chief. By 2010, he and his wife indicated 
collecting debt had become increasingly difficult, and that many people owed him money. Amongst those 
that owed him money was the governing body of a local school, for work he did on the school. He did 
little to try and collect outstanding debt, and did not go to the chief about this default. When asked about 
the difference between 2007 and 2010, he ventured that collecting credit had become more difficult (his 
wife said it was because everybody was distantly related in the village, and Thembela was scrupulous 
about not looking ‘bad’ by pursuing them for the outstanding debt. Thembela’s difficulty in collecting 
debt was sufficient to have him toy with the idea of devoting less time to building and undertaking more 
subsistence agriculture. He also mooted using his welding gear to weld burglar bars and sell them in town 
‘for cash’, so that he would not have to collect debt. 
Mamjoli (Tavern keeper, meat vendor, small scale farmer) 
Mamjoli was an elderly woman who lived in a deep rural area of the Eastern Cape, with her grandchildren 
at her rural homestead. She was relatively unusual in owning a gas-powered chest fridge/freezer, a 
valuable asset in her distant and un-electrified village. It was the key to her self-employment, as Mamjoli 
used her fridge to sell meat and beer from her rural homestead. 
The half a dozen grandchildren that lived with Mamjoli were supported by the five, distantly-resident 
grown-up children who regularly contributed to the household. Adjacent to Mamjoli was the homestead 
of an urban-employed, married son, occupied by his wife and children (viz. Mamjoli’s daughter in-law 
and grandchildren). The boundaries between the two households were somewhat porous, with the 
daughter in law and grandchildren frequently present at Mamjoli’s rural compound. 
In terms of her personal history, after being widowed as a young woman, Mamjoli spent most of her 
working life as a domestic worker in a succession of distant urban centres. During this time her mother 
helped raise the children, while Mamjoli remitted money to support them and build her current 
homestead. Her long urban employ had also given Mamjoli the social confidence, English language 
comprehension and keen eye for arbitrage, that was perhaps less evident amongst women who had never 
worked outside of the village. 






After her late 1980s retirement to the village, Mamjoli’s eldest son sent remittances from his menial job at 
a Durban supermarket, and bought her the gas-powered fridge. However when Mamjoli started receiving 
a state old age grant in the late 1990s, the pressure on both of them eased off. Her son worked fewer hours 
and cut down on his monthly remittance while he returned to night school and completed his secondary 
education. Attainment of his matric enabled him to train as a baker and steadily work his way up the 
occupational ladder. 
In the two decades since her retirement Mamjoli augmented her income by selling beer (mostly consumed 
on her premises) and meat (pre-packaged, bought from a commercial butchery in the nearest town two 
hours away). Running the fridge required the trouble and expense of procuring bottles of LPG gas; not 
only was it key to Mamjoli’s vending, it also enabled her to store perishable goods for other villagers and 
even special events at the local school. This positioned her as a powerful benefactor in the village-based 
network of social reciprocity. The enterprises profitability is difficult to calculate; in 2005 Mamjoli 
estimated she made R500 monthly from the meat retail (with the caveat that they also ate some of the 
meat within the household). Mamjoli managed the money, earmarking the returns from specific items for 
particular purposes (the ‘chicken money’ paid for the grandchildren’s school related expenses). Beer retail 
could return a profit of R500, but there were more bad debts associated with drinking customers. These 
figures had doubled by 2009. Finally Mamjoli’s older grandchildren were a key part of her economic 
activities: they helped to transport stock (on a public bus), assist customers and were occasionally 
dispatched to collect outstanding debt. 
Through the research period Mamjoli’s adult children, particularly the two with solid, middle-class jobs, 
were important benefactors to the household. They continued to support Mamjoli and the grandchildren 
and Mamjoli’s son visited at least monthly, and unfailingly with items for his mother to vend. One of 
Mamjoli’s daughters, a government employee, funded a programme of homestead rebuilding and installed 
a rain water tank. Mamjoli was mindful of her older children’s moral stake in the household too. She 
engaged in a sometimes comic process of hiding empty beer bottles (and even the patrons) if her pious, 
charismatic Christian daughter and son in law were to visit. 
Despite being obese and relatively immobile, Mamjoli presided over a vibrant ‘kitchen garden’ and some 
cultivation in the communal maize fields. The labour was supplied through a combination of her 
grandson’s efforts, and the casual agricultural labour Mamjoli hired in the village. Although the value of 
the harvested maize was close to the imputed costs (for the tractor ploughing, seed, fertilizer and hired 
labour), Mamjoli explained they had consumed ‘green mielies’ throughout the growing season. 
Observance of a traditional commitment to agriculture was also an effective way of harnessing the labour 
of her boisterous and potentially disruptive grandsons. 
By 2010 Mamjoli was selling less beer, but had diversified into brandy sales (despite her low opinion of 
brandy and brandy drinking in general), while she continued to oversee agricultural production. Her eldest 
son had engaged a ‘herd boy’ to look after their eight head of cattle, while Mamjoli had acquired several 
pigs. With her various income streams: earnings, and remittances Mamjoli reported that her state old age 





grant was being spent on funeral insurance, some groceries, and ‘smaller things’ (including sugar, 
toiletries and the irregular amounts required by the various grandchildren attending school). 
Magalama (Cooldrink vendor) 
Magalama was a retired domestic worker, who sold bottles of carbonated cool drink (Coke) from her very 
comfortable, even comparatively prosperous, looking rural homestead. Morbidly obese and unable to 
move easily, she effectively constituted a single person rural household. Although she had two, 
remittance-sending urban based sons, they seldom visited. Magalama was unusual in that her small 
household was relatively unchanging in size, not even displaying evidence of the annual Christmas return 
migration. Throughout the course of the research (2007-2010) Magalama hired a succession of caregivers 
to help her with domestic tasks around the house. 
Magalama’s cool drink vending was facilitated by the acquisition of a refrigerator, which in turn, was 
enabled by four related factors: her accrued savings from many years of urban domestic worker 
employment, a solid remittance from her sons (at least R500 a month), the receipt of a state old age grant 
and the electrification of the village. Magalama’s cool drink vending is less remarkable for its returns, 
than the fact that it has persisted for several years despite its miniscule scale. Magalama routinely sells a 
single case a month (viz. 12 bottles), yielding a profit equivalent to no more than five percent of the value 
of her state old age pension. Yet she continued to engage in the activity, because of the steady trickle of 
visitors it elicited. 
Magalama’s regular church attendance and her vending drew her into the social networks of a village 
where she was neither long-resident nor particularly well-established socially (She only moved there on 
her retirement from the city, having paid the local headman for the site). This potentially served to deflect 
some of the suspicion, or even jealousy that she might otherwise have attracted. 
Despite her physical limitations Magalama also engaged in petty agricultural production, relying 
exclusively on hired labour for the manual work. Early in the research process she reared chickens, but 
when all her birds were claimed by an infectious disease she gave up on replacing them with more chicks. 
With regards to her rain-fed crop production (vegetables and maize), the research team’s calculations 
suggested that, at best, she was breaking even (i.e. the imputed cost of the outputs matched her inputs). In 
an unfavourable, drought year she would effectively lose money. Yet when questioned about this 
marginal farming by proxy, she impatiently explained to the research team (in English), ‘it is our 
tradition’. However, it was apparent that offering fellow villagers casual employment (with payment in 
cash or in-kind) was used to channel their requests for material assistance. This enabled her to both 
respond to, yet simultaneously limit, their claims on her. Rather than just giving the other villagers 
portions of her income, she was harnessing her cash and their sweat in agricultural production. 
Finally, in the course of the research, Magalama hired a series of young women (and then surprisingly) a 
young man to assist her with domestic tasks around the house. Often rather reticent in the presence of the 
research team, they were important purveyors of the care work and labour required in a rural setting. 






Sipho (Welding business operator) 
Sipho was an articulate young man in his 30s who operated a welding business in the small town of 
Mount Frere. Employing two Swazi welders, Sipho’s enterprise fabricated a variety of products on 
clients’ requests. These included driveway gates, burglar bars and security gates, TV stands, the frames 
for cages for chickens (to be covered with mesh) and toilets (a welded steel frame with a door, clad in 
corrugated iron, to put over a pit latrine). The enterprise occupied a prime location alongside the main 
road through the town, and work was largely conducted under the veranda of a derelict, roofless house. 
The rented site had electricity which powered the arc-welder and the hand-held power tools. However in 
the absence of secure storage, the welders took the tools home with them (the heavy arc-welder in a 
wheelbarrow), while their unfinished work was chained down nightly. 
Like Sipho the two Swazi welders were relatively youthful, however they deferred to him in the research 
interviews. Their poor isiXhosa language skills clearly marked them as outsiders and somewhat marginal, 
in a context where isiXhosa is the most widely spoken language. The welders were paid bi-weekly or 
monthly, receiving a ‘stipend’ (Sipho’s word) for work done, rather than a fixed salary (they essentially 
work on a ‘piece-rate’ schedule for work completed). The first man had learnt to weld while working at a 
large general dealer store in town; he then left to work for a small scale welding contractor, until recruited 
by Sipho several months earlier with the promise of higher commissions. However the past four months 
had been particularly quiet, the first man ruefully noted. He had taught his compatriot how to weld, so 
neither man had any formal qualification. 
Well versed in business jargon, Sipho spoke of the ‘synergies’ between the welders and himself and 
explained his role was to ‘make the business grow’. Sipho’s energies were focused on canvassing for new 
business, applying for tenders (mainly securing schools with burglar proofing) and liaising with clients. 
This was alongside the considerable time and effort he devoted to engaging with local patronage networks 
and with the scantly local state-funded business support services. 
In terms of his personal history, Sipho came from a comparatively elite middle-class homeland family 
(his father was a policeman) and completed his secondary schooling at a moderately prestigious former 
Transkei-era school. He studied commerce subjects at a regional technikon, and attained a marketing 
qualification at another institution. He returned unemployed to Mount Frere in 2003, and became 
variously involved with a branch of the local ANC, a local ‘youth council’ and was a member of a ‘youth 
project’ that was focused on agricultural production. Questioned on his agricultural ambitions, the dapper 
and urbane Sipho reported he was part of the ‘organizing committee’, rather than a regular member 
toiling in the fields. The aspirational Sipho was clearly seeking to ally himself with local opportunities for 
social mobility, on a terrain between the state and the market. 
Much of Sipho’s more recent efforts had been directed at securing funding (he had approached SEDA 
recently who assisted with marketing and signage), and had secured ECDC (Eastern Cape Development 
Corporation) support to develop a business plan. Sipho identified the ‘toilets’ (outhouse buildings for pit 
latrines) sold by local large hardware stores as a potentially viable product to develop. The existing units 





on sale at the hardware stores in the town were apparently trucked down from distant Johannesburg and 
sold for between R600 to R800 (R1200 if galvanized). These were prices Sipho felt he could comfortably 
undercut. Hence his ambition was to secure R100 000 of credit to buy materials in bulk (primarily steel, 
corrugated iron, mesh and welding consumables), produce the toilets and sell them to the hardware store. 
Significantly he did not plan to vend these items directly, seemingly keen to avoid having to deal with 
customers and credit. 
The loquacious Sipho had a keen sense of the need to look ‘professional’, and spoke of the enterprise in 
ways that invoked the template of a more formal enterprise (he described discussing the ‘vision’ and 
‘mission’, and weekly feedback sessions with his two welding ‘partners’). In the short time he had rented 
the present site for a monthly rental of R1000, he (more precisely the welders) fenced it, welded an 
elaborate gate and cleared the yard of the undergrowth and saplings. They did however struggle with the 
weak electricity supply. With poorly enforced by-laws, Sipho did not think that the absence of a permit or 
permission from municipality was especially problematic, yet he had reportedly registered the enterprise 
and sought to obtain a VAT registration number. Sipho used his brother’s vehicle to transport materials 
and completed products, and continued to maintain close links to his parental home. 
Sipho had not yet developed a catalogue but he and the others routinely sketched designs (for gates) or 
took potential customers to other sites to show them completed work. In their relatively short history they 
had encountered problems with collecting credit from clients, including an elderly man who was a family 
friend of Sipho’s. Despite the exchange of recriminations and a letter of demand, Sipho had not pursued 
the defaulting client as vigorously as possible (i.e. small claims court) because the debtor was elderly, and 
well-respected in the community. All three members of the enterprise, having suffered the consequences 
of non-payment, were very circumspect about granting credit. 
Zanele (Cooked food vendor) 
Zanele was a young woman in her late 20s who ran a small food stall from a small steel shipping 
container, alongside the main road in the small town of Mount Frere. She served a plate of well prepared 
food (including a meat, a starch, vegetables and gravy) at R20 for a ‘full plate’ (R15 for a small plate) to 
her patrons seated around the stall on plastic garden chairs. When first interviewed in 2009 she had been 
running the business for only several weeks. 
Zanele was an enthusiastic cook and had both a collection of recipes and selection of bottled herbs (unlike 
many other takeaway food outlets that simply season food with salt or Aromat). In the time she had been 
running her informal restaurant she essentially planned her menu around the daily purchase of the two 
live chickens that she slaughtered and cooked (live chickens, particularly ‘spent-hens’ from the poultry 
industry are commonly sold by informal vendors along Mount Frere’s main road). Zanele was unusual in 
keeping very accurate records of her daily sales (a skill she had previously learnt during a municipality 
endorsed furniture-making course, although she never produced furniture). Excluding the costs of the gas 
used as fuel and the vegetables, Nonelwa recorded returns varied from R100 to a maximum of R340, with 






an average of approximately R180. From this she budgeted a weekly sum of R200 on a cylinder of LPG 
(liquid petroleum gas). 
Zanele’s patrons included both transient visitors to town (she was adjacent to a busy petrol station), and 
regular, often formally employed workers from the town centre. Although she made attempts to market 
her business (by erecting a few posters in town), she relied heavily on word of mouth referrals from her 
customers. She rented her shipping container premises for a sum of R500 monthly and collected water 
from a tap at an adjacent carwash. She had no business license, nor had she had any dealings with 
municipal environmental health officials. She knew little about the vending stalls recently built by the 
local municipality, but thought them ill-positioned and imagined they would have long waiting lists to 
acquire one. She aspired to gaining an electrical connection (and had already made inquires) to run a 
microwave oven and kettle, but the costs were prohibitive at this stage. Zanele was also contemplating 
engaging an employee in order to diversify into sandwiches and cool drinks (perhaps sold directly at 
business premises). 
Zanele generally did not give credit, but as it drew near to the end of the month she occasionally extended 
some credit to her regular, formally employed customers such as teachers, especially if they arrive after 
15h00 when she knew she was likely to be straddled with unsold food. 
In terms of her history, Zanele never completed her matric and hailed from a modest village family 
background. She previously worked as a cook in another container restaurant further down the road. As 
an employee she earned R150 for a six day week (R600 monthly), working from 7am to 5pm on 
weekdays. She left this job because of the low earnings and conflicts with her previous employer (who 
dismissed her). Zanele was pleased to describe how several of her former customers followed her, 
complaining that the food was not the same since she left. In addition she earned more money than she 
did previously. Zanele was circumspect on how she secured the capital to start her business, including  
purchasing the kitchen items she needed (gas stove, pots, kitchen supplies, etc.), but explained that one of 
her customers saw her working, questioned her on what she wanted to do, and asked her if she wanted her 
own business. This benefactor was neither a relative, nor did he require the R1000 advanced returned, she 
coyly answered (A fieldworker understood this mysterious benefactor to be a boyfriend, but her reticence 
and the demands of decorum meant this issue was left relatively unexplored). 
An important part of Zanele’s self-presentation was her courtly and respectable demeanour. Not only was 
she a regular churchgoer, she was a member of a local choral choir and practiced daily. She supported 
several younger siblings who resided with their grandmother back at their village, and indicated her 
mother died several years before. Zanele was therefore an important breadwinner in the household, and 
one who regularly returned to her village family while living in a rented room in Mount Frere. By 2010, 
Zanele had hired a helper, but under unfavourable conditions. She had grown ill with hepatitis-like 
symptoms, and hired an employee for a short period while she was in hospital and during a long 
recuperation, before her being able to return to her stall. 





Malusi (Tavern owner, taxi operator, builder) 
Malusi was a man in his early 40s who resided in a village on the outskirts of the small rural town of 
Mount Frere. Malusi had a varied history of self-employment, including running a tavern (a formalized 
shebeen), a taxi and a construction business. His core activity (running uninterrupted from 1999 to 2009), 
had been a busy shebeen. The location of the tavern intermittently shifted between an older house (which 
Malusi inherited) and a newer structure he had built and used as a family home. It was the tavern which 
had been run in conjunction with a range of other activities over the years, including a rural bakkie (pick 
up truck) based taxi (quqa) and contract construction work. 
With a family background amongst the former homeland petty-elite, Malusi completed his schooling in 
distant urban centres. He obtained a post-school course in aspects of project management, before working 
in a series of fairly menial administrative jobs in Johannesburg for most of the 1990s. Returning to Mount 
Frere, and having inherited property on the communal land of the village, he opened his tavern. A busy 
establishment, it could retail 30 to 60 (when busy) cases of beer a week, along with spirits and industrially 
brewed, cheap sorghum beer. Malusi claimed the tavern could make R4000 profit a month (including 
sales on credit) and easily tripled this sum during the busy Christmas holiday period. Malusi described the 
tavern as licensed but indicated he had been fined for licensing infractions in the past. A major challenge 
he faced was to upgrade the dilapidated building so that it continued to attract salaried middle class 
patrons (teachers, policeman, etc.) and also met license requirements (separate toilet facilities, fire 
extinguishers, etc.). In terms of labour the shebeen was variously run by Malusi, his public-sector 
employed wife, or alternatively paid labour. Malusi had previously used kin labour (cousins), but they had 
twice absconded with the takings and were the subject of bitter enmity. At the time Malusi was paying a 
non-kin employee a reported monthly wage of R900 to tend it. 
Around 2005 Malusi purchased a bakkie, but unable to keep up the monthly payments he surrendered it to 
the bank a few months later. He again used income from the tavern to purchase a bakkie in 2007, and the 
vehicle was extensively used including as a quqa for several years until being irreparably damaged in an 
accident. 
In 2008 Malusi began to style himself as a builder, and started tending for the smaller but potentially 
lucrative local government contracts. With little building experience, but with access to local elite 
networks, some capital and a vehicle, he simply hired a builder to physically do the work. He described 
how during this busy period of running three enterprises he would load alcohol in the early morning for 
his tavern, take some passengers into town and go onto a construction site with the same vehicle, until he 
acquired a cheaper second hand car. At this point he hired a driver for the quqa at a weekly wage of 
R250, until the loss of the vehicle. 
The business accounts for the three enterprises were not kept separate, and income from one business 
would be channelled as operating capital for the others. Distrustful of formal bank accounts, he conducted 
much of his business in cash. Since recently closing his construction business, Malusi turned his attention 
to the outstanding tax bill (of about R14 000) and weighed the pragmatic prospect of declaring himself 
bankrupt to escape it. 






The labour of Malusi’s wife was an important part of the household livelihood strategy. In 2003 with the 
tavern established, he paid for his wife to complete an ‘ambulance attendant’ (a basic paramedic) course 
in KwaZulu-Natal. After a year of unemployment, she secured a job locally with the provincial health 
department. Her solid and regular income was an important part of the household’s income stream and 
was often diverted into running the various enterprises (such as sourcing stock, paying fines or repairing 
vehicles). 
Finally, Malusi was regarded as a somewhat shrewd business person, and sought out by kin and 
neighbours for advice. Furthermore he was politically active, but although he had toyed with the idea of 
standing for local government elections, his candidacy was made difficult by his slightly disreputable 
occupation of selling alcohol. 
Zungiswa (Tractor ploughing contractor) 
A man in his late 20s Zungiswa lived at his parents village homestead and worked as a ploughing 
contractor in the surrounding village using the family tractors. His father and mother worked as a 
technician and nurse at a local state hospital, and the comparatively prosperous looking household owned 
a double cab bakkie, along with two tractors, a tractor-drawn trailer and an assortment of agricultural 
implements. The ploughing enterprise was strongly seasonal, and saw the tractors used to plough fields 
for agricultural production (maize, vegetables) in the spring and summer months (from September to 
December), whereas in the quieter winter month they ploughed fields for potato production, mud brick 
production and hauled sand for building. The summer months were extremely busy and the working days 
long, but in winter the tractors would sit idle for several days at a time. 
Zungiswa operated one of the tractors, but was regularly assisted by his brother and a paid employee 
(recruited from a nearby village). The summer working day extended from 06h00 to 19h00 (and typically 
saw them swop shifts at 13h00). Zungiswa explained that both he and his brother had a regular car license 
(‘code 08’) but not the specific license required to drive a tractor. As they seldom drove on tarred public 
roads he did not view this as much of a problem. The third employed driver had no license at all. 
Customers typically approached them to plough or supply sand. Sand cost R600 to R800 (depending on 
the distance) for approximately two tons delivered with the tractor drawn trailer from the district’s rivers. 
For ploughing Zungiswa typically examined the area in question and then quotes a price. A small 
homestead garden (perhaps the size of a large suburban plot) could be done in as little as 15 minutes and 
cost R200. A large field could take 30-60 minutes to plough. Travel to a distant site and burning 
expensive diesel would increase the price, but Zungiswa was prepared to negotiate keener prices if a 
group of people in a locale arranged for him to work with minimal wasted travel. 
Zungiswa extended little credit (unless a person was well known to them), due to the difficulty in 
collecting it. They often got paid in cash, but customers frequently deposited money in the bank account 
of his father. During a long summer day a single tractor could consume R900 worth of fuel, but brought 





in returns of R2000 to R3000. Although there were other tractor owners in the district and they competed 
on price, Zungiswa emphasised the skill required to plough correctly so that all the sod is turned and no 
grass visible. 
Operating the tractor not only required skilled, but ongoing maintenance. While his father had previously 
owned tractors, both of the current machines were bought second hand in 1997 for between R85 000 and 
R75000 (the second as a back-up, and because his father received very favourable payment terms). 
Zungiswa undertook not just the routine maintenance, but could also do extensive repairs on the engine. 
He had a range of specialist tools (such as torque wrench and ring puller). He also had some uncompleted 
formal technical education. 
Zungiswa firmly resisted describing himself as employed in a family business; instead he explained he 
was helping his family. Accordingly, his father did not pay him as an employee but ‘takes him as their 
child’ and gave him money when he wanted something. Zungiswa clarified that he neither drank nor 
smoked, so his needs were modest.  Significantly Zungiswa was the eldest son, and according to the local 
mores of primogeniture he would stand to inherent his father’s estate (his efforts would therefore 
effectively build a household he had a stake in). 
When asked about his aspirations, Zungiswa explained he wanted to get a job (distinct from his current 
occupation of ‘helping of his family’), and he wished to build his own house. He was ‘married’ 
(incompletely, having not yet paid for his bride) with his wife and a young child locally resident at his 
parents’ compound. Zungiswa regularly applied for messenger or driver posts within government 
departments, advertised in the regional Daily Dispatch newspaper. He had secured an interview for a 
similar post with the police, but nothing came of it. If he were to secure a formal job, his brother or their 
employee would take over running the tractors. Zungiswa viewed secure (preferably public sector) formal 
employment as a crucial pillar of his envisaged livelihood activities. He explained ‘you cannot have an 
(informal) business until you first have an (formal) job’. 






Appendix 2 Locating the qualitative sample within the NIDS 
data 
This study sought to make use of both qualitative data from our own fieldwork, and quantitative data 
from the NIDS dataset. In addition, however, some quantitative data were collected from the ‘qualitative 
sample’, the main purpose being to see how well our qualitative sample matched the NIDS data (i.e. in 
respect of informally self-employed blacks residing in South Africa). These quantitative data were 
collected using selected NIDS questionnaire modules, by a survey company that actually participated in 
administering of the first wave of NIDS. The main differences in the ‘administration method’ between the 
capturing the quantitative data from our sample of 30 (mainly) qualitative interviewees, and the NIDS 
survey, is that in the former, specific individuals were targeted, and their NIDS-style interviews were 
preceded by the qualitative interviews. In the case of applying the NIDS questionnaire modules to 
qualitative interviews, the focus was on one adult in the household rather than coverage of all of adults in 
the household as provided for in the NIDS survey. 
This part of the appendix serves to answer the question of how our qualitative sample compares and 
contrasts with the NIDS sample regarding informal self-employment. Firstly, it does not employ 
statistical tests to establish the likelihood of non-difference rather the comparison is ‘by inspection’. In 
any event, no prior claim had been made to the effect that the qualitative sample would be ‘typical’ or 
‘representative’ in a statistical fashion, rather the purpose is to obtain a  sense as to how typical or 
representative it is before assuming that there is a basis for analysing the qualitative data together with the 
quantitative data from NIDS. The main conclusion in this respect is that such a basis is adequately 
established. 
The first thing to notice is that the qualitative sample in fact did not focus exclusively on the informally 
self-employed, using our own operational definition of registration for tax to signal formality. Within our 
sample of 30, three (10%) indicated that they were in fact registered for tax, and for six (20%) no answer 
was recorded. To see if the operational definition applied to the NIDS data also makes sense in the 
context of our qualitative interviewees, we show below the average self-employment income 
differentiated by registration status (for the qualitative sample, the number of useable observations is 
indicated in square brackets). The general finding is that difference is in the same direction(i.e. those who 
are registered earn significantly more from their self-employment than those who are not). Something of a 
question mark arises regarding the qualitative sample however, in that those for whom the registration 
status is not clear earn quite a bit more than those who are not registered (though less than those who are), 
suggesting that as a whole the qualitative sample might have erred in the direction of formal self-
employment. 
More importantly, perhaps, the average self-employment income of those not registered for tax is higher 
for the qualitative sample than for the NIDS sample(i.e. R5051 versus R2413). This is probably an 





indication of the fact that the qualitative sample tended to gravitate towards relatively better-off 
informally self-employed individuals, driven by the fact that the research team tended to seek a diverse 
collection of informal self-employment activities rather than a ‘representative sample’, the latter of which 
is characterised by a higher proportion of petty traders than the former. In our view, this is a defensible 
and justifiable difference, given the objectives of the study. The fact that the means are shown twice for 
the NIDS sample(once using the data ‘as is’, and again where zeros are excluded from the calculation) 
refers to the uncertainty mentioned in the report that by and large zeros are miscoded missings. 
Table 22: Comparison of the qualitative sample and NIDS sub-sample of the self-employed, by 
formality status 
 Qualitative sample NIDS sample 
Share of 
sample 












Registered for tax 10%     30,100  [3]  12%          13,320           22,916  
Not registered for tax 70% 5,051 [10]  84%            1,461             2,413  
Missing 20%  14,333  [3]  4%            2,047             3,806  
 
Next we look at the gender breakdown of the respective samples. However, given the uncertainty 
regarding the 20% of the qualitative sample for which the formality status is uncertain, the calculations 
are done in two ways. In the first (“Excluding ‘missing’ inre tax”), the calculations take into account only 
those observations for which the response to the question regarding registration for taxes was negative; 
for the second (“Including ‘missings’ inre tax”), those observations for which this question was not 
answered are treated as though they also belong to the category of informally self-employed. The gender 
mix for both favours men, in contrast to the gender mix of informally self-employed in the NIDS sample; 
however, the gender mix for the inclusive treatment of those who failed to respond to the tax registration 
question, is close to that of the NIDS sample. On the other hand, neither rendering of the qualitative 
sample provides the same picture of men’s superior earnings from self-employment that emerges from the 
NIDS data. In any event, the main finding is that the mean and median incomes are significantly higher 
according to the qualitative sample than to the NIDS sample, again reflecting the fact that the qualitative 
fieldwork tended to embrace a richer mix of entrepreneur types than can be said to ‘represent’ the 
informally self-employed. On the other hand, in light of the preceding discussion regarding the relative 
data quality of income from different employment types in the NIDS data, it is also a possibility that the 
capture of quantitative information from the qualitative sample was less badly affected by data quality 
problems owing to the higher level of interaction with the qualitative interviews. 
  






Table 23: Comparison of the qualitative sample and NIDS sub-samples of the informally self-
employed, by gender 
 Qualitative sample NIDS sample 
Excluding ‘missings’ inre 
tax 







































Women 38%     9,342  3,600 44%   10,634  7,000 54% 1,654 400 
Men 62%     6,611  4,900 56%     7,101  5,000 46% 3,317 1,000 












Appendix 4 Data quality regarding income from informal self-
employment 
As mentioned in the report, one of the deficits of the NIDS data regarding informal self-employment is 
the relative dearth of information on income.19 This is not unique to the NIDS data. Another concern 
includes the quality of such income data as does exist, in respect of which we here explore two issues. 
The first of these two issues has to do with the apparent under-reporting of income. While by definition 
we do not know the extent of such under-reporting, we can observe some patterns that give some idea as 
to its nature. Our approach is to compare two variables from NIDS’ household questionnaires, namely, 
total monthly household income and total monthly household expenditure. There are in fact different 
versions of these, usefully made available with the NIDS dataset; the ones we draw upon are those 
without imputations, except to the extent they include mid-point income imputations for those 
respondents who preferred to select their income range from a flashcard rather than stating the amount. 
The values of these variables(namely ‘w1_hhq_incb’ and ‘w1_h_exprough’ for household income and 
expenditure, respectively) are therefore generally identical to what respondents reported, rather than being 
adjusted by the statistical team that generated some of the NIDS dataset’s derived variables. These two 
variables were then compared to one another with the idea that the more consistent and/or greater the 
discrepancy between reported expenditure and reported income, the more serious the problem with the 
accuracy of respondents’ reports, especially in respect of income. 
Of course there are good reasons why expenditure may exceed income other than an under-reporting of 
income. For one, the household may be in the process of dis-saving, perhaps because its income is 
irregular and at the time of the interview was less than its medium-term average, even though by 
definition the respondent was involved in self-employment at that moment in time. Also, it is possible 
that a household might over-state its expenditure rather than under-state its income (though it’s unclear 
why it would wish to do so). Thus a comparison of household income to household expenditure lends 
itself to different interpretations. 
Our comparison takes two forms. First, we report the share of households for whom the household’s 
monthly expenditure exceeded its monthly income by 50% or more. And second, taking together all 
households for whom expenditure exceeded income (that is, disregarding the larger number for whom 
income exceeded or equalled expenditure) we calculated the ‘over-spending’ per household, which in turn 
was compared to average household income. These calculations are done separately for different types of 
                                                      
19One theoretical remedy to compensate for missing income information that was attempted and then dismissed was to use the variable regarding 
income in the previous month together with the variable regarding the number of months out of the previous 12 during which the individual 
pursued the self-employment activity. Logically one would imagine that multiplying the one by the other would give a reasonable approximation 
of annual income. However, looking at the 243 observations for which data on all three variables was available and non-zero, it is clear that the 
correspondence is very poor, with the average ‘imputed annual’ income being on average 3.8 times as great as the reported annual income. The 
correspondence is no less poor if one confines one’s attention to those cases where the respondent reported engaging in the self-employment 
activity continuously during the previous 12 months. 






households, where we distinguish for instance between those households whose only earned income is 
from informal self-employment, and those for whom income is from regular wage employment, etc. The 
table below summarises the results. 
Table 24: Summary of findings for household 




by 50% or 
more 
Average ‘over-spending’ 
per HH (conditional) 
n 
Rand As % of 
avg. 
income 
Regular wage employment & formal self-
employment 
45% 
      
4,606  
80% 24 
Formal self-employment only 
34% 
      
4,920 
68% 45 
Casual employment only 
30% 
         
508  
37% 390 
Informal self-employment only 27% 1,013  70% 367 
Regular wage & casual employment only 27% 713  26% 163 
No employment 23% 897  49% 3,171 
Regular wage employment & informal self-
employment 
21% 1,235  38% 116 
Regular wage employment only 15% 703  21% 2,370 
 
The pattern suggests that those households with income from self-employment are especially likely to 
spend more money than they take in, and are likely to do so by a greater amount relative to their income. 
Interestingly, those households with income from formal self-employment are particularly likely to ‘over-
spend’, and for those who do so, to ‘over-spend’ a lot relative to their income. By contrast, those 
households whose only earned income comes from regular wage employment are least likely to ‘over-
spend’, and also to over-spend by the smallest proportion among those who do ‘over-spend’. The pattern 
would seem to imply that the capture of income is especially poor among those who rely either partially 
or entirely on self-employment20. The fact that ‘over-spending’ households with no reported earned 
income tend to over-spend by 49% is also food for thought, especially given the debate mentioned above 
regarding the ability of household surveys to capture the informal sector. 
                                                      
20 It also might suggest that, at least potentially, the concern among some policy-makers about the need to bring the informally self-employed 
into the tax net is misplaced relative to the likelihood that formally self-employed individuals might be abusing the tax in greater monetary terms 
if not numbers. Of course the fact that a person may under-report income on a household survey does not necessarily imply that he will do so on 
his tax returns, but the incentive to do so on the latter is obviously far greater. 





Arguably the most serious weakness of the comparisons drawn above has to do with the fact that self-
employment is often temporary, thus one would expect episodes of dis-saving during which expenditure 
exceeds income, more so certainly than the case with regular wage employment. Although the self-
employed individuals captured in the dataset were engaged in their self-employment activities at the time 
of the interview, it is conceivable that those whose activities had commenced more recently might still be 
dis-saving income they had accumulated during prior episodes of self-employment or indeed wage 
employment. In an attempt to make the comparisons more meaningful, therefore, we focus on those 
households whose members reported being self-employed for the previous 12 months.  
These results are presented in the Table 25. The table presents recalculations only for household types 
with at least some self-employment income, however some of these household types are omitted owing to 
the fact that the number of useable observations declined too far (our threshold was 20, thus for example 
results for the categories of ‘regular wage employment & formal self-employment’ are not reported 
because the number of observations fell below that). 
Contrary to expectations, households with self-employment income and whose self-employment had been 
continuous for at least the 12 months leading up to the interview, appear to have a tendency to ‘over-
spend’ (i.e. under-report income) more, both in terms of frequency and extent. The differences are, 
moreover, significant. We can only speculate as to the reason why this is the case(one possible 
explanation is that those whose self-employment activities have continued for longer are more likely to be 
concerned that they are not complying with tax requirements, and by extension are more cagey in 
responding to a household questionnaire). In any event, this dispels our concern that the relatively high 
incidence of ‘over-spending’ among those households engaged in self-employment was merely an artefact 
due to the inconstancy of self-employment activities. 
Table 25: Household ‘over-spending’ for households with 
self-employment income and for whom the self-





by 50% or 
more 
Average ‘over-
spending’ per HH 
(conditional) 
n 





Unspec. period self-employed  34%         4,920 68% 45 
12+ month self-employed 37% 8,502 89% 22 
Informal self-employment 
only 
Unspec. period self-employed  27%         1,013  70% 367 
12+ month self-employed 32%         1,822 150% 127 
Regular wage 
employment & informal 
self-employment 
Unspec. period self-employed  
 
21%         1,235  38% 116 
12+ month self-employed 22%         1,884 47% 35 
 
